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A PROCEDURAL DISCOURSE GENERATION






A model is presented for the interactive generation of discourse
in a clearly defined area of verbal behaviour(of interest in its own
right) in procedural rather than purely descriptive terms.It is built
up from an examination of the relation between form and function in
the recorded data(fairly informal games of 'Twenty Questions* in
Lnglish and three other contrasting languages) for evidence of -and
justification for - the some sixty discrete discourse acts involved.
The latter are then treated as complex input-output processing units
called 'demons' operating within context formalizations termed 'frames*.
The relationship between this procedural approach and descriptive
discourse analysis and speech act theory is continually assessed.This
discourse component is subsequently integrated with components dealing
with sentence generation and game strategies to produce a complete
model(incorporating syntax,semantics and pragmatics) whose operation
is illustrated diagramatically for selected games.It is compared with
a simplified but working program for IWenty Questions,and an attempt
is made to test some of the rules embodied in the model.The methodo¬
logy behind the thesis is a synthesis of approaches from Artificial
Intelligence and Cognitive Psychology as well as from within Linguis¬
tics itself.The belief is that such an integrative project is a step
towards a theory of context-specific Pragmatics meaningful to all
three disciplines.
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ilie present work is an attempt to build up a plausible model of the
linguistic and psychological processes behind the behaviour exhibited by
speaker-hearers in a specific discourse situation.Although it is in prin<-
ciple difficult to model such intentional behaviour accurately for typic¬
ally free conversational dialogue,it is possible to approach objectivity
by choosing a domain of discourse so defined by rules that the motivation
behind individual utterances is maximally transparent.'Twenty Questions'
has been chosen as such a domain,of interest in its own right.
This widely known game is played by two players - the questioner and
the answerer.The latter thinks of a particular object(or,in the laboratory
recording session^is given it on a slip of paper)and states whether it is
'animal,mineral or vegetable'.The questioner then has a maximum of twenty
yes/no questions('game questions') -to which the answerer must reply - in
order to guess what the object is.This alternation of questions and answ¬
ers constitutes the basic structure of the game.The answerer is obliged to
reply 'yes' or 'no* if he can,though in practice there is much 'hedging'
of answers,and 'clues' can be given if the questioner appears to be in
difficulty.Exchanges concerning the count or the 'legality' of a question
(or clarity of an answer),etc.,are also liable to occur at any point.The
function(communicative purpose) of any utterance within the game context
is generally quite clear - the two most common being,obviously,'game
question' and 'answer'.Other common functions of utterances within the
game can be given similarly transparent labels,e.g. 'request rephrase',
•object','request confirmation*,or 'prompt';such functions I shall call
'discourse acts'.Although the choice of a fixed set of such labeled units
does require - due to overlap and differing level; of generalization -more
objective criteria than this intuitive classification(these are discussed
in the first two chapters),it presents no particular problem for analysis.
iVhere matters do become more complex is in relating such functions to
specific linguistic form. ITiis traditional linguistic problem is central to
the present model.claiming as it does to reflect the processes whereby the
actual utterances in the recorded games were produced and not stopping
short at the point of modelling the bare intentions to produce such and
such a type of utterance.The model purports to explain how the hearer re¬
cognizes the function intended by any such utterance(as well as how the
speaker chooses to formulate it as he does),and this recognition clearly
must in some sense come via its form,the arrangement of words of which it
consists.This i3 simple enough in cases where form and function correspond
in a direct fashion(e.g. when a game question is formulated in interroga¬
tive form:'Is it the Queen?'),but where they don't(e.g. a game question
in declarative form:'It's the QueenEither considerations become crucial.
Functions such as those mentioned above have traditionally been dis¬
cussed within linguistics(and the philosophy of language) in terras of
•speech acts•.Austin,whose 1962 volume can be said to have initiated
this line of inquiry in its modern form,distinguished between what he
termed the 'illocutionary' and the 'perlocutionary' aspects of the func¬
tion of utterances.By the former(what he called an 'illocutionary act')
he meant the function conventionally performed 'in* producing an utterance
type by virtue of its linguistic form -e.g. asking a question or making
a statement.A 'perlocutionary act',on the other hand,was what one might
perform 'by* producing an utterance - as a secondary effect upon the hea¬
rer less directly dependant upon any particular linguistic form,e.g. con-
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vincing or annoying him.Following his lead,such philosophers as Grice,
Strawson and Searle have all concentrated exclusively on the illocutionary
aspect of the function of sentence-length utterances,either formulating the
notion in terms of speakers' communicative intentions(conveyed via conven¬
tional linguistic forms) or,in the case of Searle,whose seminal book on
speech acts(1969) first welded a complete coherent theory in this field,
in terms of 'felicity conditions' adhering to individual functional acts.
These defining features of speech acts are divided into 'essential* con¬
ditions,where by utterances of a certain formal type are taken to 'count
as' such and such a conventional act;'propositional content' conditions
constraining the content of utterances performing the act;and 'sincerity'
and 'preparatory* conditions concerning such matters as the belief states
and wishes of the participants and the current feasibility of the act.Searle
defines these conditions for a handful of basic speech acts such as 'Ques¬
tion' ,'State','Bequest' and 'Command•.The felicity conditions for the first
of these,for example,are:(1)the utterance must count as a question(essent-
ial);(2)the speaker doesn't know the answer already and it is not obvious
to both speaker and hearer that he will provide the information of his own
accord at that time(preparatory);and (3) the speaker wants the information
(sincerity);there is no constraint on the propositional content.
In effect,however,such speech acts are context-free abstractions(free
from any particular context within an ongoing discourse),and in analysing
*Both kinds of act can be intentional,note;the distinction has never been
defined in a fully satisfactory manner.I take it that the crucial point
is their differing relationship to linguistic form.
actual sequential discourse the situation is not so straightforward,since
one soon comes upon dozens,if not hundreds,of distinct functions,none of
which is as clearly linked to a particular linguistic form as,say,Searle's
'Question' act is to interrogative syntactic form.Recognition of the force
(intended function) of such acts would seem to depend much more on propo-
sitional content and expected response sequences within the given discourse
context - such as the expectation of a suitable answer following a game que
stion in TVventy Questions.For this reason,the emphasis in the present con¬
text-specific model is on the perlocutionary effect on the hearer of indi¬
vidual discourse acts,these latter being complex communicative functions
embodying both illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects.Illocutionary force
is taken to be a special case of perlocutionary force where there is a def¬
inite relation between the function of the utterance and the linguistic
form(s) realizing it.Such a case would be the discourse act of 'Request
information *(corresponding to Searle's 'Question'),which is typically ex¬
pressed by an interrogative utterance(e.g. 'Is that ten or eleven?'),as
opposed to that labeled 'Give Kelp',which can be realized in a wide vari¬
ety of form types,including such utterances as 'What else is made of paper?
and 'It's part of a human being'.
vVhereas Chapter One addresses the question of deriving rules from the
data to relate discourse acts such as 'Game Question'(distinguished from
'Request Information' by specific propositional content constraints and
the additional consequence of increasing the game count by one) with
linguistic forms realizing them,Chapter I\vo is concerned with 'response
sequence' rules between these acts.These prove to be crucial (along with
propositional content)in justifying a cetegorization of discourse acts for
the data.Thus one finds,besides the basic question-answer sequence for the
game,such typical sequences(where the first act sets up the expectation
for the second) as 'Request Rephrase'—^ 'Rephrase':
(c<:Is it something like an electricity pylon?)
^ :VVhat do you mean 'like an electricity pylon?
ok'Is it an electricity pylon?
Or 'Offer Help' » 'Accept Help':
c* :Should I give you a clue now?
£ :Yes please.
ITiis leads naturally to the consideration (in Chapter Three) of indirect
realizations of a discourse act by forms typically associated with other
functions.I have already mentioned the common case in the data where a game
question is realized by a declarative form.Clearly contextual expectation
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(that a new game question is going to follow an answer to the preceding
one) plus appropriate prepositional content renders initial recognition
by the hearer of the utterance as an illocutionary 'State* act superfluous.
As an example of a linguistically 'remote' discourse act which is typically
realized indirectly,consider the following exchange.where * (the answerer)
performs a 'Give tielp' act at the indicated point:*
o< :George IV Bridge?
jNoJ^Vhat's it made of?
0(1 The Forth Bridge?
:The Forth Bail Bridge.
Jue once again to tlie model's incorporation of contextual expectations it
will be found that many of the steps that Searle for instance(197Q) regards
as necessary for the hearer of such utterances to go through in order to
calculate their 'primary•(intended) force can be bypassed.Thouga a distin¬
ction between direct and indirect realizations of discourse acts is certa¬
inly required in the model,the line is drawn in a somwhat different fashion
than it is by Searle.Thus game questions in declarative form and requests
in the form of modal intorrogatives('Could you...','May i...',etc.) are
treated as direct realizations of the acts in question.The realization rules
for the model's discourse acts include only the most conventional formulae
associated with the acts:recognition of the force of more indirect realiz¬
ations has to draw upon local context in the game and general conversatio¬
nal principles,such as Grice's maxim of 'relevance'.whereby the hearer can
expect the speaker's utterance to be relevant to the current situation.
Ihis approach allows us furthermore to unravel eoimionly occurring 'blends',
in which one utterance can be seen to realize more than one discourse act
at a time.
ihe game of Itoenty Questions as described above constitutes a definite
discourse context with a recognizable structure.Itecognition by a discourse
participant that this context pertains to the ongoing dialogue will obvio¬
usly simplify the processing he lias to do on his interlocutor's utterances
to determine their force. Ihe question now a rises as to how to formalize
and integrate this contextual knowledge into the model.Existing techniques
of discourse analysis can be brought to bear in describing the structure
of typical games,but the problem is somewhat different if one wishes to
construct a model that purports to show how such games could actually be
produced by two interacting speaker-hearers.In particular.it is found(in
*
The questioner knows the object is all metal,which is presumably not
the case with the first named bridge.
Chapter Four)that the application of a hierarchical analysis in the man¬
ner of Sinclair and Coulth rd(1975),although adequate for games artifici¬
ally constrained to simple question-answer chains,accounts for the actual
games in the data rather poorly.This is because the recorded dialogues ex¬
hibit considerably less structure than such an analysis(based on a controll¬
ed classroom situation)presupposes.What structure they do display,apart
from the central game question- answer sequence,is best described in terms
of response sequences between particular couples(or triples) of discourse
acts.These can cut right across the pattern of alternating game questions
and answers,as can be seen in the following •excursion' inserted between
a 'recap* by the questioner and his next game question:*
c\ :You said mammal,you said found in Britain...Is that three?Four?
jp:Three,I think.No.I asked if it was alive also - so that was the fourth-
ql :That was the first one - so we've had four.
|,:vVe've had four...Hie fifth one, then,would be: is it a domestic animal?
Such excursions concerned with the current game count can be initiated by
either player,and it is not possible to relate all utterances in such a
situation produced by one player to his basic game function of guessing or
answering.lt is for similar reasons found impossible to describe the gen¬
eration of games in the data in a tree-like fashion from a single highest
node in the manner of a 'text grammar'.The central question-answer exchange
pattern of the game can indeed be treated as a 'macrostructure•,to use Van
Dijk's term(1972),but generation of actual games of Twenty Questions seems
clearly to involve the complex interaction of a number of components(inciu-
ding individually'activated'discourse act sequences),not all of which are
hierarchically organized.>
The solution that is, adopted for formalizing the I\venty Questions con¬
text is in terms of what I call 'frames'.This expression has been variously
used within Artificial Intelligence since Minsky's 1975 article as a label
for world knowledge representations ranging from the semantics of individ¬
ual English predicates to detailed action scenarios - e.g. for what one
typically 'does* in a restaurant.vVhat these have in common with my own use
of the term - and also with Goffman's sociological use of it(1974) -is the
representation of common situation types,knowledge of which must be invol¬
ved in the interpretation of utterances produced by participants in those
situations.Generally,frames(or 'scenarios',or 'scripts•)within Artificial
Intelligence consist of lists representing the most expected sequence of
events within that context -e.g.,in the restaurant case,the following items:
entering,sitting dcwn,ordering,eating,paying and leaving. In this linearity
is the answerer,trying to determine the count at that point.
they differ from the frame structure I suggest for Twenty Questions;while
the core of the game can be captured by a linear sequence of two alternat¬
ing discourse acts - which 1 term the 'Game Frame' -,the more inclusive
structure I call the 'Metaframe* fro the game is much more loosely consti¬
tuted.This contains the Game Frame as well as'slots'for a variety of other
exchange types common in the Twenty Questions context(e.g. requesting a
rephrase,giving help or determining the count).It represents the players'
knowledge of expected speech events within that context relevant to thei.
monitoring of the ongoing game and determining the force behind the other
player's utterances.Further,it acts as a 'control structure' for the pro¬
duction of their own behaviour during the game.The reason why such a stru¬
cture is necessary on the model(apart from the psychological plausibility
of human beings having representations of common interactional contexts)
can be stated in procedural terms -i.e. in terms of theoretical computer
simulation -sit simplifies the processing necessary on the hearer's part
to calculate the likely force of any utterance that doesn't fit the expe¬
cted Game Frame move.Kather than sifting through dozens of general disco¬
urse acts known to him to find one which the utterance concerned fits,he
can check first just those discourse acts in the Metaframe that he knows
to be relevant to I\vditty Questions.He need only revert to a more lengthy
analysis(in terms of conversational principles and local context)when the
utterance doesn't match at once as a conventional realization of those acts
The model is intended to be 'procedural' in the sense of representing
real-time performance processes rather than an abstract 'competence•;the
discourse acts(and their sequences) indicated in the Metaframe are subsequ¬
ently treated in Chapter Five as processing modules termed 'demons'.These
have their own activating conditions and output actions and are akin to -
but not identical with - the entities of that name within Artificial In¬
telligence. The term,as used originally by Charniak in this context(1972),
refers to a data structure(e.g. for children's parties) which is activated
by'recognition'in a text of one element of the structure(e.g. the word
•party'),causing expectations to be set up for the rest of it(e.g. presents
paper hats,etc.).In as far as recognizing an utterance as a realization of
a particular discourse act sets up the expectation of a permissible respo¬
nse sequence following it,this is analogous to the function of the demons
on the present model:they are embodiments of the discourse act intentions
derived from the data on linguistic grounds(distributional,formal and fun¬
ctional). Diagrammatical representations of a variety of 'excursions' beyond
the question-answer core of the game are presented in terms of frames and
demons to conclude the essentially linguistic first part of the thesis.
sVhat the full performance model 'looks like' then,as diagrammatically
portrayed in Chapter Six(which initiates the second part of the thesis),is
not a unitary rule list capable of describing the 'grammar' of 7\venty Que¬
stions exhaustively,but an assembly of interrelated components consisting
of sets of linguistic rules,procedural flow diagrams and the demons and
frajpes discussed above. It is the complex interaction of these components -
syntactic,semantic and pragmatic - that generates utterances corresponding
to those of the data.Each diagram(one for each utterance produced by the
questioner and answerer alternately)represents the minimal cognitive activi¬
ty on the speaker-hearer's part that could account for his production of
the utterance in question -i,e. what he must somehow know or do in order
to produce itvlhe procedural •flow'(abstracting away from any parallel pro-
cessing)proceeds from analysis by the speaker-hearer concerned of the last
utterance received and leads through the demon-and-frame system,which is
activated in such a way as to produce an appropriate utterance-in-response
in conjunction with specific linguistic rules summoned by the generation
process.
Although the model as diagrammed is essentially algorithmic(i.e. will
automatically produce well-formed sequences of utterancesiit is clear that
real games are by no means so mechanical.Consequently there is included in
the model one component which is highly 'heuristic*:it searches for a solu¬
tion of its particular goal by flexible 'trial and error'.This goal is to
decide on a suitable next game question.An examination of the data shows
(as discussed in Chapter Seven) that players typically apply a mixture of
three major strategy types in playing the game.These are: a 'top-down* str¬
ategy dividing the current search set -the class of game object candidates
as defined by the properties known at that point -by approximately two(thus
'Is it female?* following a positive answer to 'Is it human?');a 'bottom-up*
strategy making an intuitive leap to a possible candidate and asking a que¬
stion relevant to that hypothesis(e.g.•Is it the Queen?'following a hedged,
uncertain answer to 'Is she involved in politics?');and a 'useful question
type' strategy whereby a type of question known to be generally useful in
the game(concerning,for instance,profession or nationality for a human 'ob¬
ject') is asked at a suitable point.Broad world knowledge and experience
with the game is obviously involved here,but all three strategy types have
been incorporated into the model in at least a general manner.
The data on which the model is based is principally in English,but games
in Russian,Japanese and Eskimo were also recorded.This was in order to show
just what in the model was universal and what was language-specific(as con¬
sidered in Chapter Eight).In general,it can be seen that the components and
processes as modelled for English are perfectly adequate for modelling
games in the other three languages,which were chosen to display as wide
a range of language types as possible.What is dependant on the particular
language used,besides the syntactic rules concerned,is the semantic scope
of the predicates,arguments and modifiers of the propositions stored and
processed on the model,as can be seen from the effect these(with their
language-specific connotations) have on the choice of succeeding game que¬
stions. They are consequently represented as language-specific word-senses
rather than as more universal concepts.
Finally,the question of testing the model must be raised,for if it could
not predict further tokens of Twenty Questions behaviour(i.e. not be falsi-
fiable) it would be open to the charge of being merely an ad hoc reflection
of a handful of particular games.There are two approaches here,apart from
the theoretical considerations applicable to all cognitive models - namely
maximal generality and overall simplicity.coherence and plausibility.The
first approach is psychological:since no attempt has been made to model de¬
tailed processes lying beyond the production of overt discourse acts,it is
reasonable to limit the testing to that observable level,and this is what
has been done in the experiment described in Chapter Nine for eliciting
fresh data in order to validate some of the realization rules derived from
the initial data.Secondarily,the testing serves to indicate that my own intu¬
itions as to 'what is going on* in the data do not diverge significantly
from those of other observers.On the other hand,in order to justify the
whole procedural approa&li behind the thesis it must be demonstrated that at
least the core of the model - the Game Frame with its maximum of twenty
question-answer exchanges - is simulatable on the computer.For this purpose
a simplified version of the game has been implemented as an interactive pro-
gram(the computer taking the part of the questioner),and this is discussed
in Chapter Nine in relation to actual human games.In theory the entire model,
with the Metaframe and the demons it contains,is simulatable - it is intended
to be fully generative in the real-time systems sense.^The basis on which
this would have to build would be a 'core* much like that implemented in the
existing program.
Underlying the thesis as a whole is the belief that the two approaches
to discourse it attempts to integrate - that of text-based linguistic gener¬
alization-seeking and that of 'intentional' system-modelling for computer
simulation -are mutually illuminating and necessary for a coherent and empir¬
ically grounded interdisciplinary theory of pragmatics to approach the stage
of explanatory adequacy.
1
iliis presupposes the ability of the system to analyse all well-formed game
utterances as well as to produce them.
-Part One-
Chapter 1
In the present chapter we shall be concerned with the complex many-
to—many relationship between form and function exhibited by interrogat¬
ive forms in the data.The first step will be to examine the various
forms that the major sub-class of all polar questions found -namely
•game questions' - can take there,attempting to determine any functio¬
nal 'delicacy' adhering to particular forms.Conclusions as to the force
of the act involved will be drawn following an examination of the dif¬
ferent functions performed by polar interrogatives elsewhere in the data.
A preliminary matter which must be clarified is what exactly is
meant here by 'form'.As a first approximation we shall define the p©-
lar interrogative form as that of an utterance type exhibiting either
interrogative syntactic order(i.e.,for English,having the constituent
structure auxiliary verb plus noun phrase plus verb and/or complement)
or interrogative intonation(some kind of terminal rise symbolized by
'?'),or both.Examples will be discussed that fulfil neither of these
criteria but are nevertheless understood as 'game questions' in context;
this phenomenon will be attributable in part to contextual expectations
and in part to prepositional content. Constraints on the latter can be
characterized as follows:to count as a 'game question' a polar interro¬
gative must(a) refer directly or indirectly to the unknown object(or
some property of it or class to which it belongs),and(b) presuppose
an answer that can be seen,in a broad sense,to help the questioner to¬
wards his goal of guessing what the object is.
The game question types presented below are not absolutely mutually
exclusive,as one utterance may sometimes combine elements of more than
one type.But a distinct type has been postulated wherever at least two
exemplars of a form were encountered containing a single formal marker
that distinguished it from 'basic' type (a)when the presence of that ma¬
rker could be related to a distinct 'prepositional attitude'(or discou-
rsal context) on the part of the speaker.Debated or disguised game que¬
stions, though mentioned tangentially,are not included - nor are non-
polar questions that the answerer let pass.A few examples of each type
are given,plus pre-theoretical comments{precise contexts can be found
^Constraints on prepositional content will also be treated as within
the domain of 'form'.
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in the Appendix under the game number indicated.
(a)Interrogative syntax plus interrogative intonation(the 'basic1
form)
Game 3: 'Is it female?'
Game 3: 'Does it have two legs?'
Game 49:'Is the vegetable some kind of plant?'
This is the most wide-spread form fulfilling the (printed) instru¬
ctions to ask only yes/no questions.Hiere would appear to be no constr¬
aints on when it can be employed:all and any game question could have
been asked this way.There is also a version of this form with what ap¬
pears to be declarative intonation,giving a more peremptory or 'dista¬
nced' effect,as if the questioner is less in doubt about the answer,but
this is largely a personal stylistic matter,a plane on which there aje
various more subtle modulations of the 'basic* intonation of interroga-
tives which cannot be treated here.
(b)Oeclarative syntax plus interrogative intonation
Game 33: 'It contains things which might belong to individuals?'
Game 4: 'It's a form of mass media or something?'
Game 4: 'They partially enter it?'
This form is more commonly elided as in (d),but is occasionally fou¬
nd either following a hint or suggestion from the answerer,as in the fi¬
rst Game 4 example(thus having something in common with the 'inferencing'
form (h) below),or in a context where it immediately follows a question
plus negative answer of analogous propositlonal content(e.g. about the
content of the object in the Game 33 example).In the second example from
Game 4 both conditions apply:the previous question was 'Do people enter
it?' and the answer was 'Not exactly'(a hedge which is also a hint).Mo¬
reover, in this example,it is not clear whether the question was in fact
counted as a game question(the players were lax about keeping count
in this game),though it could certainly be seen as an attempt to get
further useful information from the answerer.This does not moan it was
necessarily a conscious trick on the part of the questioner;she might
simply have responded 'automatically' to an unclear answer by a request
for expansion/clarification(an act we shall come across later),forgett¬
ing that she was running the risk of having it count as a further game
question.
These examples serve to point out the difficulties that arise in
trying to assign precise discoursal(and cognitive) conditioning feat¬
ures to particular forms within a functional set.At this level of
delicacy there would appear to be a number of such conditions occuring
in a given context,some competing for different forms of realization
(e.g. snappy versus hesitant performance),others cooperating for the
production of the same formCe.g. repetition of analogous propositional
content and snappy performance both leading to elided forms).xtesolution
often seems to be effected by some kind of blending of forms.In parti¬
cular there appears to be a continual competition between 'basic' form
(a) (related directly to the game rules) and other forms evoked by more
general - and subtle - discourse factors of propositional attitude,etc.
The question of multiple speech act functions borne by one utterance
will be returned to in Chapter 3.
(c)Beclarative syntax plus declarative intonation
came 3: 'It's a man.'
Game 18: 'It's the railway one.'
As with (b) above this form is much rarer than its corresponding
elided form since the disceursal factors conditioning its use overlap
with the latter:both forms are found in 'snappy' sequences of questions
and answers/This form also appears to be used when the questioner is
particularly sure of his hypothesis - it is less tentative than corre¬
sponding questions with interrogative intonation(thus,in the Game 3
example the questioner knows that the object must be one of two bridges
only).But such 'aureness' may also be relatable to personality factors
and subsequent stylistic pref rencea on the questioner's part.tfhat is
interesting is how such utterances - questions in the form of state¬
ments - are recognized as such by the hearer.Clearly his expectation
of a question in that discourse 'slot' plus the propositional content
of the utterance overrides its formal features;i.e. interrogative mark¬
ing is rendered redundant in such contexts.
(d)Blided versions of (a),(b).or (c)
G.4: 'An instrument?'
G.3; 'Or the acting profession in general?'
G.3S: 'Human animal?'
G.31: 'A particular person in the department.'
G.31: 'Male?'
G.23: 'Nose?'
*i.e. the more specific function(s) performed by utterances of a
certain form within a larger functional set(Halliday's term)
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Forms such as the above are found widely throughout the data,and
the conditions attending their appearance are readily statable:if the
syntactic form of (a) - or (b) or (c) - was used in at least the most
recent preceding question(which is nearly always the case),without the
intervention of 'excursion1 sequences,an elided form can always be used
for the next question(and any subsequent ones presupposing the same el¬
ided material).This is particularly likely in rapidly moving,'snappy'
games or episodes of games.The only constraint appears to be that the
first question of a game is not usually elided - unless it follows imm¬
ediately the answerer's statement of 'animal,mineral or vegetable',as
in the Game 39 example.The elided material will typically include a
form of the verb 'be' plus hn expression referring to the unknown obj¬
ect (e.g. 'Is it -').What is left will be the 'new' material:the prop¬
erty or class assignment of the object being asked about.Fven the art¬
icle may be dropped from a noun phrase - as in the Game 23 example -
when delivery is particularly rapid.Sometimes it is a somewhat more com¬
plex structure that is presupposed(not repeated) as in the Game 3 ex¬
ample, where 'Is it somebody connected with the cinema?' has just been
asked and answered in the negative.-float the actually uttered 'new' ma¬
terial in this case is meant to replace the object of the predicate
'connected with',rather than the entire complement of 'Is it -',is clear
from the propositional content of the second,elided question:its refe¬
rent, the unknown object,is known by the questioner to be a person,and
the answerer knows that the questioner knows that.A major factor condi¬
tioning the choice of these forms is presumably economy of effort - in
as far as they are not entirely predictable from preceding context.
(e)aiodal versions of (a)
G.33: 'Would it contain something which I own?'
G.4: 'Would the function be related to what happens in this bui¬
lding? '
G.33: 'Can it be a cigarette packet?'
The modal element appears to add an element of tentativeneso to
the question.'Would' is more common than 'can* in this functionjthe
latter,being potentially ambiguous,has the additional interpretation
(albeit unlikely in this context) of asking whether such an object is
allowed by the rules as a possible game object. Ihe form with 'would*
may also simply be a stylistic alternate to (a),one much used by panel
members in the broadcast version of the game.
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(f) Negative versiona of (b).(c) or (d)
G.27: 'It's not ffaverley Station by any chance?'
G.4: 'It's not an atomic bomb?'
G.49: 'It's not a kind of pis?'
The negation in this form is not,strictly speaking,part of the prop-
ositional content of the questiondt could be omitted and the same
propositional content conveyed).As in (e) it marks a distinct attitude
on the part of the speaker,suggesting that the hypothesis being asked
about is rather tentative or unlikely on the face of it(it may be a
'shot in the dark'),or that the speaker thinks he has suddenly intuited
the answer and that this presumed solution is unlikely or surprising.The
implication may be(as in Game 49 where the questioner is decidedly fru¬
strated) that the presumed solution,the game object,is an unfairly dif¬
ficult one to guess and therefore that he cannot be blamed for taking
so long to get it.The answerer in turn may feel obliged to supply a
more elaborate answer than a simple 'no' if the guess is wrong - in
Game 27 this is in the form of a clue.That the questioner is having
difficulty is clear both from context and from his intonation.The 'ten¬
tative' marker 'by any chance' is not used in such cases.
(g)Tag questions
G.27: 'It's not the Forth Bridge,is it?'
G.32: 'It's the old one,is it?'
This form is not particularly common in the positive,presumably
because its primary function - that of checking/asking confirmation -
presupposes that the questioner has access to/has been given already
the information contained in the proposition,in which case the utter¬
ance wouldn't count as a game question anyway.In the Game 32 example
the utterance probably wasn't counted as one in fact,since the ques¬
tioner had just been told that the object was 'the other one'(not the
new bridge);but,strictly speaking,the questioner must actually name the
object even if it could logically only be one thing and thus it could
have been counted as a game question.Negative versions as in the Game
27 example(with positive tag)are simply extensions of form (f),the tag
stressing the attitudinal nature of the question(tentativeness ,un¬
likeliness, etc.).This form is more common in the data in attitudinally
modulated comments,or for checking on the course of the game.
(h)Questions in the form of inferences
G.41: 'So it's not an art form.'
G.35: 'So it's something that comes from an animal,not an animal
itself?'
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G.33:'So it's not a Smarties packet.'
G.31:'It can only be the Queen,then?'
This form is marked by 'inferential' conjunctions such as 'so' and
•then'.It is often used - consciously or unconsciously - by the questi¬
oner for 'pivot' questions ambiguous as to whether they constitute a
real game question or merely a case of 'thinking out loud'.drawing a
conclusion from the answerer's last reply.These 'inferences' are most
commonly in the negative,suggesting the cognitive process of narrowing
down the search set by ruling out successive candidates(see Chapter 7).
The cases we are dealing with here are clearly not examples of strict
logical entailment(as,for example,the conclusion 'It's a woman then'
following 'It's human' and 'Is it a man'->'No' in Game 42 is),other¬
wise the possibility of the utterances being taken as game questions
would not arise.Throughout the data 'natural logic' is being deployed
primarily in a mode of 'plausible deduction' rather than of strict(syll¬
ogistic) inference.Thus in the Game 31 example the questioner knows
only that the object is female,English,a public figure known by virtue
of 'what they are',and is not a writer,entertainer or politician.The
intuitional leap to 'the Queen* can in no way be explicated in terms
of logical entailment,but is still expressed in the verbal form of an
inference.The speaker draws his conclusion from - at least - his general
knowledge of (a) famous English women now living and (b) likely candid¬
ate objects for 'IWenty Questions'.In this case there can be no quest¬
ion of the speaker 'talking to himself':the intonation and volume of
the utterance is not that of a monologue,and the propositional content
is such as to elicit information that will clearly further him towards
the goal of the game.But in the Game 33 example it is^ debatable,as an
one sense the question can be seen as eliciting useful new information
('packet* as opposed to 'box') despite the answerer's prior utterance
'It doesn't contain food'.which would appear to rule out the possibi¬
lity of it being a 'Smarties packet'.A jocular argument did indeed de¬
velop about this point.Not all utterances of this form serve the same
function.Thus in Game 18 the question 'So is it flat?' is asked by the
answerer to disambiguate the questioner's last question;the inference
concerns the questioner's intentions rather than the propositional
content of the question.
(i) 'What about' interrogatives
G.41: 'iVhat about a sculpture of some sort?'
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G.15: 'What about plastic?'
Note that this form still constitutes a polar question,despite the
Wh- pronoun.lt makes a tentative suggestion as to a candidate object
(or class) fulfilling the conditions the questioner has just been con¬
sidering.Thus it is found in the context of 'thinking out loud',espec¬
ially if a list of possible candidates is being considered(as in Game
15),or of a clue(Game 41).More like a'special appeal' for further help
than a strict game quest ion,it presupposes a friendly,helpful answerer.
(j) 'Meta-queations'
G.3: 'Is it a particular person you have in mind?'
G.4: 'We're referring to a system?*
G.2: 'So you're thinking of a specific piece of rock or whatever?'
G.33: 'Do you have plastic in mind?'
This indirect way of asking a game question seems largely a styli¬
stic variant,but it may also be used,in conjunction with appropriate
intonation,in order to elicit more information out of the answerer than
a simple 'yes/no',by appealing to him to reveal something of his own
attitude/cognitive relationship to the game object.This form is not
found in the data in successive questions,nor is it used to make a
final guess as to the game object(as the last question of a game).
(k) Expanded questions
G.4: 'Does that mean only one person is able to use it?'
G.39:'By that you mean does not appear regularly on TV?'
G. 15: 'That is,is it made up of different sorts of vegetable matter?'
G.40: 'I mean is it decorative?'
These are not simple game questions but combine that function with
rephrasing the questioner's previous question or with asking confirmat¬
ion for the questioner's interpretation/expansion of the answerer's
previous answer(as in the first two examples).They are game questions
since they are attempts to elicit new useful information beyond what has
been supplied in the previous exchange.These forms are found,then,either
immediately following a question-answer exchange whose semantic content
is close to their own,the reply having been ambiguous or unsatisfactory
in some way to the questioner,or following a question of similar content
which the questioner immediately reformulates without waiting for an
answer.The initiation of the reformulation may come from the answerer
(as in Game 40),who requests a rephrase before answering the original
question.The game question is usually embedded in a higher clause with
the verb 'mean'(or contains some other'reformulation' marker such as
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'that is').
Having looked at various forms in which the function 'game question'
is realized in the data,we must ask again what it is that all of them
have in common in order for them to be recognized and counted as such.
For if one were to be 'micro-functional' about one's criteria for dist¬
inguishing speech acts it could be argued that we are dealing here with
some ten or eleven distinct acts - albeit related by some kind of'fam¬
ily reswblance' - ,since each form can be shown to relate to slightly
different attitudes/complex intentions/stylistic functions on the part
of the speaker.Going to the other extreme one could relate them(and many
others not performing the function 'game question' at all)to some general
speech act category such as 'asking a question',pointing out that they
all meet certain felicity conditions,the most basic of which is that
they all 'count as an attempt to elicit information from the hearer'(as
Searle proposes).But given that some of the forms listed above would
not meet that criterion outside of the particular context we are exam¬
ining* (and that not all 'questions' count as 'game questions'),such
a generalization is not particularly useful here.What all the utterances
concerned clearly do have in common is 'counting as a game question',
i.e. on the discourse level they all fall into the 'question move' slot
of the question-answer exchange pattern basic to the game(and as such
'expect' certain responses which shall be discussed presently).It is
this plus their propositional content that renders them game questions
clearly pursuant to the goal of the game rather than the particular
syntactic/intonational forms in which they are couched.We can neverthe¬
less attempt to characterize the options open to the native speaker of
English for 'realizing'(in the Hallidayan sense) this act,which could
perhaps be labelled 'Guess',since on the discourse level(that on which
we shall be defining our acts)it is an attempt to elicit (dis-)confirm-
ation of successive hypotheses towards the goal of guessing the game
object.The single arrow in the schema below is to be read as 'realized
by'.The optional forms contained in the vertical brace are not marked
for functional 'delicacy' or for contextual conditioning factors(these
being too overlapping and complicated by stylistic considerations
to be easily summarized here).STATE and ASKIF refer to declarative and
interrogative syntax respectively.'Meta-questions' and 'expanded ques-
*For example,an utterance with declarative syntax and intonation does
not 'count as an attempt to elicit information'except in very specific
contexts.
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tions' are not indicated,nor are 'inferential' markers and elided
forms(these are either the result of 'blends',to be described in Chap¬
ter 5,or are handled by discourse-level rules,as in Chapter Q).'^'
indicates a terminal rise* ;'modal' and non-propositional 'neg* a*e
treated as separate from propositional content 'p',which is reserved
for first-order predicates and arguments.
Game Question
In other words,any utterance by the quest!cner(the person taking
that role in a game)of the above form(s),with a propositional content
relevant to the furthering of the questioner towards his goal of
guessing the game object,is a potential game question and can as such
cause one to be added to the game count.
We turn now to functions other than asking a game question perfor¬
med by interrogative forms in the data;following this we shall be better
able to discuss our criteria for treating 'Game Question'as a distinct
discoursal act.The listing below represents an initial,intuitive class¬
ification without regard for hierarchical level or overlap of function
or for the distinction between 'illocutionary• and 'perlocutionary' acts
for the time being.
(a) Kequest Information
2
G.40: 'Did you say it was functional or pretty?'
G.12:'Is this a red herring?*
G.42: 'You been keeping count?'
G.49: 'Do you want to switch it off and carry on guessing?'
Ifais act is the most general from the point of view of use outside
the 'TWenty Questions' context and can be said,in a sense,to include
'Game Question' within its scope.But it is here introduced to account
for cases of questions in the data that do not fall under one of the
more specific acts listed.Its relationship to the latter(and their
•illocutionary force')will be dealt with later in this chapter.A great
*
Intonation in the data is of considerable complexity - and interest-
but has not been fully analysed. In general,'.typical'intonation patt¬
erns are taken to adhere to the output of particular acts.
2
Not strictly a polar question,of course
STATEp +modal + neg + tag +
'What about' + NP
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many 'Wh-questions' in the data(such as 'Which question are you ashing?'
in Game 34 and 'How many did you get it in?' in Game 37,as well as a
variety of forms asking about the game count ) also fall under this
category.
(b)Hequest Confirmation
G. 11:'That's about ten,isn't it?'
G.42:'Are you sure I've never met this person?*
G.41:'Didn't you say it was not a construction?*
fliis act is performed most commonly by a tag-question.The proposit-
ional content of such utterances must consist of information that the
utterer has some reason to believe(e.g. by having been told it earlier)
but is not certain about.whereas he believes the addressee is probably
in a position to (dis-)confirm it.It is because of this condition that
this act(or game questions couched in a form associated with it)can be
used as a 'pivot' for acquiring 'free' game information:the questioner
can pretend to know the truth value of the proposition he is asking about
already(merely requiring confirmation of it).while actually its content
extends somewhat further than what he has in fact been told by the
answerer. Hiere is some degree of overlap with (c) and (d) below(an utt¬
erance can perform at least two of these acts simultaneously).
(c)itequest Expansion/Rephrase
G.34:'Would you like to develop that?'
G.27:'Can you rephrase that question?'
G.40:'You mean do ^ think it's pretty?*
This act commonly takes the form of a (politeModal request,speci¬
fically mentioning the response desired,or it can be a more indirect




G.36:'It's in this room?*
G.41:'There's only one in the world?'
This act can easily be recognized by its echoing of the utterance
that caused the emotional reaction and by its distinct intonation
(usually high tone throughout plus high rise at end).
(e)Give Help/Clue
a_A <"\_/\
G.40:'fhe bridge like this:(gesture)?0r that one:(gesture)?'
This act is usually realized by Wh-questions,e.g.:
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G. 41:'What's it made of?'
G.49:'What do you bake normally?'
This and the following two acts are related to the general cognit¬
ive function of 'helping',which will be discussed later in this chapter.
The relationship between this functional intention and linguistic forms
realizing it is particularly tenuous and indirect.
(f)Offer Help/Clue
G.41:'Do you want another clue?'
, G.21:'Would you like a hint?'
G.28:'(I'll be giving you a clue next question.)Can I give it
to you now?'
These utterances generally enquire about the addressee's wants or
request permission to do something,using a modal verbCcf.under (k)).
(g)Hequest Help/Clue
G.31:*0h,is there a useful subdivision I can make?(or do I just
have to ask names?I can't really think of one.)'
G.32:'Am I better off looking for the things that belong to an
individual?*
Utterances such as these can be regarded as a special case of (a)
above.In fact many utterances classed primarily under (a),(b),or (c)
can be seen to perform this function indirectly(see Chapter 3).
(h) Object
G.27:'Well,wasn't it in the first place?'
Usually this act is realized by Wh-questions(or by statements),e.g.:
G.12:'Why did someone make it if not to be useful or decorative?'
There is usually a distinctive - querulous - intonation pattern
adhering to this act,to some degree overlapping with that for (d) above.
(i)Hhetorical Questions
G.4:'In Edinburgh?'
G.14:'To anyone else besides the person using it?'
Wh-questions are more common here too:
G. 16:'What else have I got above my waist?'
G.36:'I mean,what could you say?*
There is some overlap here with (d) and (j) - and possibly even with
(g).These utterances are of two kinds:those which exemplify 'thinking
out loud'(usually with 'sotto voce' intonation and volume) as in the
Game 16 example,and those definitely audience-addressed,serving some
higher cognitive function(such as (j) below in the Game 36 example).The
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latter tend to have a distinctive intonation pattern(e.g. high rise
nucleus on a Wh-question) and not be followed by a pause long enough
for the addressee to supply his own answer in.An anomoly is produced
by questions apparently intended as game questions - or requests for
confirmation(as in the Game 4 example) - but immediately answered by
the questioner himself.rendering it rhetorical in retrospect.Polar
questions serving this function are not common during the game itself
since a strict answerer can always claim that such a quest ion,if its
answer furthered the questioner towards his game goal,counted as a
game question even if spoken in a low voice.
(j)Blame Self
G.33:'Do you think I should have given you more help?'
G.36: 'fVere my answers misleading?'
This function is found only in 'post mortem' discussions after the
game itself is terminated;the answerer is politely taking some of the
blame for the questioner's poor performance.Like for (e) there is no
direct relationship between this 'higher' cognitive function and the
various linguistic means of expressing it available.
(k)Bequest Permission
G.20:'Can X give up?'
G.21:'Can I have that question back?'
G.28:'Do I have to answer that question?'
Commonly this act is marked by a modal verb plus a first person
pronoun(and indication of the action desired),though it can be less
direct,as in Game 2b,where permission is requested not to have to
answer a difficult quest ion. These examples can all be seen as 'jocular'
in as far as they are 'out of place' in the game context:they refer
to actions the questioners know they must (not) do according to the
rules.'Jokes',being parasitic upon ordinary speech acts,are not here
treated as a seperate function.
(1)Sjgnal Intent
G.3:'May I just recap.'
G.27:'Can I recap?'
This act is often performed by an utterance of form similar to those
under (k),though with falling terminal intonation;the action referred
to must be one the speaker intends immediately carrying out.An even more
common form is the utterance type 'let me - '(plus action intended).
In listing these functional types a certain amount of 'overlap'has
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been In evidence.Can our discrete classification still be justified,even
though various markers and constraints on propositional content are sha¬
red by several acts?Clearly the basis for the classification cannot lie
in function or formal elements alone.There are two related problems here:
(1) that of hierarchical level(both in the sense of generalized acts
subsuming more specific ones,and of 'higher' cognitive acts that can
utilize more closely 'linguistic* ones in their realization)and (2) that
of specific criteria for distinguishing one act from another.Solution
of the first will lead to solution of the second.
Of the acts listed above,(e) and (j) in particular appear to belong
to a different plane altogether from the others:they are quite remote
from particular linguistic realizations.This can be accounted for if
we accept that such higher cognitive functions can find realization
through a variety of lower-level ones(more directly tied to the lingui¬
stic system),much as in flexible modern computer programs a routine can
'summon' another as a sub-routine and in turn be summoned as a sub-rou¬
tine in some other procedure(the principle of 'heterarchical' structure).
We are forced nevertheless to identify them as distinct acts like the
others if we are to account for the ability of the hearer to trace back
the intention behind the utterance in question to the speaker's ultimate
reason for uttering it(and understanding the 'reason' behind such an
utterance is^ necessary if the hearer is to respond appropriately*).
But what of act type (a)?This looks very like Searle's general speech
act 'Question'(Searle,1969),which in turn can,as mentioned earlier,be
seen to embrace at least one other of our acts,namely 'Game Question'.
Could not all of the acts listed be regarded as bearers of either of the
two basic illocutionary forces here of 'Question' and 'Request'?In an
abstract,sentence-meaning sense this may be the case,but in terms of
discourse,where distinct acts have distinct interactive consequences,
we shall find that illocutionary force(the conventional pragmatic force
of an utterance,such as stating,asking,requesting)is not a sufficient
criterion for distinguishing distinct acts on the discourse level.In
what follows I shall concentrate on the illocutionary act of 'Question',
since for 'Request' it is easier to see the need for distinguishing
^Though of course he may not recognize this intentionjSnd respond as
if it were a lower-level act,in which case he has failed to understand
the utterance fully.Of course not all higher cognitive acts are perfo¬
rmed with the intention of the hearer recognizing them as such.
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separate acts depending on what the request is tor* ;whether all the
acts we are here concerned with can usefully be regarded as sharing
the illocutionary force of a 'directive'(according to Searle's more
recent taxonomy) will be considered in Chapter 3.
If act (a) in our list is indeed Searle's basic 'Question' speech
act,how is the 'essential condition' of that act - concerning 'what
counts as a question' -relevant to our present classificatory purposes?
The point I wish to argue for is that 'counting as' is a vacuous concept
for purposes of discourse modelling of the acts we are concerned with
(though possibly not for such acts as 'promising^involving socially
imposed commitment).From this print of view 'illocutionary force' is best
treated simply as the neutral or unmarked function of ,for example,the
interrogative form - i.e. is. a term belonging to the description of the
language system rather than to that of the functions of language in a
particular social context.In fact,in dealing with the force of indirect
speech acts(Searle,1975),Searle does himself avoid(except in a brief
recapitulation of his earlier felicity conditions)the notion of essen¬
tial condition,as Myers(1977) points out - an inevitable consequence,it
seems to me,of shifting the emphasis from language system to pragmatic
considerations of how speech acts are recognized by hearers.Naturally
there are conventional forms through which a speech act is performed
in a given language,but,as Strawson points out(1971),this is not always
the case,and even when it is,the form may not be enough to disambigu¬
ate the force of a given utterance.
When Searle states that the essential condition for a Question is
that it 'count as a question'(in the language system)he means something
more than that conventional linguistic means are available to express
it(as he replies to Strawson in the same volume).Now surely the expre¬
ssion 'counts as' presupposes some purpose which the 'counting as'
serves.Thus in the case of a Game Question it is clear that 'counting
as' this act has the important consequence of adding one to the game
count.It is also clear that in making a promise(a speech act Searle
relies on heavily -as in Searle 1971 -when illustrating what he means
by the phrase in question) an utterance 'counting as' such an act has
*And there is,arguably,no one grammatical form whose most neutral
function is that of requesting in general(as opposed to commands
and statements,etc.;see below).
-23-
the consequence of committing the utterer to some future course of
action.But what would be the consequence of an utterance being recogn¬
ized by a hearer as 'counting as' a Question?The answer to this must
surely be in terms of the hearer's recognition of possible responses to
it(corresponding to the effect on him desired by the utterer),unless one
merely wants to say that it 'counts as' a Question in the sense that
the hearer recognizes the utterance as a token of the conventional
linguistic form whose 'neutral' function is the expression of a 'Quest¬
ion* - which,I take it,is what Searle claims he is not saying.'Essen¬
tial condition' and 'function' seem to be synonomous,or at least circu¬
larly related.When discussing discourse,rules concerned with 'counting
as' would appear to be redundant,since all that is required for a dis-
coursal act to be performed successfully is recognition on the part
of the hearer of the speaker's(perlocutionary)intention to produce a
certain effect in him via recognition of the conventional linguistic
means used for expressing that intention,plus the subsequent appropriate
response by the hearer.What Searle,following Austin,calls the 'uptake'
of the illocutionary force of an utterance is surely equivalent to rec¬
ognition of the potential response set appropriate to utterances of
that form.
The drift this argument is taking is,as should be apparent,towards
the position that for the purposes of discourse analysis all speech
acts are best defined in terms of perlocutionary force(intended effect
upon the hearer) *,this being,in the case of a'Request for Information',
for example,the elicitation of an answer.The term 'illocutionary force*
we then can reserve for describing the interface between linguistic
forms and language u3e,from the point of view of sentence grammar.But
in this case have I not undermined the justification for at least one
of the acts listed above,namely 'Request Information',since I have ass¬
ociated it with Searle'a illocutionary act 'Question'?When we come to
examining appropriate response sets in the next chapter we shall see
that it is indeed a 'perlocutionary act' of the same status as the
others,but what is special about it is that,as the unmarked function of
the interrogative form,its perlocutionary force corresponds directly
to the illocutionary force of that form in the language system.Because
*A possibility Searle mentions(1960) but shies away from,seeing the
spectre of Stimulus-Response theory loom(not a justified fear,as I
shall attempt to show).Sadock(1974)also argues that an illocutionary
act is a variety of 'force perlocution*.
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of this special characteristic,an interrogative utterance can always
be treated as a case of (a)(iiequest for Information) if no further ult¬
erior reason for its production(corresponding to some more specific
discourse act) can be found.* As a discourse act with its own 'expected'
response set it is not to be equated with the (syntactic) interrogative
form(which I shall label 'ASKIF*),and is not to be regarded simply as
the output of other eliciting discourse acts such as 'Game Question',
which also produce ASKIF utterances as output.That it is in some sense
a more 'basic' act(i.e. found in wider contexts) than 'Game Question'
(which is derived from it) is not in doubt:witness the way players occ¬
asionally forget the rules of the game and respond 'automatically' to
illicit game questions as simple 'Requests for Information'.readily
supplying the answer(e.g. the beginning of Game 39 in the Appendix).
Sinclair and Coulthard(1975) have expressed this relationship be¬
tween form and function of interrogatives as tri-stratal;as follows,
where an interrogative form(according to the grammar of the language)
may be intended as /recognized as a question(its function in the situ¬
ation of utterance but independent of discourse context).which in turn
may serve the discourse function of eliciting information:
Discourse Situation Grammar
Elicit Question Interrogative
In our own data there appears to be no independent justification for
the middle stratum here(where 'Question' seems to correspond to the
force of our act (a) )since the game situation does not itself serve
to disambiguate the force of a grammatical interrogative independently
of specific discoursal context in a manner analogous to the classroom
situation of their data,which is associated with certain typical func¬
tions of interrogatives(e.g. as commands).Situation of utterance must
certainly enter into our own description,but it is simpler to stick
to a bi-stratal model for our purposes.Getting from an ASKIF grammati¬
cal form to the discourse act its utterance is performing will indeed
involve knowledge on the hearer's part of relevant situational context
and of the discoursal sequence in which it is embedded(what Sinclair
*This is not to claim that the utterances falling under (a) cannot
have 'ulterior' motives behind them.The point is that what they all
have in common is what is relevant to discoursal intentions and re¬
sponses: the questioner does not necessarily want the hearer to recog¬
nize any such ulterior motive - he merely wants the information.
-25-
and Coulthard call 'tactics');but this is a matter of procedures
rather than of intermediate representations.
Hie outcome of this excursion is,then,that we have decided upon
•expected response set' as the major criterion(apart from functional
'definition',which proves insufficient on its own)for distinguishing
the acts in our classification.In the following chapter 1 shall show,
by examining actual responses to utterances in the data performing
the acts concerned,how this is justified.We shall also see,however,
that there remains a certain degree of overlap between response sets
for different acts and that we shall have to appeal to propositional
contentCand discoursal context of a wider sort)to describe how the
performance of these acts is recognized as such.
What we have been talking about in this chapter are 'discourse
acts' - the term we shall henceforth use - whereby distinct communic¬
ative needs on the part of the speaker* (such as the need to elicit
some piece of information) are fulfilled - at least potentially -by
an appropriate response on the part of the hearer.How this relates
to the two major approaches to speech act theory - that which attempts
to extend a description of the language system into pragmatics by way
of rules and conventions,and that which tries to explain communicative
activity in terms of complex intentions,shared knowledge and inferential
procedures,etc.,independently of particular linguistic forms - will be
returned to in the second half of Chapter 2.
Of course any one utterance may fulfil more than one of our discourse
acts;the ambiguity involved may even be played upon,as in the case
of 'pivot' game questions.
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Chapter 2
We now turn to an examination of typical responses to the discourse
acts differentiated in Chapter l;exact contexts can again be found in
the Appendix.
Responses to Game Questions:
(All games:) 'Yes / No.'('Yeah/ uhuh/ oh yes/ no.no'etc)*
G.4:'Yes,it does / No,it doesn't.*
G.4:'Yes.That particular one.'
G.4:'Um...That's difficult to answer!'
G.28:'Yes,as far as I know.'
G.28:'I can't answer that question!•
G.34:'No,people don't consume it.'
G.40:'Strictly,no... •
G.42:'I don't think so.'
G.42: 'Yes... '
G.31:'A member of the royal family.'
G.31:'Princess Anne,right.'
G.23:'Yes...Not it itself.'
G.13:'No.It's alive.It's in this room.'
G.20:'Right. '




G.35:'I must answer 'yes' there,they do.'
G.35:'No...but in a sense you're getting warm.'
G.13:'You've already asked that,didn't you?'
G.40:'You mean do ^ think it's pretty?'
G.40:'Yeah,I*m sure you must have.'
G.40:'It is a bridge,yes...'
G.4:'No,I wouldn't say so.*
G.l8:'It may be,but that's not its purpose.'
The printed rules for the game stipulate merely that the answers
ought to be simple 'yes/no' ones,though more elaborate responses are
permitted if the answerer feels it is impossible to answer a question
1
Including grunts,nods and other paralinguistic signals
in this dichotomic fashion.
It is possible to summarize these various responses in a 'response
sequence' rule of the following kind,where the double arrow is to be
read as 'is typically followed by' and the alternatives on the right
constitute the 'expected ' response set on the part of the addressee
for the discourse act on the left.This kind of interactive rule is of
a very different kind from those that can be incorporated into a sent¬
ence grammar,a point we shall develop later in the chapter.As Labov ^
points out(1970),such sequencing rules operate between speech acts,not
between utteranees.Discourse act labels will henceforth be underlined;
English words referred to are between quotation marks.
Game Question y ^Answer j- Expand/Hephrase




The conditions leading to the choice of one response type out of the
set are self-evident:if a simple yes/no answer is possible the first
alternative is chosenCthe unmarked response);if this is not the case
an expansion/rephrase may be requested(if the answerer sees the possi¬
bility of a yes/no answer to a rephrased version of the question) or
inability to answer claimed(if no amount of rephrasing is going to
help),or an objection raised(if a broken rule precludes a straight
answer).If the questioner is way off the mark the answerer may choose
to give him a clue - though an Answer usually precedes the Give Help
unless it is presupposed in the content of the latter,which;being in-
dependantly activatable at any point in a game,need not be marked on
this rule.An expanded form of answer(perhaps rephrasing the preposit¬
ional content of the question) is given if the answerer feels that a
yes/no answer,though justified by the rules,is misleading if unquali¬
fied; this may create an overlap with the conditions for choosing the
Give Help alternative.Note that these responses are also appropriate
to a wider range of guessing situations,where the'answerer * wants the
•questioner' to work out the answer for himself;outside of games like
'IVenty (Questions' with rules limiting the type of answer allowed,the
answerer can presumably decide for himself how helpful he is going to be.
Just as we saw in Chapter 1 that the act of Game Question could be
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realized by a variety of forms depending on discoursal context and att-
itudinal factors,we can write a 'realization' rule for Answer.bearing
in mind again that stylistic/ideolectic factors complicate the actual
conditions of choice for each alternative form.The rule is merely a
representation of options available to the answerer(those found in the
data).
Answer ^TREPLY+ +STATEp +Hedge +Tent
^STATEp + 'right/correct'
! Hedge +Tent
REPLY* indicates any linguistic or paralinguistic affirmation or nega¬
tion marker; 'p' is the prepositional content of the preceding question;
'Tent' is tentative intonation (typically high rise-fall-rise);
'Hedge' can be realized in a number of different ways,e.g. as a noun
phrase modifier( 'not itself),as an adverb ('strictly'), as a subo¬
rdinate clause ('so far as I know'),or as a whole sentence('I wouldn't
say so').Similar rules for responses to ail acts in Chapter 1 follow.
Responses to Requests for Information;
The game numbers here (and in the following lists) refer to the
same exchanges given in Chapter 1 under the corresponding discourse
act - i.e. these utterances are the responses to the uttex*ances listed
there.Note that some of these sequences presuppose particular role-
bearers as initiator or responder(notably (e),(f)and (g)).
G.40:'Functional.'
G. 12:'It's more or less a red herring,yes.'
G. 42:'No.•
G.49:'I don't want to switch it off at all.'
A response sequence rule covering these examples can be formulated
thus(where possible sequences not actually met in the data are brack¬
eted) :
(a) Request Information - >fAnswer ± Expand/Rephrase
(Claim Inability to Comply)
(Object)
(Request Rephrase)
The realization rule for Answer here is the same as for a game question
*No linear order is implied by any of these outputs.
—20-
answerjin fact the above sequence rule also largely overlaps with the
previous one(the absence of Give Itelp as a possible response to this
act is due to the fact that in this 'unmarked' case of asking a question
the answerer is not obliged by game rules to withold information and
cannot merely hint at the answer,unless some more complex perlocutionary
act is simultaneously being performed*).Game Question is nevertheless
a distinct discourse act from this one,both as regards the specific
effect of adding one to the game count and as regards special constra¬
ints on propositional content.An example where a (presumably)intended
perlocutionary effect overrides the 'unmarked' response set correspond¬
ing to a Request Information is found in Game 13,where the utterance
•Are we supposed to keep count?' elicits the response 'That's five'
(still a case of requesting information - but different information
from that directly requested in the corresponding unmarked case).Such
cases will be treated in Chapter 3,where indirect discourse acts are
considered.To all polar questions performing this act a minimal 'yes*
or 'no' is a sufficient response(given suitable propositional content).
Responses to Requests for Confirmation;
G. 11:'Mia. That's ten.'
G.42:'Pretty sure.'
G.41:'No,I didn't say it wasn't a construction.'
3
(b)Request Confirmation . y Dis-)Confinn ^Expand/Rephrase
where 'Hp' is a rephrasal of the proposition in the request.We might
wish to formulate a more general rule for all requests at this point,
namely:
1
In which case the sequence rule would be between this act and Give
Help.
2
A number of surface syntactic variations on this(and any otherReal¬
ization formula may result of course,as determined by thematic discourse-
level rules(see Chapter 6) and the 'predicate frames' of individual
lexemes. Note G.27 and G.40 below.
3
Largely overlaps with Answer in realization.
(Claim Inability to Comply)
(Refuse)




Claim Inab. to Comply
This merely shows what they all have in common,and does not undermine
their status as distinct acts(they have distinct felicity conditions,
syntactic forms and propositional content constraints on *p' in the
realization rules attached to them).The difference between response
sets for different types of requesting acts can be seen in the follo¬
wing for requests of rephrasing ,when compared with (b).
Responses to Requests for Expansion/Rephrasing:
G.34:'Not at all* *
G.27:'Well,what I mean is...(etc.)'
G.40:*No,I mean is it decorative?'
(c) Request Rephrase Expand/Rephra se
Refuse
(Claim Inab. to Comply)
The example from Game 40 involves two discourse acts combined:the que¬
stioner here(see under (c) in Chapter 1) is both asking for a rephrase
and formulating a hypothesis as to what that rephrase will be,the latter
requiring confirmation.The answerer responds with both the 'no' required
by the disconfirmation of the hypothesis and the rephrase requested,in
one utterance.Note the 'jocular' reply in Game 34,which is a play on
the polite formula used in the request(a 'parasitic' realization of
Refuse):the impression of willful inappropriateness comes from the
questioner's reasonable expectation that the answerer will comply,there
being no apparent reason why he shouldn't.
Responses to Expressions of .Surprise:
Sirrprisc/Qiabelief }ft
In other words there is no response sequence associated with this act,
and in the three exchanges referred to in Chapter 1 the following utt¬
erance is either produced by the same speaker or is totally unrelated
(as in the Game 36 example:'You've got two to go').This act can,however,
easily combine with Hefpaegt Confirmation.as already mentioned,in which
case a (Oia-)Confirm may follow.
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Responses to Giving Help:
G.40:'Yeah.The suspension bridge?'
G.41:'The Forth Bridge?'
G.49:'Pies or Baked Alaska or...'• • •
(e) Give Help ^ Game Question (+ Acknowledge)
The intended(perlocutionary)effeet of the clue is,of course,that the
questioner should use the new information to formulate his next ques¬
tion; he_ex_jjects that the questioner will in fact ask such a question
as his next move - and this is what the rule captures.The 9 response
allows for the questioner being unable to use the help or ignoring tt.
His next move will even in this case be expected to be a Game Question,
but this is due to the question-answer framework of the game(the wider
discoursal context) rather than to the immediate response sequence.
Responses to Offers of Help:
G.41:'is it a harbour or something?'
G. 21:'(Jm, no.. .thank you.'
G.28:'Yes.•
(f)Offer Help
j0 again represents ignoral(as in G.41).The minimal realizations of
Accept and Refuse (Help) are,respectively,'yes* and 'no'(the 'neutral'
responses to a polar interrogative as in (a) above).Other realizat¬
ions would be expected,presumably,if the offer were not couched in the
interrogative form:our realization rules have ultimately to be more
context-sensitive.
Responses to Requests for Help;
G.31:'You've got several questions left,so you might as well.'
G.33:'You're well off enough,I should say!'
i.e. a new question,based on the clue.The answerer initiates,the





The questioner in the Game 31 example inserts a comment justifying his
request for help(see Chapter 1 under (g)) immediately after his request,
and,similarly,the answerer starts his response with a justification
of the advice he is giving.Both these elements would have to be indic¬
ated on the realization rules for the two 'head' acts involved(which,
especially in the latter case,could be rather complex).In general,
single acts can be realized by a sequence of acts.Whether this justif¬
ies analysis in terms of larger discourse units(say 'moves* as opposed
to acts)will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Responses to Objections:
G.27:'Perhaps,yes.'
An objection can - as in Game 12 - be regarded as rhetorical by the
hearer,in which case he ignores it.
Responses to Rhetorical Questions:
These are almost by definition unresponded to(and in the examples the
subsequent utterance is always spoken by the same speaker),though there
is still a certain perlocutionai^y effect intended - e.g. communication
of attitude towards a proposition,or some form of 'convincing'.
Responses to Self-Blame:
G.36:'No,no,I don't think so.'










The choice here depends very much on inter-personal factors such as
politeness,friendliness,etc.There are presumably numerous ways in
which the high level act of shifting the blame back to oneself(or
at least away from the self-blamer)could be realized.The one chosen
in the second example above is to cast doubt on the possibility of
other courses of action the self-blamer could have followed in the
cix'cumstances,via a rhetorical question.
Responses to Requests for Permission;
G.20:'No.•
G.21:'There are certainly some senses...etc.'
G.28:'So the question doesn't count.'
(k)Hequest Permission
The requests in G.21 and G.28 are ignored(refused) since the rules
of the game are such as to make them inappropriate,and therefore to
be taken as jocular.Note that in the third case the request was
the second half of a compound act involving a Claim Inability to Comply
('I can't answer that question'),and the response above is thus also
related to that act.Linkages between successive acts on the part of the
same speaker will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
Responses to Signals of Intent:
(1)Signal Intent )/
This act is always followed by the action the speaker announces he in¬
tends carrying out,though this action may in fact be silent(recapping
to oneself)as in the Game 27 example(Chapter 1 under (1)),where a len¬
gthy pause is followed by a new game question.
We can now summarize our findings in a table as follows,indicating
all the aspects of our discourse acts necessary for their recognition
as such,within the game.Sincerity and preparatory conditions for their
appropriate performance are - as features of the discourse context(see
Chapter 5) - not marked here.The labels of the acts in the left-hand
column can be regarded as describing the communicative needs served
by the acts(as intended by the speaker).It is the combination of min¬
imally adequate response set and propositional content(the central
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colunms>that forms the basis of this classification into distinct acts,
parallelling the intuitive classification supplied by column one .The
last column gives only a very sketchy indication of some of the more
common realizations of these acts(interrogative forms only).Due to its
special relation with the language system.Request Information will be






































Echo prior utter. Surprised inton.
Relevant to game —
goal
Refer to help Modal offer form
g)Req.Help Give iielp
Refuse

















k)Reg.?ermis». Give. Feraiiss. Refer to action ModaL request form
Refuse required
1)Signal Intent P> Refer to inten- As (k)
ded action
rt'e must now relate our findings to,on the one hand,what philosophers
of language have to say about speech acts in terms of speaker intenti¬
ons and,on the other hand,to what linguists(and linguistically orienta¬
ted philosophers) have to say about linguistic forms realizing particu¬
lar speech acts.Both approaches are essential if we are to attain our
goal of characterizing a production system capable of accounting for
the generation of all the games in our data.Since both approaches tend
to employ the notion of 'illocutionary force',which I have rather
summarily deemed irrelevant to present purposes,we must take a closer
look at how this term is used by two representatives of these approaches,
Strawson and Searle respectively.
Strawson's formulation(1971)is as follows:understanding the illocu¬
tionary force of an utterance involves recognizing the audience-directed
intention behind it,and recognizing it as wholly overt - as intended to
be organized(i.e.,I take it,recognizable through its organization/form).
Further,developing Grice's original formula in 'Meaning'(1957),he argues
that a successful illocutionary act is performed if the speaker of an
utterance intends to produce an effect on the hearer and the hearer
recognizes this intention, and if that recognition forms part of the
hearer's reason for responding as he does(according to the intended
effect).'Convention' is involved only in so far as the speaker uses
1
conventional linguistic means for performing the act in question .
Intended discoursal effect(including the overt response expected)is
an essential part of this formulation,and yet we have opted for a
purely perlocutionary description of the acts in our data.#Ve must
*
Though certain acts are essentially conventional according to him
(e.g. naming a ship,pronouncing a defendant guilty,etc.)
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examine some of the latter more closely to see if Strawson's formula
does apply.
In the case of Game Question the speaker certainly intends to pro¬
duce a particular effect on the fcearer(resulting in a 'yea/no' response
or some other suitable realisation of the response set for that act),
and he intends the hearer's recognition of this intention to partially
determine his response.The hearer has to recognize that a game question
has been asked in order to respond appropriately(i.e. respond 'yes/no',
etc.,and add one to the count).The basic formula works equally well
for Reouost Confirmation ,where the hearer must recognize that confi¬
rmation is being requested in order to respond with a Confirm and not,
for example,add one to the count.Similarly for Request Rephrase/Expand.
iVhat is special here about the 'neutral' act Request Information
is that the hearer only has to recognize that a polar question has been
asked(as directly determinable from the form of the utterance)in order
to respond appropriately with a reply:he does not need to recognize
any further motivation behind the act,whereas for all other acts
realized by interrogative forms in the data something else must be
recognized for successful uptake.This 'something else' is signalled
by propositional content or by linguistic markers conventionally asso¬
ciated with the act(e.g. tag questions in the case of Request Confirm¬
ation). These acts,at least,all seem to fit Strawson's criteria for
illocutionary acts then.But what of more linguistically 'remote' disco¬
urse acts such as our (.1) (Blame Self) and (e)(Glve Help)?
In blaming himself for something it is certainly part of the
speaker's intention that the hearer should recognize his intention of
blaming himself and that this recognition should partly determine
the effect it has on him(whether or not it results in overt verbal
response).Yet it can hardly be termed an illocutionary act in the
original Austinian sense(one certaiiiy can't say anything like '1 here¬
by blame myself that -',using Austin's test),any more than the act
of helping/giving a clue can.The difference here is not so much one
of 'overt avowability' of intention(a condition Strow3on puts on
illocutionary but not perlocutionary acts) - though it may be irrelevant
whether the hearer recognizee that an utterance is intended as a token
of B1ame Self or Give Help or not,as long as he responds appropriately
by treating it as another,lower level act.It is rather that there is
no linguistic convention for expressing these acts in a certain form
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and they must therefore be mediated by some other act.In our terms,
they lie at the perlocutionary pole of the cline at whose other pole
are found discourse acts for which 'illocutionary force' does 'exhaust
the meaning'(as Strawson puts it):mediation by another act is in their
case not possible.Discourse acts between the two poles(such as our (b)
and (d) lire all indirect to some degree or another.
Illocutionary fcsroe is ftr Strawson,then,that intended force which
must be recognized by the hearer as adhering to the form of the utter¬
ance for him to respond appropriately to it(as opposed to,say,'con-
vlncing'or 'boasting',which the speaker may or may not wish the hearer
to recognize as such but which is not relatable to any particular form
type).Since this recognition is mediated by the linguistic form of the
utterance,we can simply correlate his use of the term •illocutionary
force' with that pole of our continuum of discourse acts which has the
most direct linkage with linguistic form - i.e. the mood system of the
1
language. This is quite compatible with our emphasis on 'expected re¬
sponses' as opposed to 'conventions' in differentiating discourse acts.
Turning now to the approach to discourse from the point of view of
linguistic system,we find a greater concern with rules for relating
function to form. Thus Searle,while realising the complex,multi-dimen-
sional nature of what he terms •illocutionary force',attempts to reduce
2
the extensive class of illocutionary acts suggested by Austin to a
small set of basic acts,whose relationship to the linguistic mood sysiem
(of English)is fairly transparent and whose force is conventionally
associated with distinct 'illocutionary force markers'. Ihough he does
of course speak of situational conditions and communicative intentions
on the part of the speaker,these are on a generalized,context-free
plane(situational rather than discoursal,in Sinclair and Coulthard's
terms),and he does not address himself to the question of expected re¬
sponses. Following Austin,he is more concerned with the secural of 'upta¬
ke •(comprehension of the speaker's illocutionary intention)for isolated
utterances rather than for utterances in context-of-discourse.He is not
perturbed by the fact that many of his 'illocutionary force markers'
are redundant in discourse and not in fact overtly expiessed(being
relegated to 'underlying' linguistic structures).This suggests that
*Allowing for modification of his formula to exclude cases like (j)
and (e) above.
2
On the basis of the large number of performative verbs in English
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'uptake' is a rather abstract notion,not to be equated with 'recogni¬
tion of complex intention' on the discourse level.
Though this approach is essential to any discussion of the un¬
marked or 'neutral' function of particular linguistic forms,there are
problems when attempts are made to extend it beyond a handful of basic
acts,and in particular when what are in fact complex discourse acts
axe explicated in terms of deep structures of some version of an abstr¬
act sentence grammart'The thrust of the pxesent thesis is towards a
sharp distinction between discourse-level pxagmatics and sentence-level
grammar,justification for which - in tex-ms of simplification of descri¬
ption - will be demonstrated in the following chapters.
If we are to reject an illocutionary view of discourse acts we had
better be able to account in some other way for the felicity conditions
analysed by Searle as distinguishixxg speech acts..Ve shall then be able
to judge the 'conventional' or rule-defined status of our discourse
acts,and in tui'n see whether the type of regularity between form and
function discerned by linguists might make us wish to reformulate our
classification in terms of more general acts such as those Searle
proposes.
I have argued that the 'essential condition* of Searle's speech
act paradigm is simply a matter of the act's function(plus appropx-iate
response set) - i.e. a tautological statement of the function conventi¬
onally associated with forms tokening the act.hut what of his 'prepax-
2
atory' and 'sincerity' conditions? Hie former are as follow for his
speech act 'Question':1)the speaker doesn't know the answer already and
2)it is not obvious to both epe&ker and hearer that the hearex- will pro¬
vide the information of his own accord at that time.The only sincerity
condition is that the speaker should want the information.These condit¬
ions cex^tainly apply to our acts Request information and Game Question
(and others).3ut the kind of question we want to ask(in developing
*The same may be said of the functional approach of Halliday which,
though it identifies a textual(discourse level) component,rests on
a notion of 'choice'(systemic) quite different from that of choosing
in procedural terms how to express an intention;due to its non-concern
with response sequences it is difficult to extend beyond the basic
mood options of its 'interpersonal' component.
2
his 'propositional content condition' is covered by the third column
of oux1 table of acts.
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a production model for our data) is whether the hearer has to calculate
that these conditions are met to decide that the act in question has
been performed.This is clearly not necessary in the context of *T\venty
Questions•(except perhaps for certain interruptions of the game sequence)
since the context itself determines both these sets of conditions(if they
didn't apply they wouldn't be playing the game).How situational contexts
can be formalized to indicate such conditions relevant to the recognition
of acts performed within them will be considered in Chapters 4 and 5.
Similar considerations apply to Searle's speech act 'Request',where
the following felicity conditions are met by at least our discourse acts
(b),(c),(g) and (k): preparatory - l)the hearer is able to do A(the
action requested) and believes the speaker is not,and 2)it is not ob¬
vious that the hearer will do A of his own accord;sincerity - the speaker
wants the hearer to do A.Here again it is the situational context that
determines what the player might want to do or is able to do and is
likely to request(at least as regards the actual playing of the game).
It is the propositional content(and.secondarily,any linguistic marker
typically associated with the particular kind of request act)that will
determine the appropriate response set fulfilling the request.
I have already expressed doubt as to the relevance to discourse
analysis of Searle's notion of underlying rules which determine whether
an utterance 'counts as' performing a particular speech act.At this point
I must forestall objections that could be made to the effect that by
denying the relevance of such rules I am a) denying the rule-based
nature of discourse and b) opting for the only alternative,a behaviour-
istic Stimulus-Response theory.There is probably some confusion lurking
here as to what exactly is meant by a 'rule'.Searle's application to
speech behaviour of the distinction between'constitutive* and 'regul¬
ative' rules(those which actually constitute the game being played -
e.g. the rules of football or chess - and those merely social convent¬
ions that regulate independently existing behaviour - e.g. the rules
of etiquette)seems to be based on a rather shaky analogy with board
and field games.Whereas a given move in such a game is determined solely
by convention,regardless of context,the act a given linguistic form
performs in discourse is partially determined by context.A more useful
distinction for our purposes might be made here between those rules
actively followed in the production of behaviour(consciously or other¬
wise) and those forming part of a linguist's or sociologist's model
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which capture regularities of language behaviour*.The procedures(in¬
cluding those corresponding to grammatical rules)that are active in
the production of utterances may not correspond directly to those
generalizations that capture most succinctly the •communicative compe¬
tence 'of the speakers of such utterances.Ib doubt much of human langu¬
age behaviour is capturable by such rule-like generalizations.But what
Searle appears to be claiming(and he's by no means alone in doing so)
is that these generalizations are somehow internalized within the
speaker and are thus in some way productive of the behaviour in question.
This is a strong claim.I,on the other hand,wish to demonstrate how a
language generation/comprehension system can be characterized which
produces regular behaviour without necessarily 'following' all such
generalizations as internalized rules.This will not entail the posit¬
ing of a large number of stimulus-response couples^operating automat¬
ically: any of our discourse acts can have a variety of realizations
(the sequencing and realization rules have context-sensitive output),
and ,moreover,these outputs can be overriden by higher level require-
ments(cf. the 'lieta-f rame' in Chapter 5) or be blended with outputs
cf simultaneously performed acts.Our 'rules* are indeed intended to
correspond(in some fairly direct way)with cognitive procedures that
could plausibly account for the production/comprehension of the acts
evidenced in the data;but they represent,in fact,no more than test¬
able intuitions as to what the speaker/hearer may expect at a given
2
point in the discourse.Generalizations over a wide range of related
acts,abstracting from context,are only of direct interest for our
purposes if they can be shown to simplify our production model.
Let us examine, then,one such taxonoraic simplification(abstract
generalization) related to our data:Searle has claimed(1976) that his
speech act 'Question* is really a variety of 'Bequest' - both are
'directives* in his more recent classification. The illocutionary 'point'
is in both cases to 'get the hearer to do something';he formalizes
this as • I ^ vV (H does A)',where the exclamation mark is the illocut-
*Cf. Lyons(1977) on models.I am not claiming that mine is necessarily
closer to 'real' cognitive processes than anybody else's,merely that
it is not based on a 'one behavioural generalization = one productive
rule' assumption such as underlies many others.
O
e.g. Searle's (constitutive) rules for the felicity conditions of a
general speech act 'Question'.
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-ionary force indicating device for a directive*,the vertical arrow
means that it is an attempt to'change the world*by the performance of
the act,and *.V(H. does A)* indicates the (future)proposition corresp¬
onding to what the speaker wants done by the hearer.The difference is
that 'A* in the case of a question is supplying the information reque¬
sted and in the case of a request is some other actionfwhich may or
may not be performed by verbal means )f «sv» is the sincerity condition
of the speaker wanting a response from the hearer,and 'H does A' is
the propositional content condition.This latter condition presents a
problem for questions,since no mention need be made within the uttera¬
nce of what the hearer is to do(namely answer) - only the proposition
to be answered to is typically made overt.One might suppose that we
are here in the realm of 'underlying' performative markersCe.g. for 'J*
when thex-e is no overt marker),but this is not of much use for the
hearer in recognizing the force of an utterance.
The point I wi3h to make is not that Searle's taxonomy is incorrect.
It merely does not simplify our production model,since the latter must
account for hearer recognition of tokeas of each particular discourse
act type subsumed by the category 'directive' in order for an appropriate
response to be produced in each case.He has shown convincingly how illo-
cutionary acts can be reduced to a very small set when one considers
the 'neutral' function of sentence types;the way that discourse acts
in context utilize these potential functions is a different raattex- - one
which directly concerns us.
Thex-e is in fact linguistic evidence that supports the treatment of
requests and questions as sep&rate acts.Thus Sadock(1974)points out that
real questions may bo strengthened by such markers as 'the hell*,un¬
like what he calls 'requestions',which,in turn,can be used with the
politeness marker 'please' whereas real questions cannot(without adding
a 'distancing' effect). Ihus,in opposition to other generative semantlc-
ists who see an underlying 'request-tell• beneath real questions,he
sees such questions as 'Where is John?' as ambiguous as to which of the
2
two types of act is being performed.Johnson (1976),reviewing Sadock's
position,adds further arguments from distribution^.g. the fact that
real questions - with the illocutionary force 'Ask' - can undergo
*Hiis presumes that there jLs some overt marker of the force in question -
which in many cases thei-e isn't(see Chapter 3).
2
Who denies the ambiguity Sadock claims
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certain kinda of idiomatization that requests cannot)and from the con¬
sequences of admitting an underlying 'tell* in the deep structure of
real quest ions(e.g. time and manner adverbials relating to such an und¬
erlying predicate cannot,as might be predicted from its existence,
appear in surface forms of real questions).Such arguments are,unfortun-
ately,based on rather dubious single-sentence examples and rely heavily
on theories of 'underlying' performative representations.But her princ¬
iple conclusion: i£ interesting:questions are different from requests,
she claims,because the appropriate responses to them are different.
Namely,a (polar) question can unambiguously and independantly of con¬
tent be satisfied by a following 'yes* or 'no' alone,whereas a request
cannot.fhis seems to me to be the only way one can escape from the
circularity of arguing about hypothetical underlying representations
and directly relate the linguistic forms to their discourse function
here.The distributional generalizations unearthed by linguists concern¬
ing utterances performing different acts must,of course,be accounted
for in our realization rules(as I have attempted to do in some detail
for game questions),but there is advantage to be gained from approach¬
ing the question of realization from the discourse level rather than
from within the grammatical system of the language itself.For one thing,
most of the features/conditions relevant to the contextual recognition
of the force of a given utterance can be taken care of at a higher
level(that on which our discourse acts are defined),and one simply does
not have to hypothesize deep structure performative elements according
to the particular brand of grammar one espouses.Syntactic deep stru¬
ctures can be left for purely syntactical information,surely a desirable
state of affairs if it allows us to construct models of discourse beha¬
viour without having to rely on any a priori theory of grammar.
We have seen how the form-function relationship of discourse acts
can in theory be handled independantly of any particular sentence gram-
mar.and we must now turn,in pursuit of more detailed realization rules,
to examples from our data where one or another of our acts is realized
by forms typical of other acts.Ve shall need to enquire how it is that




Our principle concern with 'indirect speech acts' in the data is
as to how the hearer might recognize the speaker's utterance as a
token of the act(indirectly)intended in order to be able to respond
appropriately*.There are two main problems here which must be kept
apart:the realization of an act through a form typically associated
with some other act,and the performance of more than one act by one
utterance.lt will be seen that there are two related approaches to
a solution:on the one hand in terms of calculation by the hearer of
the speaker's complex intention via principles of basic conversational
cooperation and of speech act theory (.the procedural approach favoured
by Grice and developed in his own manner by Searle in his article
(1975) on indirect speech acts),and on the other hand in terms of the
recognition of discrete discourse acts expected by the hearer in
context(an approach much less developed than the former).Just as in
Chapter 2 it was argued that the intentional and the conventional
approaches to 'direct ' speech acts are complementary,it will now
be shown that both the above-mentioned approaches to indirect speech
acts can - and should- be integrated in our model.The latter is demo¬
nstrably simplified if allowance is made for the hearer to resort to
computation of speaker intention via basic conversational(and world
knowledge) principles only when an utterance doesn't immediately match
his expectations according to either the present response sequence or
to the higher question-answer framework of the game.The model does in¬
deed incorporate indirect (discourse) acts - only the line between
them and more direct realizations is drawn somewhat differently than
it is by Searle.
Most investigations of indirect speech acts (which tend to be
limited to such relatively transparent cases as requests couched as
polar questions)are in terms of the hearer's computation of the 'pri¬
mary '(or 'conveyed') force behind the 'literal' illocutionary force
of the utterance.What seems to be meant by 'literal force•(Searle's
term) is the pragmatic force adhering to the 'neutral* use of the
relevant syntactic form - e.g. the interrogative -,and of these basic
sentence patterns there are only a handful within the mood system of
any language.When we address ourselves to a wider range of contextual-
*And secondarily as to how the speaker might choose a form to realize
his intention to perform the act
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ized discourse acts,however,the relevance of the notion becomes much
more questionable due to the wide array of forms available for reali¬
zing them and to the possibility of one utterance performing more than
one act at once.Thus already in the case of game questions we have
found that forms typically associated with the making of statements
are common in this function*.It seems intuitively unlikely that the
hearer in these cases has first to recognize that the utterance is a
statement(its 'literal* illocutionary force),then to compute the impli-
cature(Grice's term for this relationship) that its primary force is
that of a question.This would appear to be a clear case where hearer
expectations override the formal(syntactic and even intonational) prop-
2
erties of the utterance .What he does have to calculate in order to
determine whether it is in fact a game question is the appropriateness
of its propositional content and whether it implies a yes/no answer.
Iliis he can only do by computing what the answer might be.But he has
to know that the utterance is in fact meant as a question in order
to search for an answer:without introducing the notion of context-det¬
ermined expectancies this is obviously going to remain circular.This
reformulates the reason why we decided in the previous chapters to treat
asking a game question as a distinct act from Request Information even
though their response sets largely overlap.The fact that there is a
well-known response sequence between the latter act(typically associated
with the interrogative form) and a 'yes/no' answer is not of any use
in itself to the hearer in determining how to respond to a game question
which is not in the interrogative form.Response sequences are between
acts,and it is simply false to state that,for example,polar interrog¬
ative forms call for yes/no responses(e.g. in the case of rhetorical
questions or requests realized by such forms).A game question is reco¬
gnized through contextual expectationd.e. is expected following an
Answer act - and vice versa)and appropriate propositional content(this
is all that the form types listed in Chapter 1 have in common).An inte¬
rrogative form is interpreted as a Request Information if there is no
over-riding expectation and no formal marker indicative of some other
xe.g. form (h) with 'so' or 'then'.Criteria for regarding all these
forms as realizations of the same act have been adduced earlier;that
•blends' might be involved is a possibility(see Chapter 5).
O




act present(e.g. of a Game Question) .
But how does a hearer recognize when there is no primary illocuti-
onary force (read 'ulterior discourse act intended')behind an (interr¬
ogative) token of Bequest Information?How extensively need he search
in order to decide that there is no such ulterior point?Again the answer
can be put in terms of propositional content and contextual expectanc¬
ies :within the 'Meta-frame' for the game(the assembly of expected resp¬
onse sequences - or procedures for predicting them from the rules of
the game - relevant to the monitoring of the game's coursejsee Chapter
4) is contained information as to the predictable motives of the players
throughout the course of the game and a corresponding array of discourse
act correlates reflecting these motives.The hearer need only check that
the interrogative utterance in question doesn't match any of the potent¬
ially expected acts by propositional content(and,in particular,doesn't
match Game Quest ion)to be justified in falling back on the 'neutral'
interpretation of the act as as a Request Information. Plough there
might still be some ulterior point behind the utterance,recognizing it
will at least not be essential to playing the gume according to the rules.
The hearer might well discover some such possible ulterior point(and
assume that it corresponds to the speaker's actual intention),as in
Game 13:
^ :'Are we supposed to keep count?'
p(, : 'That's five. •
The point is .though,that a minimal 'yes/no' response would be appr¬
opriate here(any further action according to the answer on the question¬
er's part being wholly his own affair),as in the example from Game 42:
'You been keeping count?'
•No. •
3ut in the first example has calculated in addition - via his (Meta-
frame) knowledge of what he is meant to be doing during the course of
the game - that he should state at this point what the count is in fact.
It may 3imply be a case of unintentional reminding on^'s part(he really
^Request Information can be realized indirectly in a certain sense(e.g.
•I'd like to know where it is');such forms should be entered on the
corresponding realization rule - it is not a case of a question being
realized by another act.An act can also be 'indirect' according to
propositional content(literal and primary force being the same) - see
the Game 13 example below.
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just wanted to know),but sharing the same 'Meta-frame* information he
is able to recognize the appropriateness of 's response to the pre-
1
sumed perlocutionary force behind the question .
A nice example of indecision on the speaker's part as to which act
to perform - a Game Question or a bequest Infomation,or,indeed,a
Hequest Confirmation,all within the same game move - is provided by
Game 14:
'Let me see,is it - Did you say it was - I can't remember if it's -
Is it a box of some sort?'
The cause of this indecision is undoubtedly the speaker's uncertainty
as to whether or not he has already been given the information he wishes
to ascertain.ihe 'factual • question 'Did you say it was(a box)?' could
in theory have been completed and taken by the hearer as a simple
bequest InformationCits propositional content does not match in any
direct sense the criteria for counting as a game question),but the
speaker decides to reformulate his utterance as an overt game question
(being reasonably certain by now that he hasn't already been told whe¬
ther the object is a box or not).He may well have considered that his
partner,in view of the mock-severe attitude she had adopted throughout
the game,was quite capable of taking the utterance couched as a sin¬
cere bequest Information as an indirect Game question anyway.
When we turn to indirect means of performing other acts found in
the data the question whether we are dealing with different realizations
of the same act or of indirect realizations via soiae other act becomes
more problematical.Thus,consider the following 'indirect' realizations
2
of 'bequest Hephrase' :
G.32:'What do you mean 'like an electricity pylon'?'
G.39:'Derhaps you could rephrase it - not 'Is it the <^ueen',the one
before that. '
*One could postulate a rule to the effect that a question whose prop-
ositional content refers to an action the hearer is meant to be doing
•counts as* a request for action,as sometimes appears tc be the case.
But it does not apply in the Game 42 example(see my argument against
'conversational postulates* later in this chapter).
2
All these utterances occur in 'move slots' appropriate for game quest¬
ions or answers,so some real computation as to force is required on
the hearer's part.
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G. 13>Vell,how do you phrase that?'
G.27:'.Veil .you'll have to tell me what the other - the non-pre¬
dominant - part is:mineral and - ?'
G.3G:''ln terms of history' depends on how far back you take
history.*
G.17:'You keep using Vre',which is difficult.*
G.22:'I don't understand your question,sorry.'
G.34:'Would you like to develop that?'
G.5:'.Vhat about the brothel?'
G.42:'Could be involved with the media?'
G.41:'Sculpture can be in another sense,can it?'
Several of these utterances perform more than one discourse act (thus
G.32 is also a token of Ob.iect ,G.41 a tequeat Confirmation.and G.27 a
Prompt - see below),and this question of multiple function must be
teased apart from our principle concern here,namely indirect realizat¬
ions of a single act.In cases like those just mentioned there will
generally be a single response act type that can satisfy both functions
simultaneously(e.g. the rephrasal 'Is it an electricity pylon?' that
follows the G.32 example,which is also a suitable response to an objec¬
tion, i.e. a 'self-correction').When this is not possible,responses
appropriate to the two acts concerned may be strung together serially
within one 'move'1.But most commonly one function will dominate in the
discourse,given the game context with its attendant goals and motiva¬
tions,and it is this act which must be appropriately responded to re¬
gardless of any secondary function. Thus Keauest tiephrase is more 'pri -
mary' than Ob.iect in the G.32 example,since eliciting an answerable
rephrase of a game question in such cases is an act essential to the
successful playing of the game,whereas objecting is not of itself.It
might be the case,however,that the secondary function predominates
as regards choice of form(as perhaps in the G.%2 example)and thus may
enter into the hearer's computation of the primary act involved.The
difference between such 'multiple function* cases and indirect 'single
function' cases is that the appropriate response set for the 'primary'
force of the latter will not be the same as that for its 'literal'
force(and sequentially compounded responses to both acts are also in¬
appropriate), so that computation is necessary on the hearer's part to
*e.g. G.3,where 'Yesjwhat she is makes her a political entity in a
sense' compounds a Confirm and a Give Help(both elicited)
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rule out the second response sot alternative.No such computation is
necessary in the 'multiple function' case,since the two response sets
overlap(or can be compounded)and the hearer can formulate an approp¬
riate response according to either.
Looking at the formal listed above,it is clear that it would be un¬
economical to enter all of them as formulae on the output of the corre¬
sponding realization rule(there being many other indirect possibilities
besides these).We have two ways open to us here:either we list a few
typical realizations - including pointers to other acts - or we invoke
general knowledge and conversational principles(and contextual expect¬
ations) to disambiguate the force of tokens of the act not in a 'typical'
form.In fact both procedures appear to be called for in our model.
The Game 36 example illustrates the case where some kinci of comput¬
ation from basic principles is necessary for the hearer to know how to
respond appropriately.The full context of the utterance is as follows:
^i'Is it in terms of history a fairly recent product?'
(j, : 'No. '
^ : 'No?'
p :''In terms of history' depends on how far back you take history.'
c*:Twenty,fourty years,something like that.'
p, : ' Oh no. '
£'s Request Rephrase is itself a response to a Request Rephrase on cA's
part(an 'echo question' being another realization of that act)motivated
byr^'s unhappiness with ^'s (unclear?)answer 'no'.After uttering 'No?'
then, d is expecting a rephrase of >> 's answer.But what follows is not
a direct rephrase. According to its form (STATE +—y )and propositional
content it is a Comment (ontsi's original question).To account fork's
correct uptake of the 'primary' force(as evidenced by his subsequent
appropriate rephrasing of the question) we must invoke Grice's princ¬
iples of conversational cooper at ion, whereby d, presumes thatjjb's re¬
sponse is relevant to his request for rephrasal.Since it does not dire¬
ctly constitute a rephrasal,he must look for indirect relevance.Now the
most obvious reason why £ should not comply directly with his request
in the context of the game is that he is unable to supply a more sat¬
isfactory to j^'s original game question.An appropriate response on^'s
part would thus be a Claim Inability to Comply (a response sequence he
knows to be possible following a request).Indeed,a Comment with propo-
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sitional content referring to the content of *s question would be
an appropriate indirect realization of that act(Claim Inab. to Comply),
as it supplies a reason why ^ i^ unable to comply more satisfactorily.
Given ^'s overt intention to get a more satisfactory reply(still un¬
satisfied) ,the utterance can be seen as indicating a type of rephrasing
that could satisfy that intention;i,e. o( understands the utterance as
performing both a Claim Inab. to Comply and a Request Rephrase.fhe first
of these is primary from ^ ' s point of view(justifying his own actions)*f
but for 0* (and his goal of solving the game problem)the Request Rephrase
is primary. iThis illustrates the important point that the 'primary* force
of an utterance may be different for the speaker and Athe hearer,even
when communicative cooperation is maintained.Another way of looking at
it would be to state that utterances in discourse may have both a retro¬
spective force(e.g. Claim I. to C. here) and a prospective force(e.g.
Request Rephrase here).Any discussion of indirect speech acts must take
this phenomenon into account one way or another.
But what of simpler examples such as those from games 34 or 13 -
does the hearer have to calculate the primary force of the utterance
from basic principles here too?Gnly in the trivial sense,I would sugg¬
est, that responding appropriately to a particular discourse act is
itself a manifestation of the general principle of cooperation.In
these cases the form of the utterance plus its propositional content
is surely sufficient,in conjunction with contextual expectations,to
ensure direct uptake by the hearer of the act involved.For this to be
true he need only have internalized some schema(part of a larger
rule) corresponding to the response sequence:
Answer .n., ... ^ Request Rephrase / Answer unsatisfactory /
and a realization rule for Request Rephrase (largely overlapping
with a similar rule for a general act Request Action from which it can
2
be derived by the aidit?on of propositional content constraints,etc.;
see later in the chapter):
1
i.e. he may not have intended the utterance as a Request Rephrase
at all
2
Unlike,for instance,Request Confirmation.which has quite different
realizations(namely ASKIF/STATEp t Tag ,with very specific constraints
on ' p' )
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uoquest ^phrase -yASKIF 'Could'/'would'/'can* +'you*(±'like to*)
+Pj +Int
j ASKiVh 'How' p. '<' Int1
I'rfhat about' +NP +int
I tichu p2 ^Contr
I deq.Oonflru
where 'p ' refers to the action requested;*po' is the content of the1 «
preceding utterance,and 'p ' is an inference from the latter.*lnt' is
the intonation patterns(s) associated with requesting,and 'Contr' is
contrastive stress on the dubious element in the preceding utterance.
Conditions effecting the choice of particular realization formulae(such
as degree of politeness) are not here indicated.The first form on the
rule is the most 'unmarked' - i.e. the most typical form for such a
request,the one used if the speaker assumes the minimum of shared con¬
textual information on the part of the hearer;it is,in our terms,the
most direct way of making this kind of request,there being no formal
choice in the mood system of the language neutrally associated with
this force.Rather than say that all requests are indirect,we can state
that typically the act of requesting(e.g. a rephrase) is performed by
a modal question form,as on our realization rule.
Note that these rules render calculation of primary force via lit¬
eral force redundant for most of our listed examples;this has necessi¬
tated, however, the insertion of 'pointers' to other discourse acts on
the right-hand side of the realization rule,with only the 'unmarked'
form(s) spelt out in detail.One has,theoretically,a choice between
indicating such pointers in the realization rule itself or in the
related response sequence rule.In practice it will be found that al¬
though the latter choice might be preferable if all tokens of the act
in the data were found in the context of the response sequence of the
rule,there will be many cases where the act must be recognized indepe¬
ndently of any such sequence(see Give Help below.for instance),in which
case realization of that act via some other act independently justified
in the data must be marked on the realization rule anyway.The point at
which one would wish to 3top inserting more and more indirect realiza¬
tions on a rule and invoke a 'computation from basic principles' expla¬
nation of the recognition of the act's forccCoy the hearer)is perhaps
indeterminate.But the safest solution is to enter as many realizations
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on our rules as would by concensus be regarded as unmarked(i.e. reco¬
gnizable as 'typical' realizations of the act in minimal context) or
as simply 'very common' in the context of the game.That the force of
all of the latter class of realizations might in fact have to be
worked out 'from basic principles' when first encountered by a hearer
must be allowed for(as in the Game 36 example);this will be further
discussed in Chapter 5.
It will be observed that according to the realization rule for
Request Rephrase above,the notion of 'literal' illocutionary(or per-
locutionary) force is extremely tenuous,direct and indirect realiz¬
ations being incorporated in the same schema.Hie most general statem¬
ent we can make is that recognition of (one of) the unoia-rked form(s)
of a discourse act may in some circumstances(as Comment in G.36) act
as input to the hearer's computation of the primary force of an uttor-
ance(beyond that of the act initially recognized),but that such a step
may commonly be circumvented by contextual expectancies.
When we turn to linguistically more 'remote' discourse acts(which
can only be realized indirectly) we find a perhaps surprisingly similar
2
picture.Thus,take the following tokens of Give Help from the data
(contexts in the Appendix):
G.33:'I wouldn't want you to pursue the notion of metals too much,
OKjwhat I said actually was 'mineral'.'
G.34:'Don't think of a whole item.'
G.4:'If you'd like to think along the lines of communication...'
G.49:'Concentrate on the baking - what do you bake normally?'
G.41:'What's it made of?'
G.3:'Yes;what she is makes her a political entity in a sense...
That's a clue.*
G.31:'You've got several questions left,so you might as well.*
These utterances are covered by the following realization rule:
*
The realization rule must in any case be inclusive enough to indic¬
ate the options the speaker has (allowance being made for an utterance
'blending' forms from two simultaneous acts).
2
Limited in the game context to the giving of verbal clues relevant to
the goal of the game.It may or may not follow a preceding Request iL 1p
(it may be initiated spontaneously by the answerer).
1
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where 'p^ * refers to some future,goal-orientated action by the hearer;
'p ' is an expansion of a prior utterance of the hearer's which con-
tains more useful information than a simple rephrase would;and 'p ' is
w
a proposition presumed known but momentarily forgotten by the hearer
which would help him solve the game problem.Propbse Action is itself
typically realized by an imperative form or (less authoritively)a
statement of (and/or justification for)the best course of action for
the hearer to follow.The factors conditioning the speaker's choice of
realization here are complex and highly dependent on the local con¬
text within the game and the type of information most likely to help
the questioner at that point.The only significant difference between
the above realization rule and the preceding one is in the lack of
direct 'unmarked* form.Several of the examples given are compound
helping 'moves' involving more than one act(see Chapter 4)- e.g. the
Game 33 one,where a TTypuse Action is followed by a rhetorical
Request Confirmation (an attention-confirming device) and a (re-)
statement of a fact helpful to the guesser.Cfrily the first and third
components are realizations of Give Help.the central one being an
independantly motivated discourse element introduced according to its
own discoursal 'activation' conditions.
Again we must allow for the hearer's computation of the primary
force behind these utterances in as far as he may not recognize them
as in any sense 'typical' realizations of Give Help out of context
(and they may not be on his own active 'repertoire' for the latter
act)1.Take,for example,the utterance from Game 41,here with full con¬
text :
^ :'George the Fourth Bridge?*
'No!What's it made of?'
: ' The Forth Bridge?'
1We must also be able to account for speaker creativity in devising
essentially new realizations for an act he already 'controls',knowing
that the hearer will be able to compute their force according to
shared background knowledge and cooperative principles.
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pl :'The Forth Rail Bridge'.
. clearly expects a yes/no answer to his game question at this point;he
gets thisfbut is immediately asked a question himself.which is not
expected.As in the Game 36 example earlier,he assumes that is being
cooperative and therefore relevant,and searches for an appropriate act
that the utterance might be performing.Even if he can't find one at once
he can always try treating the utterance as a 'neutral' Bequest inform¬
ation according to its form(ASlCWh),the appropriate response to which
is the search for - and potential expression of - the corresponding
answer.We can assume that this process is initiated in parallel with
his search for the primary force of the utterance(at a different level).
In factfinding the answer to ot's question will act as a reminder of
a piece of information he has already been given which immediately
rules out,once he recalls it,all but one possible solution to the game,
and he can formulate his final question accordingly.without answering
the utterance as a Bequest Information.but without needing to bother
further about the primary force behind the unexpected utterance.Solving
the game problem is his overriding concern during this 'heated* final
stretch.In retrospect ^ may recognize this act(more directly a Remind)
as a token of Give Help, since it has helped himCand he knows o*. is in
general being as helpful as possible towards, him);Give Help is an exp¬
ected (answerer's) act for the game - it is even specifically mentioned
in the rules.As argued in Chapter 2,this 'remote' kind of act is disti¬
nguished from more conventionalized ones by it not being essential that
the hearer recognize the speaker's intention to perform the act in
order to respond appropriately(though not doing so would constitute
only partial uptake)*.In the present case the primary force from the
speaker's point of view was Give Help.but as far as the hearer is con¬
cerned it may simply have acted as a Remind.the ulterior intention
behind it(whether of helping,warning,objecting,etc.)being unimportant
for his more pressing goal of guessing the object.The fact that Remind
is a possible realization of Give Help may or may not be recognized by
the hearer.Note that there are consequently three levels of interpre¬
tation of the utterance,not just one primary and one literal:it is a
The speaker may even decide to point out in retrospect that his utte¬
rance was meant as a Give Help - as in G.3,where the hearer could
have taken it as a Confirm(to a recap),and responded appropriately.
-54-
case of giving help by reminding with an utterance of Wh-interrogative
form.We are certainly not obliged to envisage any special conversational
convention to the effect that a Wh-questiqn Kequest Information is
(under certain conditions) to be interpreted as an act of giving help*.
One useful outcome of examining indirect acts in the data is the
emergence of a number of new acts which are performed either as realiz¬
ations of acts we have already encountered,or concommitantly with them.
The method is self-expanding. Thus,for example,we have come across cases
of prompting or urging.We can set this up tentatively as a discrete
discourse act 'Prompt'.look for further tokens of it in the data in
order to formulate a corresponding realization rule,then check that it
isn't completely subsumed (as regards propositional content constraints
and response set)by some other act already justified.If these conditions
are met we can utilize the new act as an explanatory element in the
model(until,perhaps,it can be shown,on independent grounds,that it can
be subsumed under some act of wider scope not yet postulated).In the




G.3:'Well,you must answer it!'
G.13:'That's not the answer.'
G.36:'Come on,this is limited!'
G.49:'You've got two left,come on,stop thinking out loud!You're not
going to get it.•





•Come on' ± Comment p^
IMP ,p„1
where 'p^ * refers - directly or indirectly - to an action the hearer is
supposed to perform(but hasn't yet);'p ' is a proposition necessary for
2
the hearer to ascertain(in order to fulfil his game goal);'p ' refers
J
*The primary force being computed here is not illocutionary(no one
would wish to call Give Help an illocutionary act,I presume).
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to the rules of the game,and 'P^' to the current situation.'IMP' is
the imperative form - it and 'come on' may be regarded as unmarked fo¬
rms in as far as they are recognizable as realizations of the act even
outside of a context.In all these cases the speaker presumably believes
the hearer will not perform the relevant action immediately without
being urged;this sincerity condition must be relatable to the game's
•Meta-frame' which allows/recognizes that prompting may be necessary
at suitable points during the game.
If we now ask whether we are justified in treating Prompt hence¬
forth as a distinct discourse act,we can answer affirmatively:as reg¬
ards response set it is typically followed by the performance of the
action wanted by the speaker,but,as opposed to the case of a 'general'
Request Action.this action will be contextually expected anyway(barring
the case of a misunderstanding) - the point of the act is to hasten
the expected action.As regards propositional content,the conditions
entered on our realization rule serve to distinguish tokens of this act
from those of 'neutral' acts such as Make Statement and Request Inform¬
ation, which have no such conditions and do not appear on the right of
realization rules(forms such as SPATE and ASKIF appearing instead).
There remain a number of points concerning indirect speech acts to
be discussed in the light of generalizations linking form with function
made by other investigators in this area.They center around the contro¬
versy over how these generalizations are to be related to the grammar
of the language concerned.As we shall see this is really another
manifestation of the argument over convention versus intention already
met in Chapters 1 and 2.
The formulation of our realization rules so far has been intention¬
ally grammar-free and based solely on distributional and procedural
(hearer-recognitional) reasoning.But there are generalizations to be
made about the semantico-syntactic outputs of these rules which might
ultimately simplify them when extended to cover more and more data.
Ihus it is well known that the most common 'indirect' means of expre¬
ssing requests correspond rather nicely to the felicity conditions for
the performance of such (directive) acts.Clark and Clark(1977) summar¬
ize Searle's (1975) findings in this area,stating the methods by which
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A can indirectly request B to perform an action*:
1)Ability.A asserts that he (B) is able to do the action,or asks
B whether or not he is able to do that action.
2)l)esire. A asserts to B that he wants him to do the action.
3)Future Action.A asserts to B that he will do the action,or asks
B whether or not he will do the action.
4)Reason.A asserts to B that there are good reasons for doing the
action,or asks B whether or not there are good reasons for doing
the action.
The corresponding felicity conditions are that A must:
Dbelieve that B has the ability to do the action (preparatory)
2)have the desire that B should do the action(sincerity)
3)believe that B will perform the action if requested(proposi-
2
tional?)
4)have good reasons for B to do the action.
This last condition does not,of course,correspond with Searle's own
fourth felicity condition,namely the 'essential conditi on'swhereby
the utterance must 'count as' an attempt by A to get B to do the
required action(though it is related to his other conditions).Perform¬
ative formulae such as 'I ask/beg/request you to - 'might be said to
correspond to this condition,but they would presumably be treated as
'direct' realizations of a request by Searle(they embody direct 'illo-
cutionary force markers' for the act),regardless of the fact that in
English they are actually less common and less socially 'unmarked'
than the corresponding 'indirect' realizations(see below).
Clark and Clark go on to summarize the (widely acceptedApproximat¬
ion of the procedures whereby the primary force of such indirect acts
might be computed by the hearer:
Step l:Compute the direct(literal) meaning of the utterance.
Step 2:Decide if this meaning was intended.Are there sufficient
*In his article Searle has moved much closer to the 'computation of
intention' approach;he now speaks of convention as simply determining
the particular choice of forms available in a given language corresp¬
onding to the indirect request categories below.
2
A poor statement;Searle has 'S predicts a future action A of H'-but
the general match between felicity conditions and indirect realiza¬
tion types is not as transparent as in Clark and Clark.
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and plausible reasons for the speaker to have intended to
convey this raeaning(alone)in this context?
Step 3:If not,compute the indirect meaning by way of the cooper¬
ative principle and the conventions on speech acts.
Step 4:Utilize the utterance on the basis of its indirect meaning.
I have already argued that such steps are not always necessary if
contextual expectations can bypass them or if the hearer recognizes
the utterance at once as a possible realization of the primary act
intended;we have also seen that it is in some cases difficult to
state exactly what the 'literal' force of an utterance is in the first
place*.But something comparable to these steps must in other cases be
envisaged. »Vhat is important here is to see how such a procedural app¬
roach correlates with the generalizations discussed above and with
others such as the following from Labov(1970):
If A makes a request for information of B about whether an action
X has been performed,or at what time T X will be performed,and the
four conditions below hold,then A will be heard as making an under¬
lying form 'B:do X.''
(The four conditions mentioned are:)
1)X should be done for a purpose Y
2)B has the ability to do X
3)B has the obligation to do X
4)A has the right to tell B to do X
There are two questions one might ask about this kind of generali¬
zation.Firstly , as to why there should be such a close connection between
felicity conditions and indirect realizations of speech acts,and,secondly,
as to how such generalizations(given that they really do hold)can be
related to sentence grammar.Answering the first of these,via an exam¬
ination of how Searle sees them as being actively utilized by the hearer
in procedural terms,will help explain why certain kinds of utterances
tend to be used to perform certain acts.This will lead us to consider
the second question,in response to which 'conversational postulates'
have been proposed by some linguists to relate their sentential deep
*e.g. is a game question of STATE form literally a token of Make Stat-
ment or simply (as I assume) a possible realization of Game Question
in the context of 'Twenty Questions'?
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structures to indirectly performed functions. We will then be able to
ask whether our realization rules do capture the generalizations re¬
vealed by linguists and in doing so adequately allow for interfacing
with a sentence grammar(however characterized).
Let us start,then,with Searle's (1975) example of how a hearer
might be able to compute the primary force of an indirect request for
somebody to pass the salt at the dinner table - namely the utterance
'Can you pass the salt?'His inferential sequence is as follows:
Step 1:Y has asked me a question as to whether I have the ability
to pass the salt(fact about conversation).
Step 2:1 assume that he is cooperating in the conversation and
that therefore his utterance has some aim or point(principles
of conversational cooperation).
Step 3:The conversational setting is not such as to indicate a
theoretical interest in my salt-passing ability(factual
background information).
Step 4:Furthermoi'e,he probably already knows the answer to the
question is yes(factual background information).(This step
facilitates the move to step 5,but is not essential.)
Step 5:There fore,his utterance is probably not just a question.lt
probably has some ulterior illocutionary point(inference from
steps 1,2,3 and 4).What can it be?
Step 6:A preparatory condition for any directive illocutionary
act is the ability of H to perform the act predicted in the
propositional content condition(theory of speech acts).
Step 7:Therefore,Y ha3 asked me a question the affirmative answer
to which would entail that the preparatory condition for
requesting me to pass the salt is satisfied(inference from
steps 1 and 6).
Step 8:We are now at dinner and people normally use salt at dinner;
they pass it back and forth,try to get others to pass it
back and forth,etc.(background information).
Step 9:He has therefore alluded to the satisfaction of a preparat¬
ory condition for a request whose obedience conditions it »s
quite likely he wants me to bring about(inferences from steps
5 and 9).
Searle himself points out that it is probably not in fact necess¬
ary for the hearer to work through all these steps one by one(at least
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not consciously)in a given conversational situation. This rather begs
the question,however,of how the hearer might bypass any of the steps,
rhis would be accounted for on ou-r model in terms of contextual expe-
ctancies(to be formalized as 'frames' in Chapter 4):polite requests
for passing objects at the dinner table - an 'expected' action in that
context - ara typically realized as ASKIF 'can'* + 'you' + p(where 'p*
refers to the action requested),and this can be entered directly on the
realization rule for Request Action.with any relevant contextual cond¬
itions marked.Similar entries can be made for the other main types of
•indirect' request.But why do the latter correspond in the way they
do to the felicity conditions on the act performed(the motivation
behind the crucial steps 6 and 7 in Searle's example)?Qne could deve¬
lop here an ontogenetic and diachronic explanation,to the effect that
it would be formulae relating most closely to the felicity conditions
attending the performance of an act whose 'primary' force (given the
natural tendancy to soften mands for social reasons of politeness,etc.)
could be worked out most easily by a hearer according to context and
basic principles of conversation even if he were unaware of the conve¬
ntional force/status of those formulae.Ihey would therefore readily
tend to become conventionalized in that language.The force behind
more indirect means of expressing a request(e.g. 'There's not enough
salt in this soup*) will have to be computed this way in any case,
since it is not possible to make generalizations wide enough to
cover all possible means of requesting the salt,for example.In fact,
any minimal utterance like 'The salt...' or even a paralinguistic
gesture may be sufficient to perform the act.In other words,Searle's
steps 6 and 7 could be put into even more basic procedural terms:
having been asked if he is able to perform an action,and knowing that
the asker has probably no interest in that ability as such,the hearer
will nevertheless be able to see that the action itself i£ of interest
to the asker from the way the latter is looking or nodding towards the
object,for example,or hesitating to eat up(he himself might have the
same interest , in the context of dinner).For general social(rather
*
It is safer to indicate specific lexical items here since,for example,
'Are you able to pass the salt' is not a colloquial realization of
this act(though its force could be computed according to basic
principles);cf. Sadock(1974).
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than strictly linguistic)reasons of cooperation*he may then comply,
even if he hasn't heard exactly what was said to him.
The argument for more abstract entries in our realization rules
reflecting Searle's generalizations about the relation between felicity
conditions and indirect realizations is,in the light of the preceding,
not very convincing.If the hearer is capable both of recognizing the
primary force of an utterance from basic principles of cooperation and
context/background information and of recognizing conventional formulae
as realizing the act in question directly(i.e. as entered on the right
of a realization rule),there seems little need to indicate in our rules
the more abstract generalizations as well.The fact that the most common
realizations of requests do correspond to felicity conditions on the
act concerned can be explained in historical terms and need not be re¬
lated to rules or procedures productive in the hearer's computation of
the primary force of utterances tokening the act.
Turning to the question of the interface with sentence grammar,we
find that the problem of the absence of a class of indirect speech act
realization corresponding to Searle's 'essential condition' may be
symptomatic of the difficulties lurking whenever an attempt is made
to relate pragmatic force to underlying sentential deep structures,thus
dissolving the distinction between semantics and pragmatics(as Searle
himself tries to do).Although most linguists would agree upon the
2
need to introduce the notion of very general conversational principles
and of shared background information to account for the hearer's reco¬
gnition of indirect speech acts,some(in particular those adhering to
some version of Generative Semantics)have gone further and attempted
to introduce generalizations such as those we have been examining di¬
rectly into their sentence grammars.Thus 'conversational postulates'
integrating 'natural logic' with the language system itself have been
proposed by Gordon and Lakoff(1975) to convert (by trans-derivational
rules) performentially marked deep structures into others corresponds
ing to the primary force of the (indirect) utterance concerned.These
are,essentially,generalizations such as we have observed above expre¬
ssed in a logical form compatible with Generative Semantics. Others,
*i.e. he may comply following the merest grunt and nod,etc.
2
Such as Grice's four maxims of 1)quantity,2)quality,3)relation(re-
levance) and Dmanner
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such as Sadock(1974),have proposed purely grammatically derived deep
structures to account for indirect speech acts - e.g. the conjunction
of a question and a mand(request or command) underlying an indirect
'requestion'.But in either case it is difficult to see how such discourse-
level facts are to be accounted for as the one already mentioned,to the
effect that the overt performative utterance 'I ask/beg/request you to
pass the salt' is not the most 'neutral' or directly interpretable way
of making a request for the salt in English.In fact it is highly mark¬
ed and would most probably spur the hearer into further attempts to
calculate why on earth the speaker used such an unusual form,whereas
such 'indirect' realizations as 'Would you mind passing the salt' would
be instantly transparent and responded to accordingly.Moreover,well-
and ill-formed sentenct.es adduced as evidence for conversational post¬
ulates are not always convincing,as one can generally think of sit¬
uations where the 'ill-formed' ones might be acceptable(especially
when one considers simultaneous 'blends' of more than one act)*.The
point is that sometimes (according to complex discourse factors) a
2
conversational postulate - e.g. ASK(a,b,CAN(b,Q) *.HEtiUEST(a,b,Q) -
will correctly predict the force of an utterance of a given form and
sometimes it will not.It is also unlikely that any finite set of such
postulates could cover all indirect realizations of a given act.The
generalization is captured at the expense of being able to characterize
how and when a hearer might make use of it in interpreting a given
utterance type in context(something which Gordon and Lakoff should
pfesumably be concerned about if they are to justify their procedural
notation).This is an instance of the rule-based,'conventional• approach
to speech acts trying to oust the more heuristic 'intentional'approach
completely.The lack of solid ground in this area of linguistic specul¬
ation is pertinently expressed in Sadock's artic le in the same volume
(1975) as Gordon and Lakoff's paper.
We still have to account somehow for generalizations relating form
and function such as those above,and conversational postulates are bas¬
ically just explanatory devices for handling the corresponding conver-
1
e.g. Gordon and Lakoff's examples of utterances that purportedly can't
be used to make a request:'ought you to take out the garbage?' and 'I
suppose you're going to take out the garbage.'
2
where Q is some future action to be performed by'b'
Request Action
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sational 'implicatures' noted by Grice(1975).But if we ask whether
the introduction of 'oonversatienal postulates would simplify our
model,we must answer no.So many highly context-specific postulates
would have to be set up that it would soon become more economical
to specify procedures whereby primary force can be computed accord¬
ing to basic conversational principles and contextual expectations,
and to list the most conventional forms as 'direct' realizations of
the act in question.And this is exactly what our realization rules
attempt to do.ihus,if we want to account for Searle's example of
requests to pass the salt,we can formulate a rule as follows:
.HMP p i 'please' + Int
ASKIF 'you' + 'can'/'could'/'will•/'would(m:nd)'
+p £ 'please'
STATE 'I' +'want'/'would like'+ 'you* + 'to'p
STATE 'you'+'can'/'might' + p
ASKWh 'Why' +'you'+ Neg-p
where *p' is the action requested and 'Int' those intonational patterns
associated with requesting .Situational conditions relevant to choice
of realization (e.g. degree of politeness)could be indicated appropria¬
tely. There are of course many other ways of expressing a request for
action;those listed simply cover the most conventionalized formulae.
The difference between this kind of solution and mo st others is that
it circumvents computation via 'literal' force except in less conven¬
tionalized cases,when cooperative principles and background knowledge
can be invoked. This allows us to keep our realization rules down to a
reasonable size whilst allowing for the performance and recognition
of the act via more indirect means;interfacing with grammatical forms
is ensured without burdening sentence grammar with pragmatic rules.In
other words,the model attempts to integrate both the conventional and
the intentional aspects of discourse in its representation of the re¬
lationship between form and function for the data.How this works in
practice will be seen in the following chapter,where the question of
discourse analysis as such is addressed.
*As Searle has pointed out,intonation may be a direct clue as to the
primary force of an utterance when it differs from that associated
with the 'literal* force.It should therefore be entered on our rule.
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Chapter 4
Ihe analysis of discourse involves two essential methodological
steps:a)the choice and functional definition of distinct acts to
describe the force of all utterances within the data,and b)the choice
of and functional definition of discourse units of hierarchical level
or rank above the individual act.We have already discussed criteria
for a), fuming to b),we find that sociolinguists and ethnomethodolog-
ists analysing particular domains of discourse have suggested a vary¬
ing number of levels .ranging from twoGiyraes' 'act' and 'event' (197t» )
to six (Coulthard and Ashby's 'act','move','exchange','sequence',
'transaction' ,and 'interaction' (1973) ).Beihaps the most successful of
such hierarchical analyses is that of Sinclair and Coulthard (.1975)
for classroom discourse,which,being highly structured under the con¬
trol of one participant(the teacher),falls rather neatly into a five-
rank structure(those mentioned for Coulthard and Ashby above,minus
'sequence'). Each of their units of higher rank is defined as to fun¬
ction and syntagmatic structure and is related to the next rank below
in terais of structural 'slots' which can be filled by named units from
that lower rank.We shall attempt an analysis of one of our games along
the lines they propose in order to see whether a strictly hierarchical
analysis is sufficient to account for hearer recognition(and,ultimately,
speaker production)of the discourse acts found within the game context.
'Acts','moves' and 'exchanges' will be concentrated on as the higher
ranks of 'transaction* and 'interaction'(i.e. 'lesson' for Sinclair
and Coulthard's data) are problematical when applied to 'Twenty Questions',
though a single game could conceivably be termed a 'transaction' and
the recording session(including introduction to the rules,practice run
and post mortem discussion) an 'interaction'.
As a first approximation to defining higher units above that of
acts for our data we can propose the moves 'Guess' and 'Give Answer'
(as opposed to the acts usually realizing them.Game Question and
2
Answer ),whose sequential coupling constitutes a "Game Exchange".This
certainly captures the basic framework of the game as defined by the
rules.However,one must be careful here to distinguish between moves
Other domains that have been analysed in some detail are radio and
TV interviews(Pearce,1973J,doctor-patient interviews(Coulthard and
Ashby,1973),and coramitee meetings(Stubbs,1973).
2
Moves henceforth in single quotes,exchanges in double quotes
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and roles,as in Sinclair and Coulthard's analysis one move type is
nearly always associated with one role-bearer(e.g. 'Opening' with
the teacher).Clearly it is the role of the questioner to guess and of
the answerer to answer,but can we define the corresponding moves so
that the function of any of the questioner's utterances falling under
the 'Guess' slot of the exchange,for example,can be said to serve the
function of that move - of furthering the questioner towards guessing
the game object?In all except the simplest,strictest games(such as
those simulated by the program OG)this is not really feasible,as can
be seen from the following(incomplete) list of single-act move fillers.
The acts in brackets either mark 'excursions' from the basic pattern
of the game or are responses to such excursions(respectively indicated
by 3mall arrows to the right or to the left of the brackets/.The answ¬
erer's obligatory initial move announcing 'animal,mineral or vegetable*
is not included here.
'Guess': 'Give Answer':
Game Question Answer
Recap Claim Inab. to Comply
Make inference (Give Help)
(Request Confirmation>-» (Request Rephrase »
Request Rephrased (Request Information)^
(Request Information>»(e.g.as to (Request Confirmation>»





->(Admit j (Offer Help)-»
'fojec't (Recap) (for questioner)
-»( Rephrase)
We are obviously going to have to account for a variety of excur-
sional 'side sequences *(cf.Jefferson,1972) that cut right across the
basic exchange pattern of the game and can consist of acts(such as
those concerned with determining the count)not tied by their nature
to one role rather than the other.We can nevertheless continue with
a hierarchical analysis of the game,provided we allow for the basic
*
Those without arrows are isolated acts that nevertheless inteijupt
the basic game exchange pattern.
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exchange pattern(alternate 'Guess* and 'Give Answer' moves) to be
suspended for the duration of such 'extra-ludic' excursions.To do so
we must examine examples(such as those already encountered)of 'compound
acts' in the data - where more than one utterance with more than one
function are produced by a speaker during his 'move'.Such acts found
in one game (Game 20)follow,with multiple-function acts marked with a
single vertical brace.Mere repetition or the realization of one act
by more than one sentence-length utterance will not be considered here.*
Ihe function of the two role-tied moves under which they fall('Guess'
and 'Give Answer')can be defined respectively as 'furthering the ques¬
tioner towards guessing the game object' and 'responding to the ques¬
tioner's moves according to the rules of the game'.
'Guess':
"Heq.Hephr.pteq. i
H. Heq.Express Surprise -rj Conf. ('My goodness.Yes,but not nec¬
essarily?* )
Express Difficulty +Game Q. ('I'm stuck completely.*. .Can it
be only male?')
Make Inf. + Express Jiff. + Game Q. + hephrase ('It can be male or
female...This is ridiculousiIs it alive - or is it a live or
dead human?*)
2
Kea. Confirm, (iihet.) -p.lako Infer." ('It's alive?So it's not a
i iieq. Conf. corpse or anything like that*')
Echo + Game Q. ('It's very close...Is it in this room?')
Object + Justify Self +Kephrase + Reg♦ ;?ermiss. ( 'Cheat 11 don• t see
how it could be me and not me.I don't see how it could only
be me 'sort of'.Can I give up?')
'Give Answer':
Confirm + liephrase ('Yes,it's a member of the class 'human'but it
*Some of these examples combine response to one sequence with initia¬
tion of another(e.g. the last one under 'Guess').
2
There is a general problem in cases such as this as to whether to
mark a Req.Conf. as also a Game Q.(or,as below,a Rephrase as also a
Give Help)as it is largely up to the hearer how he treats them,rega¬
rdless of the speaker's intention.The subsequent response will often
give some clue as to how it was taken.
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need not be restricted to the class
'human *.)
Answer + Comment (*Uhuh.You're very close.')
Give Help + Rephrase + Indicate ('It's not entirely you. It's not
you as a whole.That's a big clue.')
Confirm +T*Reason Out Loud + Apologize +Reatate ('No,in fact,oh
[Correct Self
no -i.e. - 'i.e.'means 'that is* - so it's definit-
ly human.I'm sorry.It's definitely human.')
2
Answer + Rephrase ('Yes.Part of it,yes.')
Answer (hedged and expanded) + ri)eclare ('Well,! suppose you
istate Intent
might,but it would look most peculiar.I'11 say no to that.')
State Intent + Req. Permiss. + Give Reason +Give Help ('I'll give
you a big big clue,OK?So's you get it right.Well,it's promin-
ant.')
By examining a large number of such compound acts within the data
and separating out the 'excursions'(inclusion of which would greatly
complicate an analysis of possible structural 'slots* within the
"Game Exchange")we arrive at the follrwing - no doubt still incomplete-
description of the acts that can combine to constitute a single 'Guess*
or 'Give Answer' move.More than one optional element can be chosen,
and,apart from a few specific cases such as 'State Intent + Recap +',
there would appear to be no clear constraints on ordering other than
those marked here by __+ (^followed by an obligatory element) and +
(=following an obligatory element).It is possible that examination of
a still wider corpus of data might reveal more local constraints on
the ordering of elements within moves.Following Sinclair and Coulthard,
we can call the left-hand elements a structural *pre-head',the oblig¬
atory elements the 'head',and the right-hand elements a 'post-head'.
'Guess':
Obligatory: Game Question or Req.Confirm./Make infer./Recap taken as
a Game Q. by the answerer(or Recap curtailed by a Give Help
intervention by the answerer)
The speaker is checking the printed rules here
2
See footnote 2 on the previous page
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Optional: Kcho+ + Hephrase/Expand *
Express Difficulty!- +Give Example
Express Surprise(etc.)+








Obligatory: Answer or Claim Inability to Comply
2






Some of the excursion types(consisting of acts themselves expandable
beyond single utterances)that cut across the "Game Exchange" are the
following:
Req.Rephrase —} Rephrase
Ob.iect =.-TAdmit/ Justify Self,etc.
Remind s Acknowledge
Req. Info^r- .v, Answer
Req. ConfirnuT=^>Confirm
Req. Help n - -■■^Give Help,etc.
iliere are difficulties when one tries to formulate these excursions
as'exchanges• of the same rank as "Game Exchange".Besides the problem
of embedding,treated below.it is difficult to characterize their int¬
ernal structure in terms of functionally definable move slots,due to
the variety of patterns t£ncountered(some involving more than two moves)
*Already incorporated in the realization rule for Game Q.it is so common
2
A Comment is distinguishable from a Make Statement by propositional
content:it must refer to the current situation.A Declare is,on the
other hand,made by a speaker with the authority for its proposition
to be binding.
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for realizing their function.Thus in the case of a hypothetical exchange
type "Assist" consisting of a 'Request Help' and a 'Give Help'move(typ-
ivally realized by acts of the same name as their 'heads')1,we find
we have somehow to relate to these 'slots' such response sequences
found in the data as Offer Help ^—rti Accept/Kefuse ^ Give Help/0 .
Similarly for a hypothetical "Determine Count" exchange,where we find
such alternative patterns as Req. Information ■ -^Answer .Req.Confirm.
=a» Confirm.or simply Declare ( »■ Acknowledge) .These are not easily
relatable to functionally constant move slots,since in the third case
of the latter exchange,for instance,the initiating speaker is giving
rather than requesting information(as in the first two).Rather than
introduce problematical move and exchange labels here(the move labels
being largely redundant in any case,echoing the 'head* acts they cont¬
ain),! shall simply leave open the possibility of describing these
excursions in terms of exchange types.The acts involved have their own
response sequence requirements regardless of which role-bearer in the
"Game Exchange" initiates them.I shall also leave open for the time
being the possibility of describing the obligatory kernel acts of
such excursions as move 'heads'(as opposed to primary acts expandable
according to their own realization rules).
Below,a Sinclair and Coulthard style analysis of one game(Game 28)
is presented.lt will be seen that the analysis works well for the
basic game exchange(corresponding to Sinclair and Coulthard's "Elicit'
exchange)if one allows for suspension of the latter for excursions.
These are contained within square brackets. The exchange type is marked
on the left and the two wide columns contain 'Guess' and 'Give Answer'
moves respectively.Acts realizing these moves are indicated in the
narrower columns to their right.The final Comment following the game





The object is animal. Announce
Or,alternatively,by lower level acts such as Exnress Difficulty or
Make Statement■but here the number of possible realizations escalates
enormously.
2
Not strictly a 'Give Answer* move,but bound to the answerer role
Game Ex.
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Is the object in this
building?
G.Q. No. Answer1
ft Is it in Edinburgh? II Not as far as I know If
If Is it in Britain? ft Yes,as far as I know. II
It Is it a specific ob¬
ject?
II Yes. II
t» Is it larger than
your briefcase?
II Yes. II











I can't answer that






It Is it useless? G.q. I can't answer that
question either!
C.I.to C
Game Ex. It's between the size
of a briefcase and a
house;in Britain;spe¬
cific. ..
And it's animal.Is it
a living animal?
















II Is this person invol¬
ved in politics?
G.Q. I have to give an ex¬
panded answer.This per¬





II Is this person male? II No. II
II
1 The Queen? No. II
1
Sinclair and Coulthard's 'Reply'
Game Ex. ...female...shouldn't
be involved in polit¬
ics-! that wasn't rea¬
lly very fair,was it^





I don't know. C.I.to C.
"(A) ISo that doesn't count! -Decl. As far as I know,yes. Con-Pi T'tnL -I
I think - I'm recapp¬
ing -you did say that
Lcomm-
indic.
this person was not iteq.
Conf.





Is it a person inv¬ G.Q. No...No. Answer
olved in entertain¬
ment?
II Is it Princess Marg¬
aret?
II No. It
II Is it a person in
the academic world?
II No. II
Game Ex. Is it a specific per¬
It
Yes.^That's not coun¬ Ans.
(B) son?! mean have I got




ted as a question,'cos- Decl.
(Give fle—
asnn)
Not counted.But it Epfco No,no,no. I mean it's





flee. j I'd be giving you a



















Game Ex. No.|I was just think¬











ft That's my clue..)So






asking 'Is she -is it






Note in particular the overlapping at the beginning of exchange(A),
where 'So that doesn't count' belongs to the previous excursion;the in¬
complete/cancelled game exchange at (B);and the double embedding that
follows (C),where the head of the questioner's 'Guess* move -i.e. the
next Game Question - is postponed for two complete excursions,themsel¬
ves embedded in a third(whose head is Give Help).The players can reco¬
gnize that the game exchange has been suspended at these points due
to the form and propositional content of the utterances marking the
initiation of the excursions concerned.Until the appearance of its
head(Game Question)the original game move 'Guess' cannot be completed.
Now Sinclair and Coulthard's method of analysis does allow for
what they call 'bound exchanges'(with headless opening moves -or J3
in that position),which represent a certain kind of embedding,as in
the following example of a 're-initiation exchange'Cthe teacher is
asking about road signs):
(Opening) (Answering) (Follow-up)
This is a super one.Iso-
belle.Can you think what
it means?
Does it mean there's been
an accident further down
the road?
No.
Does it mean a double bend
alone?
No.
Look at the car. Slippery roads? Yes.
Here the re-initiation ('Look at the car*) shares the same head('Can
you think what it means?') as the previous eliciting exchange.But the
function of such an exchange meshes directly with that of the preced¬
ing^.g. eliciting) exchange.lt is really an expansion of a prior
exchange and not an 'excursion' in our sense at all.The problem rem-
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ains then,that although the basic game exchange pattern can be cap¬
tured in terms of discourse units of higher rank and their functional
•slotslocally conditioned/activated response sequences(excursions)
do interrupt it,rendering the hierarchical structure alone insufficient
to generate the games of our data:it cannot predict the environments
in which such excursions will occur.This is,of course,not one of the
aims of discourse analysis as such,but is certainly relevant to pro¬
cedural modelling.
Various types of embedded sequences have been studied by Schegloff
(197c) and Jefferson(1972).'The former discusses 'insertion sequences'
of the general form Q - Q - A - A such as the following:
A:I don't know just where this address is.
B:Well.which part of town do you live in?
A:1 live at four ten East Lowden.
B:Well you don't live very far from me.
Here the first utterance is a request for clarification and the embe¬
dded question and answer are a 'presequence' to the final clarificati¬
on. A recognizes that the second question is initiating a pre-sequence
relevant to the clarification he has requested because of his knowle¬
dge of the sort of 'work' required on the part of the clarifier for
specifying locational information^.e. gathering material relevant to
formulating that clarification).
Jefferson examines another type of 'side sequence'(these having
the general form :Ongoing sequence - Side sequence - Return).namely
what he calls the 'misapprehension sequence',for example:
A:Why didn't they do anything about that bullet,cause there was
another wound.
B:.Yell,what are they gonna do about it,except remove it -(misapp¬
rehension)
A:No!But that means that there was another bullet from a differ¬
ent shot.(clarification)
B's misapprehension of the meaning behind A's 'wisecrack'remark(which
would normally have elicited a 'wisecrack' response in return)causes
A to clarify what he actually meant.Jefferson formulates a rule for
this kind of sequence to the effect that a 'may form'^clarification
must demonstrate or assert something which repeats part of(overlaps
1
where clarification is optional since the original utterance could
in theory be taken either of two ways
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with)the utterance that is misapprehended.lt may further be marked by
special intonation or markers like 'No,I/that mean(s) - '.Both writers
are dealing with fairly free conversational material and therefore do
not attempt to relate these local sequences to an overall hierarchical
structure.lt is precisely this kind of 'embedded' sequence which is
apparently precluded(though logically conoeivable)in the class-room
data of Sinclair and Coulthard(and also in,for example,Tearce's (1973)
broadcast interview data).
The same problems of accounting for embedded sequences in a hier-
1
archical structure arise with a 'text grammar' approach to our data
(cf.Grimes ,1975",and Van Dijk,1972).Actual discourse,apart from in
certain rigidly controlled situations,would not seem to be generatable
in a strictly hierarchical manner(as opposed to formal model-theoretic
productions,which may be),whether from a single high-level 'topic'
node or from a supra-sentential deep structure on the analogy of a
sentence grammar.At least this will not work for even such an apparently
structured domain of discourse as 'Twenty (Questions':a homogenous rule
system capable of generating the actual games in our data would have
to be so micro-context-specific in order to account for all local ex¬
cursions from the game exchange that it would be little less complex
than an ad hoc description of each game individually.What is general-
izable about all the games - what Van Dijk would call the 'macro-stru¬
cture* underlying all of them - is the basic exchange pattern described
above.But this macro-structure alone cannot generate any of the games
in our corpus.There is always going to be a chasm between the isolation
of such structures(whether it be for 'Twenty (Questions*,for descriptions
of apartment layouts(Linde and Labov,1975) or for fairy tales(Lakoff,
1972)/* and the characterization of actual discourse,where more than
one 'global* structure would appear generally to be involved.The view
that discourse is produced by the interaction of different 'macro-
structures' and indeed of different systems(e.g. a sentence grammar,
a set of discourse rules and principles,the perceptual systems,stored
world knowledge,general action schemata,etc.)is gaining ground within
cognitive psychology and psycholingui sties (cf. llever, 1970, and ilurtig,
1i.e. of stating the environments in which they are likely to occur
and relating the acts/moves involved to one or another of the func¬
tional 'slots' of the role-bound game exchange pattern
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1977),and our own data seems to support this view unambiguously1.This
is not to say that 'macro-structures* cannot be discovered nor that
generalizations concerned with textual cohesion are irrelevant to
discourse generation as such;the claim is merely that hierarchically
organized generation of real dir.course from a single macrof&tx'ucture
or'topic* node is not a practical proposition.The failure of any fully
generative text grammar to have actually emerged along these lines
(other than fragmentary formal productions)is symptomatic.
2
My own solution is in terms of what I shall call 'frames' .These
are labelled context structures consisting of'expected*patterns of
interaction within that context,and as such are assumed to belong to
Long Term Memory.They do not 'do* the generation for our data,but
enter into it in a crucial manner(see Chapter 5 for the notion of
•control structure').The basic question-answer exchange pattern(a
completed game set of which corresponds to a 'transaction',to use
Sinclair and Coultliard's term)constitutes the 'Game Frame':it consi¬
sts of an Announce act by the answerer followed by a regular altern¬
ation of 'Guess' and 'Give Answer' moves until the game object is
correctly guessed(or twenty exchanges are up),as described by the
rules.But this is only one(albeit the principal)exchange pattern
in the context of the game.A higher-level frame containing the 'Game
Frame* as well as a number of other expected sequences(such as those
concerned with giving help,determining the count,objecting to an utt¬
erance, etc . lis required;this I shall call the 'Meta-frame' for the
game.lt contains 'slots' for all the discourse acts and sequences of
acts that are predictable from the goal and rules of the game and for
those monitoring procedures relating to these acts necessary to en¬
sure the successful/rule-conformal playing of the game.It is conceiv¬
able that such a context-specific 'meta-frame* is set up to monitor
a wide variety of cognitive activities besides the playing of guessing
games.The slots in the Meta-frame are only partially ordered into
interactional sequences - according to the response sequence rules
01
1 shall have more to say in Chapter 9 as to how theories about the
nature of such interaction are constrained by general criteria for
model building as well as by evidence from individual 'micro-systems*.
2
Not identical with(though related to)Minsky's structures of that
name(1975 ),nor of course to Sinclair and Coulthard's 'frame'move
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for the acts contained within it;each of these acts has its own com¬
plex activating conditions and resultant outputs brought with it(in
most cases) from outside the Meta-frame context,as described in Cha¬
pter 5.In listing the contents of the Meta-frame 1 shall indicate acts
rather than moves,reserving the latter term(as suggested earlier in
^he chapter)for recursive turns associated with one role-player or
the other - i.e. the two acts within the Game Frame,which we shall,
reverting to earlier usage,call 'Game Question' and 'Answer'(keeping
them between single quote marks).This is partly for the reasons alre¬
ady given concerning redundancy of labeling and heterogeneousness of
the relevant exchange types,and partly because our discourse acts as
defined are capable of expansion anyway(through optional 'pre-'and
'post- heads').It should be borne in mind that the following list is
not absolutely fixed - not all the slots are necessarily present
for a beginner who has Just read the rules(how they are derivable
from the rules and general knowledge of discourse will be treated
later in the chapter).Acts marked '©' are role-bound to either the
answerer(here &%)or the questioner(here $ ) - but only indirectly
related to the function of the two corresponding moves in the Game
Frame.Optional acts are in brackets.
Meta-frame slots:
'Game Frame
®(^» Request Help=y)«^ Give Help
Offer Help Accept/Decline ^ot Give Help/ B
Request Information -y Answer (e.g. as to count or rules)
Request Confirmation =s^Confirm
Request Rephrase ft. Rephrase





Each of these acts has its formal(and content) constraints and its own
1
i.e.f. Announce ^(recursive) ^'Game Question' 'Answer'
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particular activation conditions whereby the hearer can recognise that
the game exchange has been suspended for the duration of the local ex¬
cursion involved.The reason why the two frames are best not collapsed
into one has already been discussed:the excursion 'moves' cut across
the role-tied move slots of the game exchange(Game Frame),and,moreover,
all the acts in the Meta-frame apart from the game exchange have the
additional property of marking a suspension of that(recursive)exchange
pattern.How this solution in terms of frames actually 'works' procedu¬
rally will be seen in Chapter 5,where the cognitive nature of the stru¬
ctures here discussed is made clearer.
There is at least one other frame relevant to our data,namely that
for ('post mortem')Discussion.The most common slots here are 'Comment
==^(counter)Comroent ,though argument sequences (involving such acts
as Ob.iect. Justify Self.tiestateU'osition).etc. ) and polite Self 31ame —^
Shift Hlame sequences are also found.it is possible that other types
of situational information relevant to the production of discourse,such
as social relationship between the participants,could be formalized in
terms of frames.though this has not been followed up in detail.It is
presumed that more than one frame can be activated at one time and that
during the course of free conversational discourse there will be a
continual coming into prominence and receding into the background of
a large number of such interactional structures".whilst others,close¬
ly tied to the external situation,are held constant.Thus for the dinner
table situation quoted in Chapter 3 we can assume a frame with slots
for 'expected' discourse sequence types at dinner - one of which will
be for the passing of objects on the table.Hut in no sense is a frame
meant to capture all possible sequence types within a context:it con¬
tains only those that are most conventionalized or expected and as
such of use in ensuring rapid recognition by the hearer(s) of the
2
force of utterances(or actions) within that context".The force of less
conventional.situation-related utterances will of course have to be
*Cf. Goffman(l974) ,who speaks in very general terms of social frames,
and of movement into and out of them.
2
There is some similarity here on the discourse level with W'ilks' (1973)
'preference semantics:operating at the semantic level of sentence comp¬
rehension: the model's frame slots represent a'prefered'order of expec¬
tation of the pragmatic force of utterances of a certain form in the
context(Game Frame,then Meta-frarae,then isolated acts in the system).
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determined according to local discourse context and background knowle¬
dge.
Hie important thing remaining is to see how such structures could
in theory be constructed 'from scratch' - as in the case of the abso¬
lute new-comer to the game - and added to as experience with the game
increases.What the new-comer is given in the printed rules(see the
Appendix)is sufficient for him to set up the Game Frame,i.e.alterna¬
ting yes/no'Game Question' and 'Answer' moves following an announce¬
ment by the answerer as to the material source of the game object and
terminating when the object is guessed or twenty game exchanges are up.
It follows from the rules and goal of the game that each player knows
the game-determined motives of the other during its course.Hie rules
also mention that the answerer may give a more expanded answer if he
judges that a simple 'yes /no* is not possible.lie is also allowed to
give the guesser a clue if at around the fifteenth move he appears to
be in difficulty;it is left up to the answerer just how helpful he is
going to be.Players are urged to discuss the game's course after it is
over if they so wish.fhe atmosphere in the lab-recorded games was such
as to elicit games that were taken seriously by the participants but
which were fairly informal as regards the incursion of comments,witti¬
cisms and even 'cheating'.Clearly both players bring to bear on their
game playing a wealth of background knowledge,including experience „
with a wide variety of general discourse acts.
At this point the new-comer's Meta-frame for ' IWenty Questions'
(given that some such structure is necessarily set up by him to impl¬
ement the rules)will contain a slot for the Game Frame itself,and
possibly one for comments on the course of the game;there will cert¬
ainly be one for giving help/a clue.Within the Game Frame the move
slot for 'Game Question' will be filled by a general discourse act
he already has available,namely Kequest Information (associated con¬
ventionally with the yes/no questions mentioned in the rules),but
with special propositional content conditions and with special con¬
sequences for the game count added to it,thus constituting a new
discourse act,as was argued in Chapter 1.It will follow that the
corresponding 'Answer' move may be performed by the general act
linked to Hequost—Tnfnrmntinn in the common response sequence for
questions,namely Answer,and that this act may be expanded if necess¬
ary, fhe Request Information ==»Answer sequence has the alternative
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second element Claim Inability to Comply or Refuse ;given the nature
of the game the new-comer can expect at least the first of these as a
possible response.
Again from the rules the new-comer can deduce that somebody must
keep count of the twenty questions allowed — this is usually under¬
taken by the answerer spontaneously,he being the less 'cognitively
burdened' of the two during the game,but sometimes the questioner,the
more interested partner,does so;often both do segwirately,and occasion¬
ally both forget to.In any case he (or his partner)is likely to want
to check the count at some stage during the game,so this kind of ex¬
change may be expected from the outset.In general,both players will
want to keep a check on the 'legality' of the other player's moves,
so the contingency of reminding the other of the rules or of raising
an objection is foreseeable.The possibility of either player request¬
ing a rephrase or expansion or of asking for confirmation of some
hypothesis or interpi*etation of what the other meant by an utterance
is derivable from previous experience with question-answer exchanges
in general.Similarly for the other expected acts and sequences;but
these do not all have to be worked out beforehand - tney can be added
whenever local conditions produce a 'new' excursion type relevant to
the game and the force of the utterance signalling it has to be calc¬
ulated from basic principles.Recognition of the force of such an ex¬
cursion-initiating act in the future will be facilitated if it is
given its own 'expectation slot' in the Meta-frame.
Finally we must consider how a frame might contain information
relating to the felicity conditions of the acts expected in its slots.
As mentioned in Chapter 2,the sincerity and preparatory conditions
for a number of our discourse acts are already presupposed by the
game context itself.In discussing how a new-comer to the game could
build up a set of partially ordered expectations(the Meta-frame)
according to the goal and rules of the game,it was mentioned that
he will know at the outset what the principle motives of the two
players will be during the course of the game.In other words,he will
know what sincerity and preparatory conditions adhere to the two roles-
for example that the questioner will want to obtain certain informat¬
ion in order to further his attempt to solve the game problem and that
the answerer will be able to supply that information within certain
constraints(respectively a sincerity and a preparatory condition for
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a number of our discourse act3>.It will therefore not be necessary
for the hearer of an utterance that performs such an 'expected' act
to calculate every time whether the preparatory and sincerity cond¬
itions for it hold locally in order to recognize it as such.He need
only determine its formal properties and propositional content to be
sure of its probable force within the game context.We can mark the re¬
levant information against the role-tied move slots in the Game Frame
as required.This in no way negates the validity of generalizations
about sincerity and preparatory conditions on 'speech acts* considered
in isolation from contextual frames,but is a matter that should be
pointed out here since it will simplify our description of how the
model might actually operate.
Let us sum up what has been acheived so far.A method of structu¬
ral description of our data has been elaborated in such a wuy as to
account - at least in a general sense -for hearer recognition of the
intended force behind any utterance within the game context.The hypoth¬
etical cognitive structure corresponding to the latter has been char-
1
acterized as a frame within a frame ,these latter consisting of expe¬
cted (sequences of)acts liable to occur within them rather than as a
strictly hierarchical structure.We are now ready to make the short
jump to a more hypothetical plane upon which each of the acts justified
by examination of the data is regarded as a complex,context-sensitive
processing module of unknown inner structure,but describable in terms
of input conditions and output actions.This move is essential if we
are to show how the description we have developed so far to account
for hearer recognition of 'what is going on' in the discourse can
also be utilized to account for speaker production of the interacti¬
onal games in our data,something which is not easy to do on a strictly
hierarchical model.
This frame structure is perhaps^in a procedural sense(bi-stratally
hierarchical,but this is not the same as the descriptive sense of
•hierarchy' we have been concerned with in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
The assumption we are now going' to make is that each of the disco¬
urse acts justified on distributional and functional grounds for the
data corresponds in a one-to-one fashion (however indirectly and with
however much overlap)with a processing module we shall call a 'demon'.
This can be taken as an input-output routine activated both in the
production of utterances realizing its output conditions(in 'efferent'
mode) and in the recognition by the hearer of the force of such utter-
ances(in 'afferent' mode)1.The term 'demon' does not correspond dire¬
ctly to the processing unit so named by Charniak(1972),but subsumes
the latter,which is a 'pattern-invoked' data structure activated by
•recognition' of one element of its structure in parsing a text in
such a way that the system will subsequently 'expect' other items frcm
that structure to occur(e.g. mention of 'presents' if the demon con¬
cerns children's parties and is activated,say,by the word 'party').In
a sense this is what our demons do in the afferent mode:following their
activation certain consequent actions can be expected(e.g. that an ob¬
jection will be raised if a contradictory utterance is made - the act¬
ivating condition for the demon concerned with objections).In so far
as they are active in the production of utterances (in the efferent
mode) they correspond to what are called 'productions' in Artificial
Intelligence(cf.Newell,1973).consisting of a condition and a consequent
action;but they involve considerably more complexity and context-sens¬
itivity than such rule-like binary units usually do.A system consisti¬
ng of an assembly of inter-related productions,a •long-term' data
base,and a 'short-time' 'working space' in which external input(corr-
esponding to the conditions on the productions)appears will act as a
'control structure' for the output generated.A control structure is of
course specific to certain tasks/goals,and in modelling human cogn¬
itive behaviour one would wish to allow for the setting up of control
structures for new tasks whenever encountered.This is something our
'meta-frames' can do:they embody the goal of the context-determined
task and ensure immediate access to various computational means known
- or deducible - to be relevant to acheiving it.The slots in our 'Ave-
nty Questions* Meta-frame are filled by (addresses to )particular de-
1
This may of course involve duplicated or distributed systems in the
brain;I am as usual choosing the simplest description to model.
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mons(either linked by response sequences or in isolation)and it there¬
by acts as a control structure for the generation cf well-formed games.
In a somewhat different manner the frames in Bobrow et al's pro¬
gram GUS(1976)perform an analogous function in simulating dialogue at
a travel agency.In their system(which generates utterances by filling
in 'blanks' on templates rather than by syntactic rule - a short-cut
adequate for their purposes),the procedures attached to the slots of
their frames are called either 'demons' or 'servants',the latter being
optional demons activated only on demand according to local conditions.
In generating questions to put to the client the system sets up 'expec¬
tation slots' for dealing with the answers it elicits,much as our
demons are linked by response sequences marked on their input and out¬
put conditions within the Meta-frame.The slots in G'JS's frames,howe¬
ver,are really labeled blanks for items of information that must be
elicited(by the demons and servants attached to the slots)in order
for GUS to advise the client as to available flights(its goal).This
information can be gathered in a number of different ways -by direct
or incidental elicitation - and the system has no 'knowledge' of inter¬
actional discourse acts as such:a demon for generating an utterance to
elicit an item of information to fill its 'slot' is simply activated
by some other demon or servant on receipt of its own slot-filling in¬
put. Ihe highest level frame for GUS is labeled 'Dialog' and it in turn
•contains' the two subordinate frames 'Trip Specification' and 'Trip
Leg'.concerned with eliciting specific information about the client's
projected journey.The slots of these frames do not correspond to dis¬
course acts at all.In fact very little work,beyond simple question-
answer programs.has yet been done in implementing discourse simulation
1
as such ;consequently the model I am proposing is considerably more
ambitious than the program actually implementing part of it.For the
model to be fully simulatable on the computer a number of routines
would have to be incorporated into the Meta-frame corresponding to
such cognitive procedures as checking the legality of moves and of
searching for motives behind the other player's utterances,etc.But
as these remain inaccessible to observation the model does not attempt
to press further than the modelling of overt discourse acts - it is
1
But cTPower's robot dialogue simulation(1974)and L.ehnert's recent
work with Schank(1977)
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only up to that point that the model is in any immediate sense testable
(see Chapter 9).
One further advantage of modelling discourse generation in terms*
of demons and frames(rather than,say,of unstructured rule lists)-be-
sides that of approaching explanatory adequacy for the data - is that
the fundamental notion of input condition plus output action can be
used also for the procedural representation of the rules of other sub¬
systems involved in the generation of discourse,for example the gramm¬
atical rules of the sentence-generator component.In Part Two I shall
attempt to show how a variety of Augmented Transition Network using
context-sensitive phrase structure rules of this sort could,along with
similarly structured discourse level rules,be involved in the genera-
1
tion of our data.As I've stressed before,such input-output units,em¬
bedded within a heterarchical control structure and having context-
sensitive output,have little in common with traditional stimulus-resp¬
onse couples.
In order to see how a 'demon' corresponding to a particular intent¬
ional discourse function might actually be characterized in terms of
input/output conditions we shall look at all the realization types fo-
2
und for two common discourse acts in the data ,namely Request Rephrase
and Ob.ject.These acts overlap to some degree,it will be seen,one utter¬
ance sometimes performing both acts simultaneously.Out before doing
this it is necessary to list all the discourse acts needed for a descr¬
iption of the data,as they will be referred to throughout the chapters
following(by the corresponding demon numbert on the left).Next to each
entry is an informal description of the discourse function it serves
within the data.This is enough to define each act,but,as argued in
Chapters 1 and 2,other classificatory criteria have to be adduced for
the -not uncommon- case where one act'5 function is subsumed entirely
within that of another.No attempt has been made to group them accord¬
ing to more general functional types(e.g. directives,representatives,
etc.).
Discourse Acts for the Data:
01 Answer Supply information requested
D2 Game Question Elicit information relevant to game goal
1
i.e. real-time production(our definition of this term henceforth)
2




06 Justify Self(or X)
D7 Expand/Rephrase
D8 Admit


















Signal surprise at X's * action/utterance
Signal disagreement with(or rule-breaking
nature of)X,s utterance
Corroborate truth of X's proposition
Give good grounds for own(or X's)prior
action/utterance
Elaborate prior utterance
Signal acceptance of proposition previou¬
sly denied or accusing self of blame
Justify non-complial with request
Signal assimilation of X's utterance
Emphasize own prior utterance or summar¬
ize after elaboration
Make statement about course of present
game(to make opinion/attitude known)
Supply grounds for proposition
Bring X's attention to something
Elicit elaboration of X's utterance
Give X option of receiving help
Give information believed(or claimed)to
be true
Repeat propositions known to apply to the
game object(to aid formulation of new
question)
Repeat X's utterance(signalling that it
is being pondered)
State proposition implied by prior utter¬
ance (e.g. for aiding formulation of new
question)
*
Signal acceptance of X's solution of game "
Elicit authorized approval for proposed
action
Give " " "
Cancel or rephrase own ill-formed utter¬
ance
i.e. the speaker's interlocutor
>

































Signal(conventional) regret at own action
Signal acceptance of X's proposition
Elicit X's acceptance of own proposition
Elicit information(rhetorically:as Reason Out
Loud)
Signal hesitation,preventing X from making
his next discourse move
Expand proposition with illustrative example
Signal difficulty in fulfilling game move
Elicit aid from X in attaining (game)goal
Supply information helpful to X's attainment
of game goal
Indicate something X should know but may have
forgotten
Urge X to make his next move
Indicate in advance own next action
Withhold complial with request
Make statement initiating(or terminating)game
Elicit offered help
Signal non-acceptance of offered help
Aid (own)formulation of next question(signall-
ing its postponement)
Indicate own blameworthy action
Indicate X's blameworthy action
Elicit corroboration of truth of proposition
Complete X's unfinished utterance(to signal
comprehension and hasten discourse)
Signal(conventional) gratitude for X's action
Stop X from performing illegal/useless action
Free X from commitment to complial with re¬
quest
Clarify intended meaning/force of (own) utt-
rance misunderstood by X
Make authorized,binding statement
Elicit (acceptance of)proposed future action
Elicit repetition of X's utterance
Indicate negative consequences of future course




Elicit grounds behind action/utterance







Reduce force of " "
Signal annoyance at 'unfair' action
Signal pleasure(e.g. at finding solution)
Soften or negate self-blame by X
Soften force of own admission/concession
ft
Significant pauses and other paralinguistic acts signalling uncertainty,
etc.,have not been included above as they rarely appear to be intended
in our data.Given this list of acts we can now analyse all the indirect
and multiple-act utterances(as well as the more direct realizations of
the act)that fulfill the function 'Signal disagreement withCor rule-
breaking nature of) X's utterance',i.e. token outputs of demon number
four. Ob.i ect. The following include all such utterances found in the
English data;relevant environments are in brackets:
Realizations of Ob.iect:
G.5:(What about the brothel?It's not 'the brothel'.)
It's not the brothel?You said it was a building.
G.5:(Not directlyCto do with the brothel).)
0h?That's crazy.
G.33:(I take that as a question.)
It isn't a question!You said it didn't have anything to do with
food,so I know it's not a 'Smarties' packet.
G.41:(Yes,very solid.)
Very solid?Come one!
G.41:(What else stays in the same place?)
(Oh,lots of things.)
Not many things,most things are moving.
G.49:(Is the mineral - )
I didn't say mineral.Animal and vegetable.
G.49:(...almost liquid...)
It's not almost liquid.You said that.
G.49:(No...not much mineral in that...)
Why do you keep on harping on mineral?It's animal and vegetable.
G.49:(It must be in that case shortbread.)
(No.)
You've never baked anything else!
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G.13:(Is it so small that...you could eat it in one mouthful?)
You've already asked that,didn't you?didn't you say that?
G.27:(But the questions have to be phrased in such a way that I answer
yes or no.)
Well,wasn't it in the first place?
G.40:(That's about seven,I think.)
No,it's about five.
G.40:(O.K.The Forth Hail Bridge.)
It's not made of metal,not all of it.
Yes it is,that's why they've got to keep painting it.
G.12:(Of use or decoration?)
(Neither.)
Why did someone make it if not to be useful or decoration?
G.8:(...and in the kitchen...)
I didn't say it was in the kitchen,I said it was used in the
kitchen.
G.4:(...which neither supplies nor requires energy...)
I didn't say it didn't require energy...
G.4:(And you said it has no specific function,therefore something de¬
corative. )
Yes I did.I said it had a function,very much so.
G.4:(Think of something in this area.)
In Edinburgh?I'm not a Scotsman.
G.13:(Primary is red,green or yellow.)
No it's not.
G.20:How can it be sort of me and still not maybe human?
(Ah,but I retracted that.)
G.ll:(lt has a very clearly defined position in relation to -you know.)
No.'
G.15:(You've got one more question.)
No.That was the twentieth.
We can define the input(activation) condition for this demon as
the occurance of a (believed)untruthful or 'illegal' utterance(or one
that is otherwise infelicitous but grammatically well-formed).But
when we attempt to characterize the output conditions to cover all the
above cases we find the following range of realization formulae,not




Echo . Int + Remind p (content of previous statement by X)
Express Surprise + Comment (negative evaluation of X*s utterance)
vNo/yes*+) STATE p(grounds for objection - e.g. contradictory nat¬
ure of X's utterance)+ lnt(+3ustifv Self)
3
Echo + Int(+Contr ) +'Come onJ '
Express difficulty
Elicit Reason(for) p(action objected to)(+Justify Self)
Rea.Confirmation p(X's previous stating of proposition contradicting
last one)
TElicit Heason(rthet.)(for) p ( " " " " )
(.Reason Out Loud
This list can be simplified somewhat by considering more closely
the (locally conditioned) functions being performed by these altern¬
ative forms.To do so we must speculate for a moment as to just what
the speaker is trying to acheive here in terms of Ms* goal (the overall
function of the act Ob.iect)and the immediately available means at his
disposal for acheiving that goal.Each of the more indirect formulae
suggests( but only suggests) underlying cognitive activity,the by¬
products of which(propositions involved in that activity)s%m to in¬
fluence the choice of form simply because they are readily at hand.
Thus several of the realizations concern possible grounds/reasons
(if any)behind the speaker's production of the utterance objected to.
This would suggest that the hearer(objecter) has been trying to dete¬
rmine the latter - as a concomitant process to calculating the mean¬
ing of the utterance - and that the by-products(propositional) of this
thwarted search represent immediately available material wherewith
the goal,now set up,of objecting to the utterance can be realized.
Utterances like 'Why did someone make it if not to be useful or dec¬
orative?' or 'How can it be 5«rt of me and still not maybe human?'
(both tokens of Elicit Heason)might thus arise.The question remains,
of course,as to what local conditions might lead to the situation
where 3uch by-products do arise as available means,since looking for
1
This being reserved,as in previous chapters,for the most conventio¬
nal/direct formulae
2
"'Typical' intonation adhering to this act
3
Con trast ive s tress
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a 'reason' behind the production of an utterance might well be a
cognitive procedure applied to all infelicitous or unexpected utte¬
rances.Similarly with the more direct realization of Ob.iect.
a statement about a proposition already accepted(or deducible)by
both players that contradicts the utterance concerned:presumably the
procedure involved in checking the truth value of that utterance
will bring into 'working space' the contradictory earlier proposi¬
tion, render ing it available as means for realizaing the objection.
But this procedure can be assumed to accompany the processing of
any new incoming proposition.There would appear in fact to be a cer¬
tain amount of unconditioned randomness at this level of choice,with
whatever by-products of ongoing processes happen to be most ' foregro-*
unded' at the moment of formulating the objection being integrated
into that formulation - unless a purely conventional formula such as
'Come on]'(with more 'affect' than content)is chosen.We can,however,
attempt an approximation of conditioning factors,at least for the
more direct realizations - as was attempted for Game Question in
Chapter l.It is only these conventional formulae(themselves 'avail¬
able means' for realizing the goal of the demon,of course)that need
be marked on the realization rule for the demon's output:
Ob.i ec t (KchoiInt +)('No'+)STATE p*(grounds for objection)
(+Ueq.Confirm.)(+Justifv Self)
<Express Diffic.(or Surprise) /X's utterance ambigu¬
ous but not obviously contradictory/
(Echo+Int+) 'Come on]' /ironic;to social intimate/
Hie first formula can be taken as unmarked,being chosen roost
commonly under 'neutral' conditions.The second typifies the case of
a discourse act being realized indirectly by another,as discussed in
Chapter 3.The acts marked on the right of the rule are themselves ex¬
pandable according to local conditions influencing the speaker's
complex intention,but must contain at least a 'head' that realizes
2
the basic function of the act concerned .More indirect ways of reali-
1Can be elided to 'No,it isn't',etc.,or simply 'No'if contradicting X
2
Hie hierarchy implied by such relationships between acts is,as noted
earlier,different from that of a rank system.
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zing it need not be indicated,since,on the one hand,the speaker
could produce them as realizations of Co.iect through a 'blend' of
immediately available cognitive material fulfilling its functional
goal,and,on the other hand,the hearer can calculate their force
from general principles and context(these cases and the processes
they imply 1 have only considered in general terms,of coursejthey
have not been integrated into the model in detail).It may be imposs¬
ible to specify precisely which forms should or should not be incor¬
porated into the rule defining the output of a given demon(this
varying somewhat from ideolect to ideolect,no doubt),but the fact
that we are dealing with a cline of conventionality/expectedness
rather than with a clear-cut dichotmoy does not undermine the expla¬
natory and procedural advantages of incorporating such 'short-cuts'
to the recognition and realization of acts into our model.These
realization rules,moreover,capture linguistic generalizations about
the conventional realizations of the acts in question - both direct
and via some other act - which v/ould have to be marked elsewhere on
the model in any case.
The same reasoning applied to the somewhat more complex data for
dequest Rephrase produces the following analysis.The utterances listed
include virtually all tokens of the act in the data for English;they
do not include cases of prompting more specific new game questions.
Realizations of Request Rephrase:
G.l: (Is it part or whole of a human animal?)
We have to rephrase the question according to the game.
G.5:(This one is principally mineral - but little bits of everything
else.)
What do you mean 'little bits of everything else'?
G.5: (The brothel?)
What about the brothel?
G.6:(Is it bigger than this shoe?)
Uh,which way?Length-ways or width-ways?
G.6:(Did we buy it?)
Would you like to rephrase that?
G.18:(Is it something flat or does it have depth?)
Well,which of those do you want to ask?
G.36:(I've given you quite a clue there.)
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You have,have you?Thank youJI must try and interpret that.'
G.36:(Do people have it?)
Oh...Do people have it?
G.36:(Is it in terms of history a fairly recent product?)
(No. )
No?
In terms of history depends on how far back you take history.
G.41:(Do you see it often?)
What do you mean by 'often*?
G.41: (Sculpture in the iectse of/art form,no.)
(So it's not an art form.)
(No.)
Sculpture can be in another sense,can it?
G.27:(Is its specific nature related to a human or to a place?)
Can you rephrase that question?
G.27:(The object is predominantly mineral.)
Well,you'll have to tell me what the other - the non-predominant -
part is:mineral and -
G.32:(Is it something like an electricity pylon?)
What do you mean 'like an electricity pylon'?)
G.39:Perhaps you could rephrase it -not 'Is it the Queen',the one before.
G.17:(Do we use it every day?)
You keep using 'we',which is difficult.
G.42:(This person could be involved with the media.)
Could be involved with the media?
(Often is involved with the media.)
G.22:(Was it the answer - the sheet with the answer on it for last time?)
I don't understand your question,sorry.
G.34:(Is it made of some sort of transformed animal product...or is it
some sort of direct animal product like skin or hor;i or something
of that sort?)
Which question are you asking?
G.34:(I suppose the answer is yes.But it might be a misleading answer.)
Would you like to develop that?
G. 13: (It's you or me.')
Well,how do you phrase that?
1
'Is it a person of similar standing to the royal family?'
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G.ll:(Is it a class?)
What do you mean by a 'class'?
G.ll:(Does it have a defined status?)
That's rather difficult to answer.. .no, you have to be more spec¬
ific.
(Does it have a defined position?)
In relation to what?
G.40:(Is it pretty?)
Do you mean do I think it's pretty?
G.40:(Is it a specific named object? -with a name,as opposed to a
thing: like a tape-recorder?...)
Do you mean -
(Like 'David's hat',right?)
G.40:(Is it solid?)
If you defined solid a bit more -
G.20:(Now I gave you a big clue a while back.)
What was it?
G.21:(Is it identifiable as an organ?)
It all depends what you mean by 'organ'.
G.7:(Would the product come from a higher plant -such as trees and
flowers,rather than lower ones?)
You must be more specific.
G.38:(Is it made from a raw mineral product - in other words,is the
finished article made of something different from the raw min¬
eral?)
Can't understand the question - not precise enough.
These utterances correspond to the following distinct formulae:
Hemind (of game rules)
ASKWh *what'+('you')+*mean' (+'by') p(X's last utterance,or part
of it)
ASKWh 'which'+NP(question,etc.)+'you'+( 'want to' d- ) VP(ask,etc.)
State Intent (to search for meaning of utterance,etc.)
dequest Confirm.
ASKIF ('you'+'mean') p(deduction from X's utterance)
STATE 'perhaps'/'if' +'you'+'could' +VP(rephrase,etc.)
STATE 'you must/have to' +VP(be specific .etc. ) (-i-Prompt)
(Give Ueason +)Expreas Difficulty
Claim Inabil.to Comply (+Apologjze)(+Give Ueason)
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ASKWh 'how •+'you'+VP(rephrase,etc. )
ASKvVh 'what' + 'be'-rNP(unclear referring expression)
STATE NP(the answer,etc.)+'depend on' +NP(meaning of element of
X's utterance)
'What about' +NP (element of X's utterance)
We can directly state the input condition for this demon(whose
function is to 'elicit elaboration of X's utterance') - namely'an
ambiguous but rephrasable utterance produced by X'.with specific cri¬
teria for 'ambiguous*(or otherwise unsatisfactory) determined by
the rules of the game and by general conversational principles.But we
must simplify the output formulae above in such a way that the reali¬
zation rule they embody contains only those conventional forms dir¬
ectly relatable to this act,thus:
\
Request. Rephrase ^ ' ASKIF 'you * + ' can/could/would' (+'like to')
+VP(rephrase,etc,)
ASKtVh 'how'+'you'+VP(rephrase,etc. )*
ASKIFCyou mean' + )p /likely meaning dedu¬
ced/
ASKWh 'what/which(way)'(+'you mean by'+NP
(element of X's utterance))/single word
ambiguity/
2
ilea.Confirm." p? /X's utterance surprising/
'What about'+ NP /X's utterance not specific
enough/
•P 'is a hypothetical rephrase of X's utterance and 'p 'is either the
1 w
proposition of X's utterance or an inference from it.'Ihe first line
represents the unmarked formula for the general act Request Action,as
discussed in Chapter 3(but with specific propositional content and
response set).As in the case of Ob.iect we can take it that the more
indirect realizations of the act - and optional expansions of the
direct ones - are the result of (by-products of)ongoing cognitive act¬
ivity; for example,the discovery that a rule has been broken might in¬
fluence the selection of a form like 'We have to rephrase the question
1
This form can be taken as an ideosjincratic variant of the first (or
a blend with it).
2
overlapping with(or a blend with^Express Surprise (i.e. Echo +Int)
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according to the game' to realize the act*.
We call see now how organic 'blends' realizing two or more acts are
possible in the same utterance - something that would be difficult to
account for if one insisted on marking all possible realizations on
the output conditions of each demon.If the input conditions for two
distinct demons are simultaneously met in the ongoing discourse -say
those for Object and Hequest liephrase - we can expect the conventional
realization formulae of both acts to be added to the pool of immedia¬
tely available means for realizing the speaker's complex intention(the
overlapping or compatible functions of the two acts).Propositional
content relevant to the one might in that case combine with a form
typically realizing the other,as in 'What do you mean by 'little bits
of everything else'?',where the form realizes Request Rephrase but
incorporates directly the part of X's utterance being objected to.
Alternatively,the speaker's complex intention might be fulfilled in¬
directly through incorporating some cognitive by-product which is not
related to one act more than to the other,as in the case of • ifou keep
using 'we',which is difficult'.Often it is simply the intonation of
one act that blends with the form and content of another -e.g. the
querulous intonation of Object accompanying 'Well,which of those do
you want to ask?*.
Our two demons can now be formalized as follows,with input con¬
ditions at the top left,slightly abbreviated output realizations top
right,possible pi'eceding response sequence acts bottom left and possible
2
following response sequence acts bottom right:
D4 Object(Function:signal disagreement/dis¬
satisfaction with X's utterance)
Infelicitous/contradi¬
ctory utterance by X
(Object**-1 ■ 1 > )
(Echo+)CNo'+)STATE p(grounds for object.)
Kxpr.Surprise/biffic./ambig.but not con¬
tradictory utt./
(EchOi ) 'come one.''/ironic/
Justify Self/Object
Rephrase/Admit
*The utterance is also a (blended)token of Object.
2,
There does not appear to be any clear relationship between a particu¬
lar form of,e.g. .Object and the form of the act responding to it,this
depending more on the nature of the rule/maxim infringed by X.
3
i.e. an objection counter-objected to in an argument
Ambiguous but rephra-
sable utterance by X
-94-
D15 Request Rephrase (Function:elicit elaboration)
ASKIF 'you'f•can/could/would*+p(rephrase)
ASKIFOyou mean* )p/likely meaning deduced/
ASICVh 'what'+'mean'-rNP/single word ambig./
Request Coufirm./X's utt.surprising/
'What about'+NP/X's utt.not specific enough/
^ Rephrase
sy Claim Inab. to Comply
He fuse
Felicity conditions pertaining to these acts will be seen to be
implicit in their input conditions and functions; thus for Object the
sincerity condition to the effect that the speaker must believe X's
utterance to be objectionable and the preparatory condition to the
effect that X must be able to recognize that he has broken a rule or
maxim and act accordingly are deducible from the input condition and
function as marked for that demon.Similarly with the sincerity condi¬
tion for Request Rephrase to the effect that the speaker must want/need
a rephrase and the preparatory condition that the utterance is exp¬
andable as requested.
Similar formalizations based on the realization rules given in
Chapters 1 and 2 respectively can be given for Game Question and Ansyer:
132 Game Question(Function;elicit information
towards solving game)
ASKIF p(+modal) (+neg)
Questioner's game turn STATE p( i modal) (+tieg) (+tag)/less tent-
• What about'+NP /list / ative?/
Answer Answer(+Expand/Rephrase)
^ Claim Inab.to Comply
Heq.Rephrase/ Object
Or'Announce — -*»' for first game exchange;any 'excursion* sequence
can be inserted between one of these acts and Game Question.
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D1 Answer(Function;supply information requested)
Answerer's game turn
(or info.requested)
REPLY* (+STATE p) (+tent.)
STATE p(+'right/correct')
Hedge /simple 'yes/no' impossible/
Game Quest. - y
Rea. Info. ==^
IYirning now to the wider processing implications of the model,the
rest of the chapter will be devoted to diagramatic representations of
the interaction between two players (s< and p, )in terms of demons and
frames for a variety of game incidents.Frames are represented as hor¬
izontal square braces,F1 being the Game Frame,F2 the Meta-frame,and F3
the Discussion Frame.The small curved horizontal braces contain
demons that fill expectation slots in a frame(or are pointed ;fco from
them);other demons activated by local conditions but not relating to
a slot are without such a brace.The broken arrows represent afferent
(comprehension) processes,whereby the form and content of an uttera¬
nce is matched to a demon's output conditions;the double-headed bro¬
ken arrows indicate slot-matching processes which do not result in
further efferent activity from the demon matched.Unbroken arrows rep¬
resent efferent(production) processes,whereby an activated demon gen¬
erates its own realization,either directly or through some other
demon addressed on its output conditions.Ihe demons contained in small
broken horizontal braces are held over from the previous exchange and
2
represent the speaker's own previous utterance ;these are linked to
the demon corresponding to the speaker's current utterance by small
arrows above tie demons concerned,indicating the temporal ordering.
When it is necessary to disambiguate between separate activations of
the same demon within one frame representation,the speaker of the
utterance concerned will be indicated in round brackets after the de¬
mon. When realization of a demon involves more than one act,the temp¬
oral sequence is marked next to the efferent arrows.When two acts are
performed simultaneously(other than in the case where one realizes
1A stylistic/ideolectic variant of the first line,perhaps
2
They may in turn be reactivated(not having as yet been 'satisfied'),
in which case further efferent arrows lead from them.
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the other sequentially)the two demons are joined by a small vertical
brace;sometimes the acts will be separated by necessity of the dia¬
gramming,but can be seen to lead to the same output.
Only those demons and frames taken to be active in the production/
comprehension of the particular utterance concerned ore indicated on
the diagrams.Other potentially expected demons within a frame can be
regarded as 'lurking',readily accessible for activation when their
input conditions are met.Sometimes a demon in the Meta-frame will be
activated by conditions independent of efferent activity by the demon(s)
active in the analysis of the interlocutor's current utterance,to which
it will therefore not be connected by an arrow.The precise nature of
the cognitive activity behind the overt acts performed by our demons
is not represented - considerable over-simplification is of course in¬
volved, particularly where such matters as the personal relationship
between the players are relevant.Other elements which have been omit¬
ted for clarity include indication of the motives and goals adhering
to the role-tied slots in the frames and,in the case of the Discussion
Frame,indication of the current topic of discussion. The excerpts mod¬
elled below cover a wide range of 'extra-ludic' excursion types which
illustrate how the model is in theory extendable well beyond simple
question-answer exchanges(and what is currently simulatable on the
computer).One exchange will be followed through in detail before the
others are presented.Note that and are the corresponding speakers
in the transcripts of the games and can refer to either the questioner
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Meta-frame monitoring here involves finding the reason for p's
protracted pause.The game object is the questioner's(f?'s)nose.
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At the beginning of this incident ©{ is expecting - to produce a
new game question(his next move) when he receives the utterance*Is it
me?*,and recognizes that its formCASKIF+Int )and propositional content
does indeed fit Game Question in the corresponding slot of the Game
Frame.The demon for this act,D2,will in turn activate Dl,the Answer
demon,within the same frame via the response sequence marked on the
former's output.Having searched for and ascertained the answer to the
question,D1 will activate both D12(the Comment demon potentially ex¬
pected by the Meta-frame F2 and forming a possible pre-head to Dl's
realization) and the head of its realization * Yes^recognizes this
as a possible realization of D1 within the Gane Frame,but is surprised
by the answer,causing D3(Express Surprise)to be activated in the eff¬
erent mode.The latter is realized by a Request Confirmation(D44):'It
is?',which utterance marks the initiation of an excursion temporarily
suspending the F1 game exchange pattern, recognizes that the utte¬
rance is a token of D44(realizing D3) due to its form(elided ASKIF +
Int)and content (it refers anaphorically to the proposition has
previously just asked about)and not a Game Question as expected at
that point.The response sequence on the output of D44 activates D5
in efferent mode(Confirm).which is realized by the utterance 'It's
you'.F accepts this as the expected token of 05 satisfying his own
prior Hea.Confirmation(D44).and the optional third response sequence
act for 044,namely DinfAnknmvl Ar|^')is consequently activated(and re¬
cognized as such by oO.
At this point, {£ ,taking 'me' to be the game object,believes the :<
game to be terminated(unlike j^who knows better).Meanwhile.050(Dec¬
lare - i.e. game count) is independently activated in o*.'s Meta-frame;
its input conditions are difficult to formulate exactly but can be
taken to involve a subjective assessment by ..(the answerer here)to
the effect that the questioner might need a reminder of the count at
that point,before he formulates his next game question, ^.recognizes
the force behind the resultant utterance('That's five questions now')
due to the match between its propositional content(and form)and the
corresponding demon(050) within the Meta-frame.A response sequence
from the latter demon to 010(Acknowledge)produces the utterance 'O.K!.
Though the 'now' of the preceding utterance may confuse him slightly,
p still presumes the game to be terminated and does not formulate a
new question.The subsequent pause(and possibly other paralinguistic
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features of the situation)causes to realize the misapprehension
has fallen into:Meta-frame monitoring' of the probable motives behind
<« 's behaviour will establish that the latter appears to regard the
game as over,and a search back over recent exchanges will establish
that there is indeed a likely reason,namely that he has taken the game
object to be himself.Discovery that a misapprehension has occured
will activate 949(Correct Misunderstanding).At the same time 935(Prompt)
will be activated since its input condition is that the questioner,
whose game move it is,does not look like performing that move without
encitement.'3 consequent utterance is therefore a 'blended' output
of these two demons.Now 'I mean'+p(disambiguation of own misunderstood
utterance) is an output formula for Correct Misunderstanding.and indi¬
cate p(grounds for future action on X's part)is an indirect realization
of Prompt.Indicate in turn being realizable as STATE'there be'+NP. 's
unraveling of the complex force behind the utterance here will,presum¬
ably,be on the one hand via the prepositional content indicating grou¬
nds for his continuation of the game(from which he will recognize that
a Prompt -an expected Meta-frame slot-filler - has been performed),and
on the other hand via the form 'I mean'+p to the recognition that a
Cor r est Misunderstanding is also being performed.A possible referrent
'misunderstood utterance' for the latter act can easily be found by
looking back at recent exchanges;thence the reason why both the demons
behind xA *s utterance should have been activated simultaneously can
be deduced.The efferent output of 935(Prompt) will be the activation
of 92 for the production of 's next game question(via the response
sequence from 935),but,before that,the response sequence to 949(Correct
Misunderstanding) will enter as it is More 'local* than the game exch¬
ange and must be taken care of before F1 is returned to.Hie resultant
output of applying that sequence will be an Acknowledge followed by
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Game 15
Yeah,it would be like card¬
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Further cognitive factors involved here presumably include the ex¬
pression of annoyance at an 'obvious' clue.
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Meta-frame monitoring here disallows the concession and reminds of
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Monitoring activity simultaneously finds a contradiction here and
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'It's not you as a whole';the object is her nose.
?
Fl,suspended since the beginning of the exchange,is reactivated
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Activated by recognition that the Meta-frame constraint for yes/no
replies renders the answer misleading
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It should be evident from the above how frame-expectations can
simplify our account of the likely procedures behind the production
of our data and how they can provide,together with appropriate dis¬
course act demons,the control structure necessary for actually gen¬
erating the discourse we are accounting for.In Part Two of the thesis
I shall extend the model to represent interaction with a sentence
grammar and discourse-level rules for the relevant languages,and rou¬
tines modelling the strategy behind the players' choice of successive




In the diagrams that form the bulk of this chapter the generation
of one game in each of the four languages used in the corpus is model¬
led utterance by utterance,integrating fragments of corresponding
sentence grammars with the discourse component elaborated in Part
One.A wide range of language types was chosen for the elicited data
to illustrate the universality of the model,namely English,Russian,
Japanese and .Vest Greenlandic Eskimo, ilie hypothetical strategy routi¬
nes utilized by demons 01 and 02 ,the response sequence rules and
metalanguage symbols used on the diagrams appear at the end of the
chapter,along with the syntactic rules for the four languages. Ihe basic
components of the model can be seen on the skeletal diagram below(rep¬
resenting speaker-hearer o( or f* ) ; they are largely self-explanatory
and no attempt has been made to justify psychologically the particular
divisions made - the diagram simply indicates the minimal organization
























bj contains the syntactical fapra class of the last utterance by the
interlocutor,and e^that of the current utterance being generatedje,,
On page loo ;See Chapter 7 for a discussion of this component
Showing the last utterance analysed
3
Or Long Term Memory representation of the object £for the answerer;
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is a semantic buffer for unordered input into the generator;and e^ is
the 'phonemic' output to the articulatory system.Though there is assu¬
med to be a certain amount of parallel or 'multi-'processing involved,
the general procedural flow is from component (b),where the last in¬
coming utterance is analysed as to form(marked in b^)and content.The
output from this analysis is passed on the one hand to the frame and
demon system of component (a) - where it is'fitted'to a Meta-frame
slot or activates some other demon in the afferent mode - and on the
other hand to the accreting property list of the unknown object in
(c)1for matching,generating possible new propositions according to the
strategy routine serving D2(Game Question),etc.Interaction between
this incoming proposition and the content of (c)-as monitored by the
strategy component -results in the introduction into working space (d)
of a propositional 'bundle',which is in turn passed on to the semantic
buffer(e ) according to the output of the demon currently active in >
the efferent mode in component (a).The latter simultaneously sets up
a syntactic template plus intonation contour in the generator (e)
according to its realization rule.The application of specific syntac-
2
tic and discourse-level rules"(marked S and A respectively)whose
1 • • • * • • •
activation conditions are met in the ongoing generation process will
here produce phonemic output strings according to the content of the
semantic buffer.The semantically determined phrase-unit production
(along the horizontal arrows within (e)on the diagrams that follow)is
assumed to take place in parallel to the elaboration of the clause-
level syntactic template already set up.There is indeed some psycho-
linguistic evidence from hesitation and tongue-slip phenomena that
such tvo-level processing does occur(cf.Boomer,1965) and is relatable
to prosodic tone-units.
The speech generator (e) can be regarded as a variety of Augmented
Transition Network(cf.Thorne,Bratley and i)ewar,1968)in which there are
separate routes through the network(according to conditions stated on
the rules of which it consists)for clause-level interrogative(ASK1F)
and declarative(STATE)forms and for phrase-level units such as NP,LocP,
*Or in the case of the answerer,to his Long Terra Memory representa¬
tion of the game object
2
These latter rules are indicated in component (a) since they can be
regarded as a sub-type of demon,whose output adds to or deletes
items from the ongoing syntactic generation in (e).
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etc.Syntactic generation is thus basically 'left-to-right'(allowing
for suspension of the elaboration of clause-level rules while phrase-
level accretion is completed,as required)and there is no order-changing
amongst syntactic constituents,the order being set up at the outset
by the output of the demon concerned - plus any 'thematizing*discourse
rule activated in (a).Hie syntactic rules are semantic-input-sensitiye
phrase structure rules - i.e. some of the major rules(such as S3 and
Sa for English)require a single reference to the content of the sema¬
ntic buffer to be expanded conformally.Some of them are 'augmented*
to include more than one syntactic category on the left(as the two
rules mentioned and all rules of concord)- in which case they can be
said to correspond to non-order-changing transformations.Clearly they
could be simplified as a rule system by the introduction of order-
changing transformations relating interrogative to underlying declar¬
atives, etc. , but since we are describing a real-time production model
this simplificationCmaximal generalization)of the rules must be weighed
against the increase in computational complexity of derivation it would
result in.There has,moreover,never been any psychological evidence for
the 'reality' of such transformationsCcf.Fodor,Bever and Garret,1975)
for attempts that have been made to elicit this),so,being counter-int¬
uitive as regards actual speech production,they are best regarded as
abstract descriptive generalizations rather than as rules active in
utterance production as such1.The simplification of the interface be¬
tween the demons in (a) and the speech generator(e) provided by the
setting up of a fixed but expandable template at the outset of genera¬
tion is too valuable,in procedural terms,to be thrown away merely to
collapse the rules for declarative and interrogative utterances in
English:computational space and time is presumably at a premium,where¬
as human memory is unlikely to be overburdened by a few additional rules -
especially since these are activated(on the model) by specific input
conditions being met and do not have to be 'sifted through' at every
stage as on a transformational model.There is probably a good deal of
(beneficial) redundancy in the rule-correlates actually brought to
bear on the generation of well-formed utterances by humans,and the
linguistic metalanguage used on the model to describe them may be mis¬
leading in suggesting the actual representation of such abstract
1And suitably augmented phrase structure grammars do not preclude
recursiveness,i\v,cjc>\Vi ftaibj,etc. (Chomsky's argument against them)
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symbols as'VP*or'Comp'there.In as far as the rules incorporating the
latter are semantic-input-sensitive anyway,these generalised syntactic
categories can be replaced by ' V'and'Adj',etc. (i.e.syntactic features
of entries in the lexicon)to form more specific rules equivalent to
■ftie maximally general ones.In the fragmentary grammars for the games
analysed(at the end of the chapter)it is always the descriptively
simplest set of rules accounting for them - barring order-changing
transformations - that is given,and this should be envisaged as only
part of a much more redundant(and construction/lexeme-specific)rule-
system or network.lt is explicitly not presumed that all rule-like
regularities observed by linguists are necessarily internalized in
some way and used by the speaker/hearer in producing speech.On the
analogy of mathematical formulae describing kinetic limb motions -
these not being directly relatable to the the muscular commands beh¬
ind those motions - the regularities forming a linguistic 'competence
grammar' are regarded as descriptive 'epiphenomena*,only abstractly
and indirectly related to the internal processes involved in speech
production.
Lexical entries(indicating only those features actively involved
in the productions modelled)for the lexemes corresponding to the pred¬
icates , arguments and modifiers concerned are marked below each diagram.
Predicates are marked with those elements of their 'case frames' rele¬
vant to the production in quest ion;these correlate semantic features
of their arguments(as 'beneficiary' and 'object',etc.)to ordered syn¬
tactic slots about the lexical verb(or other predicate).Constraints
marked here - e.g. the necessity of a following complementizer or obj¬
ect - are integrated into the generation between(e )and(e )and have
« u
the power to affect the further elaboration of the (clause level)
syntactic template.
The propositional elements in (c),(d)and (e?) are assumed to be
loosely associated(unordered) bundles of pointers towards 'mental
objects'* - tokens of the latter in any sensory modality or their
phonemic 'word-addresses'jor a mixture of both - rather than line¬
arly concatinated propositional strings in some neutral 'Mentalese'
(cf. Fodorig7Q ):the metalanguage employed should not be confused
with the cognitive processes/representations whose effect it purports
*i.e. multi-modal.word-addressable Long Term Memory semantic structures
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to describe(see Chapter 8).
As on example of how the diagrams are to be interpreted in practice,
lot us follow through the processes implied by the first diagram that
foliows( Si> *s utterance 'Is it a manufactured object?*),bearing in mind
that much simplification is involved.We start with box(b) on the left,
where r* 's preceding utterance 'It's mineral' is registered and anal¬
ysed (the dotted line pointing upwards into box(a)) as a token of 038-
Announce - which is the act expected within the Game Frame F1 at that
moment.lts propositional contentCinvolved in the recognition of the
utterance as a token of D38) is added to the property list of the un¬
known object XI in box (c),as indicated by the broken line pointing
downwards.The afferent activation of 1338 back in (a) now activates
D2(Game Question)in efferent mode(the short arrow connecting the two
demons) according to the sequence rule on its output for the Game Frame
context.The output of 132 is -according to its realization rule -ASKIF p,
where 'p* is the proposition produced by the application of the strat¬
egy routine(page kjg )utilized by the guesser in realizing his next
game question.The generation of this proposition involves the inter¬
action of this routine with the current property list in (c) and with
Long Term Jfemory structures/associations corresponding to it(here=
mineral objects);this complex process is simply represented on the
diagram by the double arrow leading from (c) to the metalanguage repr¬
esentation of the proposition in working space (d).The result of D2*s
output -as indicated by the connected arrows leading from the demon -
is on the one hand the setting up of a syntactic template in (e)
corresponding to the command ASKIF,and on the other the shunting of
the proposition into the semantic buffer (e ).The production of the
surface utterance'Is it a manufactured object?' involves the applica¬
tion of those syntactic rules whose activation conditions are met
during the generation process - notably S4a,which fills the 'Comp'
slot in the template with a NP since the proposition in the buffer
is one of class membership,and puts the corresponding auxiliary 'be'*
in the first slot(indicated by vertical arrows). In parallel with this
clause-level syntactic elaboration,lexicalization processes involving
lexical look-up of X2 are taking place(the horizontal arrows)between
the semantic buffer and the phrase-level output atrings^in (e ).A syn-
o
1
Converted to 'is* by the application of concord rule S5c
2
"Represented by orthographic word forms
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tactic rule concerned with the order of constituents within such a
phrase-le el group - S2 - is summoned in the process.During the gener¬
ation the discourse-level rule A6 for anaphoric pronominal reference
has its activation conditions met,as indicated by the double-headed
arrow in box (a),and the NP slot corresponding to XI is filled by
'it'.The phonemic output (e ^ can now activate the articulatory system -
in conjunction with the interrogative intonation contour associated
with the output of D2.
Game 17
(c/:It's mineral,)



























PI: mineral [Ad jj






























P5: use [v] (+ [NPl)
j3s every day[fp.J
its
C3<. :You keep- using 'we1,which is difficult.
P5i use [v] (+ [MP] )
P6: difficult [Ad j]
DI4.: Object
Dlf":Request Rephrase
P 5 I mean one of us.
D7;Rephrase
W<1
q( « I do,yes.












































{jt8^ - >jor more
u
j5i justjAdv^




PI 1 s think of IV]+[Prep] (+[NP] ) P/ j.17 :specif1c [Ad }]
Dil-i±: Re quest Confirm at iron (he re: rhetorical .reminding o<. cf
rules)
11-1














t*\3("PiO —->have to think of
.*jh. -^[a specific obj.j
XZf: question[N] X6 : object M
D5Q:Declare Dli7tPrevent (hereifrom counting)
P13: have to^»xJ+(Vp] ) i.e.'game ' question
3f6: last jAd.i] D6: Justify Self
^-^Meta-frame recognition of possible game status of
question activates





















,i6: in the evening J
-^-Suspended by excursion now terminated
m
;}7l any other time fTPl
.j8: all the time^TPj
,i9i only(Aav] j10: as opposed to'(+ptQ) Efrepj
DiUl-iReq.Confinflation(here;rhet. ; leaves option open for








































(of: Y e s. )
X8: cosmetic[ii] or [Adj)
J13: something in the (X) line [Adj HgJ
MC
(ot :No. )




















|3:Do you wear it below the waist?
^'<*-Pl6(X1 )-Loc(P17(X11)>
^fweah ■+»»'? + UetP1 1 i
Loc



















Whole utterance treated as an idiomatic unit
Well,there is not too much plastic down there,
X12 : plastic D{^.(c orres. to Pk) -::-Search motivated(in part)
j14 J not too much [Quant] - iQ-j nature of PI
j1 5 ! down there(^Aav] - D12I Comment
XI 3s stockings [Npl]
.116: something to do with (X) [AdjHgJ
(o(:Yes.)





























Pi 8: call\y\ ( + D35>: Prompt
o( {Suspender - yes;I'll give you it.
^-Treated as idiom
Game 45(Russianft
Eto iz zhivotnovo inira?
sing . ('eto' ; it/ that;neuter pronoun )
/ cone
PI: iz zhivotnovo mira [j?rep] + jAdjQ (£en. sing, neuter) + [}f](gen.
sing.neuter) ( out of the animal world )
( •iz' (+ gen. case) : out of/ (is a) member of )
Da. )
Sto chelovek?
•-■The transcription omits palatalization
(psDa.)





X1* £ (X2CLoc (X3a ))







('kotory': that( rel. prcn.,masc. sins.))
j3: zdes(Adv] (here)
X3: pome she he nie [n]( room ) ( loc.case : - enii)
j2: eto jj)e/>t] (neut. sing.) ( this) ( loc.case: etom)
( *v'( + loc. case) : in )
(f>: Net. )
























P2 : znat [v] ( know) ('znayu1 : 1st p. sing., pres.)
('ya' : I ) ('kotorovo1:gen.sing.masc.,object of 'znat')
rya.
(f): Gmm.. .Nemnozhko.Vozmozhno. )
o( : On v boy laboratorii?
(• vozmozh.no': possibly )
X^: laboratoria [n^J ( laboratory) (loc. case; -orii)
j5: tajpeMj ( fem. sing.) ( that ) ( loc. case: toy)
('on': he )
(p: Net.)
('nash' : our )
(f : Net. )
(p : Izvestay. )
oi.: Izvestny v oblasti iskustva?
(j5:Net. )
P3: Izvestny [Adj] (v/ell-known) D7:E*nand/ Rephrase














Cat: V oblasti politiki? ) i H
(fl: Net.)
(1 tak* : so )
, X7:politika {n] (politics) (gen.case:-iki)
(p : - no izvestny.)


























ol: Eto kto-nibud iz moevo nachalstva?
X2: kto-nibud J>r] (somebody) • • -
X9: nac^alstvo [n] t neuter sing.) ( superiors/authorities) (gen.:
(•moevo• : my (gen. sing, neuter)








P6: vyshe [\/\Av^] / (prev\ (+ gen. ) ( higher )
D33: Gvve_Helo
<37
(c<: Vyshe...iz moevo nachalstva.. * )
(•mozhet byt ' : perhaps / might be )
Dl8:Recap
: Eto yashe nachalstvo - ya skazala 'net'.
-Pit.: Object D6: Justify Self -
»-The objection implies a (negative) answer





















• ad. i f
X0
P -StEshcho vyshe
3,9s e she bo (Adv) (still )
D7:Rephrasp D35»Prompt





















P8: v pravitelstve |Prep3( + loc.) + {n] (in tiie government)
('togda': then )
|3 : Ne sovsem. )
4 ; Ne sovsem?Kto-zhe eto mozhet b.yt?
jlO me sovsem (not altogether) DijliReason Out Loud
D19:Echo ('kto-zhe«: who on earth)







X10: pravitelstvo [N] (neuter sing.) (government - corresp. P8)
D33? Give. Help - _
(p<; Vyshe pravitelstva kto mozhet byt?I )





























X11: Anglia [n] (England ) (loc.case: - ii )
D33?Grive Help D 3$: Prompt
V Anglii?Vyshe pravitelstva?A! )
Mozhet b'/t eto odna iz tsarstvuyushchich. osob?









(fit: Radom s ney? )
o(:Eto Prints?Edinburgsky?
D7:Expand/Rephrase
('radorn s ney': next to her)
DijliiReq. Confirmation(here rhetorical)
(p : Net.Eshcho radom.)
d ;Mozhet eto sama Printsessa Anne,?
XI 5J Printsessa Anna (nJ^J Princess Anne) D35: Prompt





X2 : dobutsu [nJ ( animal) Dl: Answer
X3 ; kakobin[N]( manufactured object ) D2;Gairie Question .
( 'desu[vj.' be(£/=);polite form of lda' )
('ka : question particle )
lie.)
Dobutsu sono mono desu ka?
14*
(fr(:So desu.)
^! Sore wa kono hen ni orimasu ka?
X4 : hen[N] ( vicinity/area) (,Sore wa»: it(theme))
! kono [peon] C this) ('so' : thus/so)
(n£0»U 5 in >
(orimasu[v}sis (loc. );polite alternative to .'imasu')
(tfjlmasu.)
( 'imasu' ; be (Loc.,anim.))
\\to
(oCHai. )








P1: iu[v] ( say ); (lemasu: polite potential form) j^l-:£pos
('mo. .mo': both) ( 'dotchi to mo': either) (arimasujv] :be( E) )
: okii[Adj] ( big );(+ 'no': big onqfe)) D7:Rephrase
f+7
i Katei ni kawarete imasu ka?
X6: katei [n] ( house(h.old) )
P2: kawareru[vPass] ( be kept ) (kawarete imasu's pres. cent, tens
Katei ni imasu .
D7:Rephrase












































X8: n'ingenjN] (human being)
(1chigaimasu': no(polite);lit.: it is otherwise)
So desu.)




















P3: ( [Np[ + ni + ) kankei aru £v(Comp)] ( be something to do with)
Arimasen.)
Ano - ningen no karada no ichibubun desu.
X11: karada [n] (body) ('no1: • s (possessive particle))
D33:Give Helo
I To
: Sore wa mieiaasu Ka?
Dl5:Req. Rephrase j6: jibun de (Adv] (oneself)
p : -koto wa dekimasen?








P6: imi desu TvJ (mean)
P8: tsukau [y~\ (use)
('wo' : object-case particle)
(•to iu' :quotative particle)
Dl5'Req. Rephrase
-^-Possibly an attempt to get information 'for free'
o<: Hai.)



























































-*7 Chikai v Aa
-L
desu
P9 : chiicai [Adjj ( close/near)
D12: (Comment (here implying the answer to p's last question)
<">>
£> * Aa.Shita desu ne?
X17: shitajjtfJC tongue)
('ne': isn't it?; expressive particle)
D5>8.* Express pleasure(here at thinking game is now solved)
(<x : Chigaimasu. )
ffr
D35iPrompt ('so': it is so,yes)
('dare no': whose)
('sore de1 : hut)
jb: Jibun no hana?
(o<: Sodesu, )













pi; Haa- ( Tn] +)[V] (be a part/member of;here synonoraous with
!*» V .-u-.ibe/e)
X2:uumasoq [n] (animal) (- nut: allative plural)




ji :Uumasoq taanna nunami uumasuuva?
X3: nuna [It} (land)
P2: uumasuu
(•taanna': this(just mentioned) jprj )
-ly]^ (Hve) (i.e. X2 + -u-fVy] ) (Loc,:(^fat)
if?
:Aap.Nunami uumasuuvoq.
|3 :Nunanii uuinasuusuni sutortarpa
P3: -tor-(|fV/N] +) [vj (eat) (su- : what (interrog.stem) [Pr
D28:Request information (here as illicit game question)
('sap* : yes)
o(. : Neqit, aalisakkat, naasullu,











































X10: timi^N] (body; - miiqth p.slug.dep. ) LoCii
X9: ila [n] (part y-at' iput: pros, pi.
rel. )
°7:Rephrase ('naamik: no )
{pros
If "f

























P5: inuu- [V], (live;same as P2 but usually for human § J
D28;Reg.Information










(Loc^(X3)) > 1 Nunarnil
-"-Intonation suggests impatience (at redundant question)
('Nunami' ambiguoust'in a/the country'or'on land1)
I Co
P :Nunami sorlermi?
^tXVP5(Loc, (X3^?) ( „ ^«cf * $ t®,itoc(X3^? j) ^Nunaai sorlernd
P5CLoct(X3l
- D'X5:Request Rephrase
(' sorleq* : what/which [Pr])
( '-mi': but
c* :QaIlunaat nunaanni.







P6: eqqarsaatigi-£vj. (think about) ( ' immaqa ' iperhaps SentAdv)
X11: qitsuk Jjl] (cat) XI2: qallunaat nunaat £n]^ + [hV,^Denmark )
at :Nagga.Uumasunart ilaavoq,kisianni nersutaatinut
ilaangilaq«
('-nngilaq.': negative of'-Poq') ('kisianni1: but [bonj] ?
D33: G-ive Help
. D7: Exp and/Rephrase
('nagga': no)
P :Eqqarsaatigaat iihmaqa inuk?









^ vAi.jP Wjj i ^tPingaartumilj
vP
(iTi)
Pif(X1A) —*Jat orfeoar poo|
iL
X1 if I atorfik Da(jo*) P4: -qar - ( |Vj +) jVs]. .. thave
j 11 pingaartoq [PnyrPj (important); - mik.i instr.case
(-«•+ unincorporated object in instr. case)
D33:Give Help
: In.uk tg.anna arnaava?
i£0
o< :Aap,Arnaavoq.









Xl6: qullersaat QlL^C' those in authority/on top');here in dep.case
Cilaat1: one of (them);rel.case PD)
oi. :Aap.Qullersaavoc|.

















X17. Dronning Margretha |V] (Queen Margrethe)( 't aamaakkuni': so (GonjJ)
(o^-Aar, TWr, • ('-aasaaq': »-u'4.'future'tense)^ • Mp.Dronnmg Margrethaavoq. )
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Symbols of the aetalanauatje
^ :efferent process
: afferent process
=3==^ :inferential and other transformations and transferals of infor¬
mation
a proposition
two simultaneously generated propositions
I 3 :syntactic category
( ) :rule applying within (e)
/ :or(alternative)
// // i in the context of
negative (or 'neg')
doubt/unknown term
argument(with semantic features in lowered bracket)
predicate ( " " " )
modifier(of predicate or argument)
is a member of the class of








X, of X1 2
X the object of P
there exists
AdJHg:adjectival hedge




















NP/VP/TP:noun phrase/verb phrase/time phrase
N /N :nominal stem(or nominalizing suffix)/nominal anding(case muinber-
8 e
Eskimo)















Sing/pl/fcja : singular/plural/mass word
Epec:specific
V/Aux:verb/auxiliary verb





The Question-formulating Routine for D2
Reply
a)Integrate reply to
last question into pro¬
perty list of XI to de¬








c)Apply preds. and relats.
known useful in the game to
form (new) PropX relevant
to current search set
/ x. j Recap j<--
The Answering Routine for Dl'
ASKIF P]
|d)Form PropX relev¬










of PropX in LTM
1
.
i.e. there is only one candidate object corresponding to the new
search set in LTM,or a 'plausible leap' to such a candidate has been
triggered
2
This embodies both the response sequence rule for D2(Game Question)
and the realization rule for Dl(Answer);output(double arrows)for Dl
is thus REPLY*. or Req.Rephrase,Object,C.I.toC.,and for D2 it is
Game Question(typically ASKIF-p) or Recap.
And add one to the game count
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itesponse Sequence Rules(for all four games)
Conditions:
First game exchange(prop.content of
P38-animal/minera}./veget.)
Game moves(must be returned to after
any other sequence)
Initial utterance unclear but rephra-
sable satisfactorily)
Initial utt.unclear or breaks a rule
D7 redresses the grounds for the obj¬
ection
initial utt.unclear but speaker of
D44 has hypothesis as to meaning
Questioner stuck
Object guessed but not phrased correc¬
tly
Game object guessed(though 3ome doubt
as to phrasing)
These rules - marked on the output of the relevant demons in the Meta-
frsime -are of course specific to the 'l\venty Questions' context (though
in part derivable from similar linkage rules for more general situat¬
ions ).'Hiey do not include cases of sequences caused by independent
activation of demons such as that for Give Help or Declare(game count)
conditioned by wider game-context factors than just the preceding act,
nor of sequences involving 'blends'(two of the above rules operating
at once or the act on the right of the rule blending with a possible
pre- or post-head),or of sequences of acts (around a 'head')performed
by one speaker.
1
i.e. followed by 0 - a return to the game exchange.In one instance,
in Game 17,it is expanded (by the same speaker)to a subsequent D50
(Declare) and D6(Justify Self).but this is determined by the speaker's
attempt to prevent the question being counted and is not a matter
of response sequence rule.
u38(Announce) —^D2(Game Q. )
D2==^ D1 ( Answer )
Pl=^ D2 /








Syntactic riules for Game 17(English)
SH a) 1 STATE f ( fconj] +) ( [sentAdv* + )(npJ + j VPj (+TCauseCi] / (CondClj )
b) ASK1F ${Aux \ + [NPj+ j'compj (+(CondCi| )
e) jHEPLYt.' >(fNP|+| VPjf) yes/no (+[NPj+|VPj)
d ) ASKWhi ^ j tfhPr] + [Auxj + [Np] + fComp |
e ) 1 ASKEI/Oijj ^uxj + [_NPj + fcomp j. + or +jjComp,(i
f ) 1MP(1 stp) ^ let + (NPJ+ [VPJ
SI a) (CauseClj ->(be)cause (np] -]VPj
b)fCondClJ > if+[NP]+(vP)
S 2 (NP] —f [Det\ / jPos sPr^ /fi)em\ + ( !Mv] + ) ( ( Quant] + ) ( fAdj] / (Adj llg\ + ) fN}1
(+(LocPp (+or+[NP])
S32a) \NPi.j+^Pj »(np~\ (+ (Auxj )+[v] ( + [nPJ,})^ Xj .p[v](X2) // (unmarked
tense)
b) " " }NP^ + be 1 Aux j ( not) + \ Ad.iPj /A^ . W)P.' Adjj //
c) " " [NP^ + kee^V^ (PresPP] # \-%ontlW
d) " " j NPJi + be jAux] (t not)+; NPj... // X^ . ( ) t±(X)//
e) " " tfere + be [Aux] + (NP^ ^cP) ) . Loc (XJ//
f) " " [NP^ + will fAux]+ |Vl(+ I'NP], ) ^1.P[v]cfut(X2) //
g) » " [N^<v;i^(+j;Prep])(+[NP]//A1.PK|.hypU«2) //
S42a) 'Aux> + !_NP]+ \Comp| » be ' Aux\ + [NPJ^+ ! NPJ2 // X^ . /= (Xn ) . // (unmarked
tense)
b) " " " bei Auxj+(NPJ1+i AdjPj // Xj .P[AdjJ/'
c) " " " dofAux) + [NPj + j^[NPi (+(TPJ K+ ;LocP_] ) // X..P~ 1 [yf(x,)^
d) " " " ^(Aux] + (N^+(Prepi+/NP9//X1.P(Prep;(X2)^
e) " " " be (Aux]+ (N^+ jt'resPPj // X^ •■P(Vjfl0n^. ^
pres
f) " " " be (Aux} + (NP^ + (LocPj (+ (Adv) )// X^.LocCX^//
g) " " " be Aux [ -f there + FKPj^ + (LocPj// E(X^ ).Loc(X )//




^Qr {Pr|(without optional constituents before)
2
\VP]and |Comp\ may be redundant categories if S0 is allowed to be input
sensitive {expansions of (Vjand Aux'i (for tense,etc.) shared by the Wo
rule sets S3 and S4 could then be integrally stated just once.
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35 a)CN^al„g/pl VW+^stog/pl/fAuising/pl //X.P//
b) XLU. +I^//Au*)i—* v°u + //X.P //
C) M*tN^ng/pl -^CA^^M/askif X.P //
di there, be
. there + ia^ + 'NI^/' K (X) //
e) be + there "* + there +[NPj/ASKIF E(X) //
S0 fAdj P] } ( \AdjH^ + ) [Adj^
S7 /LocPj —^jPrepj + [NPj / j Advj
S8[PresP^~J»IV> ing (+[NPp
S9 [TPj-T>pklv^ /[NP}/ (Prep\ +^Np3
S10 a)fDet\—* a // X . //L J {"l$§c/l«.
b) " 0 //X. //
spec
ma
c) " the //X //
spec
Discourse-Level Rules for Game 17(informal)
Al:Delete all but the new item(s) of information if repeating the same
1
propositional pattern as in the preceding exchange.
A2:Stress any word that is contrasted to another just mentioned in
the preceding exchange(in the same propositional pattern).
A3:Start an utterance with 'but' if it expresses a contrast with an
immediately preceding one.
A4:Replace a [VPjby 'do' if it would otherwise mean repeating the 'VP]of
the preceding utterance.
A5:Start an utterance with 'well' if it is a comment on the outcome of
an action(verbal or not)just completed.
A6:fteplace a \NPl by 'it' if the singular referent is understood as the
current discourse topic - e.g. the game object.
A7:fteplace a'NP'iby 'one' if it refers to one member of a class just
mentionedCor understood as the current topic).
A8:Replace a|NP|by *which* if it refers to the whole preceding state¬
ment as the subject of the present main clause.
A9:Begin a statement of intent,etc.,with 'O.K.' if it makes a decisive
break with the preceding exchange.
1
i.e. the same syntactic pattern with analogous propositions! content
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Syntactic Rules for Game 43(Russian)
50 a) jS TADj p ( (jConjJ + )( [SentAdvJ +) |N10 (+(SentAdvj ) + [VPj.
b) iASKlff > " " " " " (plus quest-
c) KEPLY-fej—>Pa(tak )/net ion intonation)
d) 1 ASKVVh ( SubJ)| >[whP^ +(nJ^+[vp\
51 aJ^RelC^jI—^£»elPr,Sit>^ (+[Adv)) + [VPj/fLocP]
b) C«eicW —^RelPr(o«i +M+W
52 [np] f ( [PossPr3/[0emj+)( [Adj] / sam(a)1 + ) [nJ/[Pt^ (+ L^n> <+ [PrePl+
"
fNP))(+[HelClj )
53 a) VP >[Prep] + [NP|//X.P(Prep')(X2) //
b) " [_NPj // \.&/= (X2) //
c) " (ne i > 03 (4^inf3 )(+\W]) // X. (^)P [v] (X2>
d) " [Adj P! //X.P jAdj]/'
e) " [LocP] // X. Loc (X0 ) //
54 [LocPj_—jf/klvj + ) |Prep| + [NP| /[AclvJ
55 £AdJ / [Advj +) £Vljj (+[locP] /^Prep~y+[NP\ )
56 a) [Prep^ae '[Nl2
1 rom n / cum nc)[Adj]/[Dem[+[lg^^— >[Adj) / [Dem^^pl + JN]lease" 'case11
d)(V3+[PrJ/rN3 ~-^[^+[PrJ/£N] //PTV^X) // 2
jfsing
e)[Pr} + ne +pQ *fPjleg +fl£ +00
I
Discourse-level Rules for Game 43
Al:Replace a[NPjby 'eto' if it refers to the current topic of discou¬
rse - e.g. the game object.
A2:Delete any element (but the new information) if the same proposit-
ional pattern is being used as in the preceding exchange.
A3:Replace ajNPjby 'on' if it refers to a single male being understood
by both participants.
*Also found after the head noun
2
"For unmarked transitive verbs(others take marked cases)
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A4:If a statement is made only tentatively insert 'mozhet (byt)KjSentAdvy
A5:Start an utterance with any thematically high-lighted element,if
there is one.
A6:Start an utterance with the conjunction 'tak' or 'togda' if it ex¬
presses a conclusion drawn from what precedes it.
A7:If a statement is made upon superficial evidence insert 'kazhetsa'
( [SentAdvj ).
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Syntactic Rules for Game 26(Japanese)
Sg a) ' STATEi > ( (Con4]+)(NFj + [vp\
b> jasklf] > ( jConjQ + ) ( [CondClJ +)[np] + [vpJ(+ ka)
c~> ! HKPLY-^j » Hai/ So (desu) (positive)
lie / Chigaimasu (negative)
d> ' ASKWhj —^[WhPrl (+ no + [np] ) + (Vp\
51 [CondClj ^fPj+ ( [Advj+) (v]+ eba/ to
52 [NP] ( (NPj + [VP](f jNom] ) ) ( fAdj]/(Dem]+)( [N]+ no + ) £N]/ [Pr]/ (Adjj
+ no (+ [Adjilg]) +[P?3
53 a) £VPj •>j^Pj2+ ^ ^ X1 * */= <X2)
b) " (Adj^+ da //X.P(Adjy/
c) " fLocin+ iru V //X 4 .Loc (X ) //<- > —— ^aiim 2
d) " (jNPj^ + X.P [\Q(X2) // (unmarked tense)
e) " |LocPj+[Vj //X.P(Loe(X2)) //
54 [LocP] ^JP> + ni jPP^
55 a) jv] >fv> te + iru // x«pIXLnt #
b) " IV]+ masu 1// sentence Vinal;polite //
se a)t^—->«a
b) " wo // Xs, . ,/2(Obj //
•x.
Discourse-level Rules for Game 26
Al:Delete theme(e.g. game object) if understood as topic of discourse.
A2:Replace^NP\by ' sore wa' if it refers to an entity just mentioned.
A3:Start an utterance with 'sore do* if it represents a consequence
or continuation(contrasting)of the last utterance.
A4:Replace'NPjby 'dotchi-tomo' if it refers to either of two alterna¬
tives, at least one of which has just been mentioned.
A5: Replace |(NP] by i_Adj£+ no if it refers to one or more of a class of
entities having the attribute signified.
A6:Stress any word contrasted to another of the same word-class in the
preceding utterance.
A7:Start an utterance with 'ano' to qualify own preceding utterance.
A8:Delete any element just mentioned in the same propositional pattern.
A9:Finish an utterance with 'ne* if asking a question tentatively.
*And d£* + masu desu
2
Ur Si *or verbs marked as taking an object with this(pp]
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Svntactic Hules for Game 10(Eskimo)
50 a) iS i Al'E —^onjAr)( £ondCl^-i ) C |SentAdvj+) jNP^j+( (Sent AdvJj+) fyP \
b) iASKIF —>■ " " " " " " (+Int)
c) iASKVVh i > " " " " " " "
d) iHEPLY'fc..:—>Aap / Naamik(Nagga) (+ {VP^|)
51 fcondSl] >(npJ+ jvp]
52 K & V fcWPj^pO [NsV li'r> |NeV+ [Encl^J
53 tocO'—4.V
Si (AdjPj jk 3
55 a) \VP) ^ &P.3+-) [V 3 // XI. P ](X^)//
b) " W // X^=/£ (X ) // (alternative to S5a)
c) " {LocPj+ \v\// Xi.?(Loc(Xo)) //
d) " CAdJP^.tr+HT[v.V/Xl-P&:k,r <X2[J IMsi "
56 M—^[h V [fr] + fvj+ [v VO DC
57 a) [v ) — >-Poa // STATE X* . .P<l5?j<\ , // (unmarked present/past tense)
e -"■ Jsiggp jintr
bifvl—^-Pa // ASKIF X J .P[\Q ^ //—
^iaerp -^ntr
o) " -PatV STATE X. , . ,p(v](X . )//— 'top 2toP
d>"
e)" -^//xtoP'F'V//
f) " -mjgUafl // STATE X d ~PCV1 //
jsing »
S8 a) [Ne\ > -nut // X ^ //'{ih
b)'XWp//x,^ng//
c) " -mi //X/, Or /X,it //
s¥ng p
Generally, (v)™/ [v ] + ( ... 1.. )+ \VA ,where the brackets enclose
S S S 1 c
any series of suffixes ending in a£.v3 (which may also represent'= or ).
2 8
' P' is a morphophoneme realized as /v/ or /p/
d) [NJ * -tigut // X
'pros
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e) " -mik ^ X, 4 //(sing^lnstr
Discourse-level Rules for Game 10
A1 : Delete* subject'[NP^ if understood as referring to the current topic
(e.g. game object!
a2: Replace (np1, by + taanna(where Tn'Us a superordinate set to which
the referent belongs)if referring to an unspecified object of which
a set-membership property has been established.
A3:Delete ail but the new item(s) of information if repeating the same
propositional pattern as in the last exchange.
a4:Begin an utterance with 'immaqa' if making a tentative statement.
A5: Place the non-incorporated object of a verbal form after the latter
if it is to be theraatically stressed.
A6:Add '-lu' to the first nominal of an utterance if the latter is an
extension of the content of the preceding one.
A7:Begin an utterance with 'kisianni' if it contrasts with the prece¬
ding one.
AS:Begin an utterance with • taamaakkuni3.f it represents a conclusion
drawn from the preceding one(s).
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Chapter 7
Players of the game were found to evince a considerable range of
skill between individuals.lt was not,however,possible to relate skill
generally to relative experience with the game,nor with any other
single factor such as subjectively assessed level of intelligence o>
education;this latter factor was even found to correlate negatively
in some cases,due perhaps to the recording situation and to concerns
about performing well in the presence of others.Factors that were
clearly relevant to performance were:the relationship between the two
players(whether they were friends or in a staff-student relationship,
etc.);seriousness or casualness of the game atmosphere;willingness to
proceed in an intuitive as opposed to strictly logical manner;and gen¬
eral alertness at the time of playing.The great majority of players
claimed no more familiarity with the game than having heard it occas¬
ionally on the radio(for example the well-known BtiC team version
some years ago) and having played it from time to time when younger
(this also included most nonSEnglish speakers).A few players - inclu¬
ding two of the Eskimo speakers - claimed no prior knowledge of it at
all and had to be taught the rules 'from scratch',while a few had
had considerable experience with some vexsion of the game - typically
teachers of English abroad using it as a class exercise.In the former
case a reading of the rules(see Appendix) plus a couple of practice
rounds were sufficient to play an adequate - and in some cases ex¬
cellent- game, once the convention of dividing the universe into 'ani¬
mal,mineral and vegetable' was grasped(and the terms translated,as
required).
Despite the overall lack of clear-cut correlation between skill
and experience,an examination of the transcripts shows that there L
are indeed certain typical features of games played 'well* or 'badly',
as judged by the time and number of questions taken to guess the corr-
rect answer - if it is guessed at all.For example,a very basic -though
not always applicable - strategy is to ask questions about properties
that more or less divide the current search set by a half(see strategy
(i) below);this is generally understood at once by beginners.Although
there is not enough data in the corpus to substantiate the claim that
more experienced players do appear to develop more sophisticated stra-
*
Friends,for example,typically convey more subtle information by into¬
nation and various paralinguistic means than strangers.
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tegies than beginners,the impression was given that the former had
incorporated more 'useful question types'(see strategy (iii)below)
into their playing of the game.This information must also include
indications of suitable contexts in which to apply particular question
typesfand how long to persist with one question type if a negative
reply is at first elicited.A 'good' player would also seem to be one
capable of taking inferential 'short-cuts' and of making the occasional
'intuitive leap'(see strategy(ii) below)by asking a question that is
'reasonable' only in the light of a specific hypothesis he/she has
formed on the basis of their experience with 'typical' game objects.
In general,the poorer player can be recognized by the preponderance
of redundant or 'random' questions with relatively little signific¬
ant chaining from one to the next.
In order to examine more closely the question of strategy,consider
the following 'skeletal' outlines of English games recorded for the
game object 'Princess Anne'.They can be taken to represent the 'key-
word' property list(somewhat abbreviated) built up by the questioner
during the course of the game.Redundant properties are not 'collapsed',
so the order in which the property list was accreted is preserved.Ne-
gative properties are preceded by W and doubtful or hedged ones by
;all the games were correctly solved at the end.
'Princess Anne' games:
G. 3 G. 37
animal animal
native to Britain human




~to do with acting








born after war ^ show bus. celebrity








This includes tentative intonation
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has famous husband(?)








^ member of department
TV celebrity(?)
/v sportsperson
of similar standing to royal
family
rv the Queen




rv member of department



































shouldn't be in politics(else)
rj male
^the Queen




A number of points should be made about these property lists.First,
they are subject to the fallibility of memory in general - they may or
may not correspond exactly to the accreting episodic memory of the
game being played,but they are at least extractable from the latter,
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and individual properties may be forgotten or remembered incorrectly.
They are furthermore subject to the imprecision of certain concepts
embodied in them - for example,Princess Anne is described as a 'sports
personality' in Game 42 but as 'not a sportswoman' in Game 39,both of
which are in a sense correct attributions.We are dealing here not with
algorithmically tested truth-values of propositions,but with judgements
of a more or less 'hedged' nature,even when the hedging is not overt.
There are also examples of apparent illogicality to be found:thusin
Game 3 the property Mcaan' is followed directly by one resulting from
the now redundant question 'Is it female?'(this may be relatable,how¬
ever, to a misunderstanding on the questioner's part as regards the se¬
nse of 'man* in the proposition 'It's not a man').
Examining these and similar lists for evidence of particular stra¬
tegies one finds three major ways by which the subsequent question to
be asked is chosen;these have been incorporated into the strategy com¬
ponent flow diagram on page 166.The three competing strategies(of
which the first to generate a sufficiently 'good' question is the
one acted upon in a given game situation) are as follows:(i) a 'top-
down' subdivision of the current search set by a factor of about a
half(cf. box (b) on the flow diagram);(ii) a 'bottom up' strategy of
asking about a property of a specific entitytor entity class) within
the current search set reached by an 'intuitional leap* as a likely
candidate(cf. box (d) on the flow diagram);and (iii) the asking of a
'useful question-type' (useful here means 'known generally to aid
successful playing of the game;cf. box (c) on the flow diagram).Apart
from these general strategies more specific chains of inferential
reasoning may intervene at any point. The reason why such a complex
interaction of strategies is found even in games played by beginners
is not difficult to see:given the fact that it is simply not possible
(due to cross-categorization) to subsume the whole universe known to
the questioner into one hierarchical tree which can be worked down
1
branch by branch in the manner of strategy (i) ,it is not surprising
that other means of proceeding have to be drawn upon.And strategies
(ii) and (iii) surely correspond to heuristic procedures utilized in
*Even if such a tree were possible for a closed set of game objects
this strategy would prove to be highly inefficient and 'unnatural';
see the description of the program in Chapter 9.
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a wide range of general cognitive functions.Despite the element of
randomness involved(due to the tendancy to ask the first 'good*
question that happens to be thought of and to the co-existence of a
number of equally 'good' potential questions at any one point in a
game*),more can be said about the interaction of strategies evidenced
in the data.
ftie 'top down' strategy is most readily employed at times when -
as at the outset of a game - the search set corresponds to a concept
referrable to by a single word or phrase(which conceivably acts as
an 'address' to a number of propositions subdividing that concept
by relationships of hyponomy,etc.).Thus questions concerning the pro¬
perty 'human' commonly occur immediately after the property 'animal'
is known.But notice that even here the search set is not strictly
numerically divided by a factor of two;nevertheless the division of
the concept 'animal* into 'human' versus 'non-human' probably is,psych¬
ologically , the most basic and generally useful distinction people do
make here,and even beginners to the game seem to realize that questions
about intermediate categories such as 'mammal' are not as useful(cf.
Rips,Shoben and Smith,2973,for evidence concerning such 'natural'
hierarchies).Cases where there is one outstanding property more or less
exactly dividing the search set by two,such as the division of the
concept 'human' into 'woman/man',are relatively rare.And,of course,it
is possible for a number of other question types to intervene between
the assertion of 'human' and asking about the sex of the person - as
in Game 31.The question that is asked immediately after the former in
this case ('Is it a member of the department?') certainly doesn't ■-
cWfc; the search set by anything like a half:a 'hunch' has been follo-
wed(according to strategy (ii)),which doesn't in fact pay off,though
if the answer had been 'yes' the search set would have been reduced
by considerably more than a half.Moreover the questioner can infer
useful information even from the negative reply:namely that the person
to be guessed must be famous.This is not strictly speaking a logical
1
Note box (e) on the flow diagram,which evaluates whether a candidate
proposition(however arrived at) is worth asking at that point in the
game;it must involve some sort of weighting of the number of quest¬
ions left and the degree to which a yes/no reply would reduce the
current search set(optimal reduction being sought).
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conclusion,but represents within the game context a highly probable
deduction - it is a contingent fact that game objects must be known
to both players and that the great majority of human beings known to
them both and not generally famous are members of the department(the
players both being on a course in the same department but not other¬
wise friends). This sort of 'plausible deduction' seems to be much
more significant in 'Twenty Questions' than strictly syllogistic
inference.
Already when the search set is reduced,as above,to 'woman',a con¬
tinued application of strategy (i) becomes difficult*:there are just
too many ways of subdividing the set at this point.Although it is
possible for the next question to be -according to strategy (i) still-
'Is the female adult?',as in Game 37,it becomes increasingly likely
that strategy (ii) or (iii) will be brought to bear.fhus.in the latter
case,a 'useful question-type*for profession,location or nationality,
for example,could be applied.Some such question-types are just'two-
branched '(i.e. have two values,plus or minus,as that for 'alive/dead',
and duplicate distinctions to be found by applying strategy (i)) but
others,such as those mentioned above,form hierarchical 'trees':they
can be applied a number of times in succession with a different - and
in the case of a 'yes' answer more specific - predicate each time.'IKe
first value ascertained for such a variable predicate -e.g. that for
'profession' - will depend in part.presumably,on the salience in the
questioner's long-term memory of (in this case) women of a particular
profession:thus whether the (well-known) woman is connected with show
business is often asked.Though this may by chance represent roughly
half of all the well-known women the questioner knows of,the numerical
criterion is clearly not the only factor at work,since the first
question about profession in more than one of the games above is as ;
to whether the woman is engaged in politics(a rather specific 'hunch':
surely most people know of fewer women politicians than women enter¬
tainers/film stars,etc.).Strategies (i) and (ii) may,then,both be
involved in generating particular predicates for the application of
strategy (iii) - that of 'good question-types'.It is also possible
for unrelated questions to intervene between successive tokens of a
'useful question-type' - as for example between 'profession' questions
1
Though it may be returned to later in a game
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in Game 28.Although it is not usual for a questioner to persist with
one question-type for more than two successive questions,examples of
longer chains can be found - as in Game 31 for profession and Game 42
for nationality.it is also possible for successive tokens of such
questions to work 'backwards' up a tree to find a correct property,as
in Game 28 to find 'in Britain'.
A clear example of the third major strategic type is seen in Game
37,where an 'intuitive leap' is made directly from the search set of
'well-known woman,alive now' to the question 'Is it Margaret Thatcher?'.
This erratic - but sometimes successful - guessing is particularly
prevalent among beginners(but note that nearly all players first
wrongly guess 'Is it the Queen' towards the end of the games for
Princess Anne).Other,less overt examples of this strategy can be found
in instances where a property is asked about that only makes sense
as a 'reasonable' question if the questioner has hypothesized a spe¬
cific game object.Thus in Game 3 the question 'Does she have a famous
husband?',though on the surface redundant(most famous women's husbands
being well known to the public),can be understood as reasonable if the
questioner had at that point conceived of someone 'vaguely to do with
politics' with a husband better known to the public than herself(say
a particular politician's wife);probably she did receive useful in¬
formation from the 'hedged* intonation of the reply - witness her
persistance in this line of inquiry in the next question.
A case where a specific inference can be seen in conjunction
with the third major strategy is to be found in Game 28,where the
property 'shouldn't be involved in politics' leads(via 'not male')
to the specific hypothesis 'the Queen'.In nearly all the games
listed above there is some kind of hedged answer(whether by an ex¬
panded reply or simply by intonation) to a question as to whether
the person is involved in politics;the number of people for whom
a straight 'yes' or 'no* reply cannot be given to this question is
presumably much smaller than the number of those for whom it can.
Many more such specific hypotheses are probably made in the games
than become overt in subsequent question sequences.
Throughout the games examined there would appear to be points
where particularly significant information is received and/or part¬
icularly useful hypotheses are made by the questioner:these are points
at which the search set(as defined by the conjunction of properties
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on the current property list for the unknown object)is 'collapsed' -
often to form a 'natural conceptual grouping' that corresponds to a
single word or phrase - rendering certain earlier properties(partic¬
ularly negative ones) redundant. ilius there is usually a point near the
beginning of the game where the game object is assigned a class-memo-
1
ership property that for the first time renders it 'imageable* (as
does 'human* in the games above).But similar crucial points can 8,l>$o
be found at later stages(e.g. when 'member of the royal family' is
ascertained in these games).Properties falling between these crucial
points - especially negative ones - seem to be subordinate to these
principle class-membership properties and to play a less central role
in the search processes involved in playing the game.Though there may
be no direct way of proving this,reference can be made to evidence
from 'recapping' after such points are reached,redundant properties
tending not to be repeated there.It may well be that sets of properties
corresponding to 'natural consepts* facilitate matching processes as
compared to more haphazard bundles of properties.The former concepts
(or the words labeling them) would presumably act as major 'addresses'
for long-terra memory searches and as such have general significance
beyond the scope of 'Twenty Questions'.
Similar skeletal property lists can be presented for a number of
games using two different game objects,as follows.Analogous remarks
as for the Princess Anne games can be made.
'Forth Kail Bridge' Games:
G.38 G. 32
mineral mineral
r\. found in all countries(?) metal
in Scotland






















vone in the flat
larger than 2*x 3*x 3'
'--like a dustbin
A-er surprised if Cj-er bought
one










needed by humans in country
larger than briefcase
found inside house
identity related to place














in sea-side village (?)

















belongs to someone at Univ.
" " in Applied
Linguistics
belongs to male
" " without beard
"v belong to A.Davies
'n. belong to staff
" M.F.
" member of MsC course








found in suburban homes (?)
























found in this country








•vcome out of habitat
animal itself(clue)
/o animal produc t
used by humans (?)
-owhole item(clue)
/v connected with clothing
connected with furniture
A-er and Q-er have one












An example of the 'top down',step-by-step strategy is seen in Game
18 and Game 32,where 'mineral' is followed immediately by 'metal'.A
•useful question-type'*is applied in ,for instance,Game 13,where 'is
this part of a human being?' is asked immediately after the object is
found to be human.Intuitive 'leaps' to specific hypotheses are found
in Game 27,where it is asked whether the object is Waverley Station
and in Game 48 where the questioner asks if the object 'exists in
water',thinking perhaps of a ship(the former leap being to an entity,
the latter to a class,of course).An example of how a player,though
applying generally valid strategies can be led(or lead themselves)
completely astray until help is supplied is seen in Game 35.Crucial
'collapsing' points are to be found at,for example,'landmark' in Game
38,'bridge' in Game 18,'part of me* in Game 16,and 'nose' in Game 1.
An instance of a very specific inferential 'short-cut' can be seen
in Game 23,when 'not sitting down itself' leads to the inference(again
in the mode of 'plausible deduction') that the object is part of a
human being.
Any attempt to extend further the analysis of strategies employed
in the playing of 'Itoenty Questions'(in terms,say,of statistical
statements concerning the order of questions)would probably be fruit¬
less - and certainly would be tedious.Enough has been said,however,
to show how complex and flexible -even without including 'extra-ludic'
material - is the behaviour here being described,despite the simpli¬
city of the game rules.
part of head
organ(?)
*here of the 'binary' variety
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Chapter 8
The present model is capable in principle of generating versions
of 'Twenty (Questions' in any natural language,given a suitable set
of grammatical rules('augmented' phrase structure and discourse-level)
and a lexicon that includes information a3 to syntactic contexts for
individual predicate lexemes in the language concerned.The implication
is,of course,that the underlying cognitive procedures involved in play¬
ing the game are not language-specific - a not surprising statement,
since the rules of the game are readily translatable from one language
to the next.This does not mean,however,that the grammar and lexicon
of the particular language employed will not affect the course of the
game.There is,for instance,an obvious influence of the particular
semantic scope of lexical items in a language used in a game question
on the formulation of following questions.There are also cultural
factors affecting the types of question asked(and,possibly,strategies
preferred)*An example of this first type of interaction is to be found
in Game 25,played in Japanese.Having reached the point of knowing
that the object was some kind of 'tabako'(which in Japanese can mean,
besides 'tobacco','a/the cigarette(s)'or even 'a/the packet of cigare-
ttes'^the questioner became confused when pressed to be more speci¬
fic by the answerer.The object written on the slip of paper in the
latter's hand was (in English) :'the packet of cigarettes on the
table'.The difficulty was evidently compounded by the tendency for
the game to be played on Japanese radio with generic rather than part¬
icular entities as game object(a 'cultural' factor in turn related,
perhaps,to the lack of articles in Japanese).Even when the answerer
pointed towards the particular packetCalmost empty) on the table in
front of him,the questioner persisted with questions related to
particular types of 'tabako'.When the point was finally grasped
that the object was the packet on the table -'tsukue no ue no tabako
no hako' - an argument ensued as to the correctness of this expression,
since it was not clear whether 'tabako no haka' could be used to refer
to an almost empty packet.It was apparently not easy to express the
concept of the container plus two cigarettes in Japanese succinctly,
the fairly clear distinction in 2nglish(and liussian,for that matter)
between a 'cigarette packet' and a 'packet of cigarettes' not being
parallelled in that language in everyday usage(where the term 'tabako',
however vague,is generally preferred).The text of tie latter part of
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the argument is given here with an approximate English translation:
t^:Filta no tsuite iru tabako to iu koto?...
^:Sore wa kankei nai...Are wa nan desu ka?





^jTabako no hako?...De mo,tabako no hako
to iu no wa -
^tMatte - tabako uio haitte iru keredomo...
Kara no baai mo attya nai?...Chotto
aimai da kedo.Hitohako no tabako...
0{:De mo,ne,hako *tte iu to katai mono...
^ iu keredomo,are mo hako ni naru wake -
nihongo de wa.Nai kara.fukoro to iwanai
deshtT... Fukoro 'tte ienai.
ot.:Watashi wa tabako no tsutsumi 'tte iu.
J£:Iie - iwanai.Tabako no hako *tte ii-
masu yo.
(Do you mean a filter
cigarette?)
(That's irrelevant...
What's that over there?






But a cigarette packet
is - )
(Wait - there are cigarettes
inside it but...But it cou¬
ld also be empty,couldn't
it?...It's a little vague.
A packet of cigarettes...)
(But still a 'packet of
cigarettes* is when it's
packed ful1...)
(But that's what it's ca¬
lled - that too is a
•packet of cigarettes' -
in Japanese.You'd hardly
call it a •fukoro'1...It*s
not a •fukoro•.)
(J^ would call it a cigar-
2
ette 'tsutsumi'. )
(No - you don't say that.
You say •tabako no hako'.)
Difficulties of a lexical nature were also encountered in trans¬





than English.Thus in Eskimo the term 'uumasoq' is a present particip¬
ial form denoting a living animal (not usually a human being,however);
the convention whereby the term was to cover human beings,parts of
human beings and also animal products(as in English within the context
of 'Twenty Questions')had to be stressed to the players.This was some¬
what easier to establish in the case of Russian,where it was possible
to use a phrase of a less colloquial nature meaning 'from the animal
kingdom'.
Occasions where questions are formulated in one of the non-English
games that would not be expressable with ease in English are quite
common - though in all cases a ponderous paraphrase could be asked
in English(it is a matter of the succinctness of lexicalization of
a concept in different languages).Thus in the Russian game,G.43,the
question 'Eto kto-nibud iz moevo nachalstva?'(roughly :'Is it some¬
body from my superiors?') uses the expression 'nachalstvo*,a singular
noun denoting any collective authority,and,in particular,one's supe¬
riors within an organization(here a university department).A similar
point can be made concerning the Eskimo word 'qullersaq' in Game 10,
which denotes anyone in a high-up position - usually referring to
Danes in elevated administrative posts('ap te and including the govern¬
ment and the royal family)as opposed to the Greenlanders themselves.
It is a singular noun form with a regular plural and,unlike its Russ¬
ian counterpart,cannot readily annex a possessive pronoun;semantically
it seems to be a vaguer,more general term than the Russian.The same
game also has a clear example of language-specific lexical ambiguity-
that of 'nunami',which can either mean 'on land' or 'in a/the country'
(whence the confusion in this game arising from use of the expression).
Grammatical influences on the course of a game (morphological and
syntactical) are less easy to pinpoint(apart from the effect of the
lack of articles in Japanese - as also in Russian and Eskimo -mentioned
above).But undoubtedly such factors as the tendency to delete subject
noun phrases in Japanese except when absolutely necessary for compreh¬
ension do have an effect on the course of the game.The former tendency,
for example,allows questions to be asked and answered which are ambiv¬
alent as to particular or generic reference - something which is usua¬
lly avoided in English by the use of distinct pronominals 'it','them',
•one of them*,etc.Moreover,Japanese questions are nearly always ambi¬
guous as to the number and sex of the xeferent. The subjective impress-
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ion is that the resultant lack of referential'clues'makes the game
somewhat more difficult to play in Japanese than in English.fhe same
may be said,to a lesser degree,for liussian and Eskimo.
Influences on the course of the game of a 'cultural' nature might
be seen in the difficulty experienced by the Russian questioner in
Game 43 in imagining someone 'higher than the government* or in the
Japanese question in Game 28 as to whether the object's leaves fall
off in autumn(a stereotyped question in the Japanese broadcast version
of the game,apparently).But these are largely matters of speculation
and of purely anecdotal interest.
Skeletal property lists as in Chapter 7 are given below for a
number of analogous games in the three non-English languages.fhe 'logic'
behind the order of successive questions can be seen to be similar to
that behind the English games(i.e. compatible in a general sense with






n^nasoqarpoq (<v have horns)
timimi ilaatigut meqqoqarpoq (has
G.9('Questioner's nose';
uumasoq (animal)
fv inuk (<->0 human being)
inummiippoq (in/on human being)
uumasup silataani (on outside
(clue)
hair on parts of body) of animal)




^nersutaat ( domestic animal) (clue) qingaq
inuk (human being)








iz zhivotnovo mira (animal)
v sovsem chelovek(?) (r« exactly a
human being(?))
/s,zver (<v beast)
chast cheloveka (part of human be¬
ing) (clue)
^ noga (r\y foot/leg)
rv ruka ('v arm/hand )




^nos M.F. ( is, M.F. 's nose)
G.43 ('Princess Anne')
iz zhivotnovo mira (animal)
chelovek (human being)
iv v pomeshchenii Gv in room)
(Q-er)znaet(?) (Q-er knovvs(?))
^v laboratorii (v in lab)
-vznakomy (e/ acquaintance)
izvestny (well-known)
✓\,v isskustve (<-vin art)





r>/iz nachalstva (/vone of
Q-er's superiors)
vyshe " (higher than ")
(clue)
<v v pravitelstve (/vin go¬
vernment )
vyshe " (higher than ")
(clue)










•N- kakShin ( J manufactured object)










sei ni kankei ( to do with
sex)
karada no ichibubun (part of
body)(clue)
jibun de miru koto(kagami to)







hana ga saku ( has leaves)
6kii(?) (big(?))
kudamono aru (~has fruit)
aki ni ha ga ochiru (leaves -^fall
in autumn)
jorokuju ('v evergreen)
/v. onshitsu ni sbdatsu ( -^cultivated
in greenhouse)
Scotland ni mieru(?) (seen in Scot¬
land (?) )
Nihon ni aru (found in Japan)
tsukau mono (-..-utilitarian object)
miru mono ( - something to look at)
taberu mono(?) ( edible(?))
-takai (/v. tall)
tokaijii mita koto (found in middle
of cities)
koko de kau koto (can be bought
here)
ie no naka ni yoku (often found in
houses)




bubunteki kami (partly paper)(clue)
. shinbun (-v, newspaper)
miete iru (visible now)(clue)
hon ( book)
tabako (tobacco/cigarettes)
tabako no shurui ( kind of tobacco)
tsukue no ue (on desk)
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The claim that the cognitive processes beneath the linguistic
surface of the game are universal may,though valid,not be particularly
interesting in itself,but there is a deeper sense in which this com¬
parative data - however limited in scope - has a bearing on fundam¬
ental linguistic questions.Namely as regards the propositional 'deep
structures' represented on the model.There are two aspects to this:
on the one hand constraints on the structure of such units,and on the
other the nature of the elements of which they consist.in relation to
the first of tbeso.it can be seen from the diagrams in Chapter 6 that,
despite the wide range of morphological and syntactic types of langu¬
age modelled,the propositional content of all game questions asked
conform to the basicfand presumably 'universal')logical structure of
one,two or three arguments plus a predicate term(and various modifiers
of these).reflecting the cognitive functions of property-attribution,
class membership assignation,or action/state/relationship predication
to an entity or between more than one entity.'Entity' is here to be
taken in its widest sense,at any level of abstraction between concrete
particulars and quoted propositions(see Lyons,1968,on first,second and
third order nominals).Further constraints as to the extent of proposi¬
tional embedding are nlso in evidence - no more than three levels are
in fact found in the data(this is presumably a matter of short-term
memory processing capacity).
These constraints apply just as readily in the case of such a pro¬
tean language as Eskimo,whose polysynthetio morphology might be expected
to blur over the distinction between predicate .argument and modifier,
but this is not where language-spocific effects are to be sought.Thus
in such a 'word-sentence* as 'Niaqumiipoq' in Game 9(*It*s in/on the
head'),the predicate is expressed by *-mii(t)'.which just happens to
be a verbalizing suffix rather than an independant verbal root as in
English,but like its English counterpart requires two arguments:the
logical subject,which is incorporated in the declarative third persnn
singular ending '-poq'.and the object(of location) 'niaqoq'.a nominal
root.Both the Eskimo and the English corresponding to it can be cap¬
tured by a propositional 'deep structure • XI .pilxf? .where XI refers
to the gsune object,X2 denotes the head,and PI is a predicate of loc-
ation(also representable as Loc (X2) ).The only significant differe¬
nce is one of word-sense:the Pi corresponding to Eskimo '-mii(t)' can
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be glossed in English as both 'be on' and 'be in*.Thus a possible
•good question' following reception of the above proposition in an
Eskimo game would be an utterance glossable as 'Is it the brain?*-
which would not be a good question at an analogous point in an Eng¬
lish game if the last proposition was 'It's on the head'.
Spending upon one's primary interests,one can either talk about
constraints such as those discussed above as linguistic universals
(in terms of the syntactic units of 'deep structures' corresponding
to the propositional structures there) - and as such argue for their
'innateness* - or as universals of a more general cognitive kind.
From the latter point of view(which is more relevant to the type
of cognitive model with which this thesis is concenied),one can spec¬
ulate as to the general 'set' of the central nervous system to
recognize and utilize - in memory storage and search and in the
analysis of incoming sense data,for example - such propositional
structures(cf.Whitehead's broad use of the term *proposition*).This
'universal' propositional base is,it should be pointed out,largely
taken for granted by cognitive modellers in Artificial Intelligence
(however it is interpreted by individual theorists) and by many
psycholinguists(cf.Anderson and Dower,19735and Kintsch(i974 ,for
example).Constraints on the structure of such propositions would
in turn constrain the type of linguistic syntactic structures corr¬
esponding to and expressing them(anci the type of rules applicable
to them for expansion into surface utterances).
Be this as it may,it is clear that there is considerable inter¬
play between the language-specific and the language-independent in
this area of verbal behaviour(as presumably in all others) and that
any model that - albeit by necessity - has to draw a precise line
between the two is to 3ome degree misleading.But nevertheless,the
set of languago-independant instructions defining behaviour conformal
with the rules of the game can be described apart from any reference
to particular linguistic expression within a given language.
The computational antilogy of a program formulated in and acting upon
units of a propositional'language'such as LiBP is of value he re.How¬
ever, the analogy is not to be taken too literally - especially in
so far as an entirely different type of processing(by•analogy'rether
than 'list-matching' )may also be involved in the playing of 'Twenty
Questions'(in relation,for example,to strategy (ii) discussed in
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Chapter 7).
As regards the second aspect of this question of universal prop-
ositional structures - that of the conceptual elements(arguments,pred¬
icates ,modifiers and operators) of which they consist - the model
treats these as word-senses,as do the majority of Artificial Intelli¬
gence theorists,tacitly or overtly.The alternative to such a position
would be to treat them as constructed of 'primitives* from a finite
universal set(cf.Schank,1972).Decomposition(for analysis and storage)
into structures of this sort might arguably be involved in certain
types of cognitive tasks,but a word-sense-based system seems justified
for accounting for the behaviour in our data.
But what sort of evidence can be adduced for word-senses rather
than more primitive semantic units being crucial for modelling 'Twenty
Questions'?We have already discussed a few examples of how specific
word-senses m a given language can influence the choice of subsequent
game questions.lt is,furthermore,easy to find occasions in which cer¬
tain connotations of words or phrases(difficult to reflect in any
discrete feature-breakdown,the meaning of the whole being greater than
the sum of any get ef-usually binary - features of this kind)clearly
influence the subsequent course of a game.An instance of this is the
use of the words 'znamenity* and 'izvestny' in the iiussian game 43."
The former term corresponds roughly to English 'famous*,the latter
to 'well-known'.Hie difference between the two is not easily repre¬
sented by the addition or subtraction of one or more simple feature(s)
from a finite set(of general application in the lexical analysis of
Russiarj),yet it is clearly relevant to the course of the game:
^:Eto znamenity chelovek? (Is it a famous person?)
Izvestny... (Well-known...)
Izvestny.No -izvestny v oblasti iskusstva? (Well-known.But -
well-known in the field of art?)
'Znamenity',like its English counterpart,would seem to suggest some¬
one renowned for some outstanding feat and/or of - in some sense -
historical stature,whereas 'izvestny' is both somewhat weaker and
suggests renown in a certain field.The combination 'prostoy no izve¬
stny •('simple but well-known')occuring later in the game is not as
contradictory as 'prostoy no znamenity* would have been.'Cultural'
connotations of the Russian word 'prostoy* are also involved here,
the game object being Princess Anne.
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Apparent evidence for a primitive analysis being relevant to
the present data is found in the relexicalization present in many
•recaps'. Throughout the corpus can be found instances where the ques¬
tioner recaps previously elicited propositions about the game object
with somewhat different lexical items or phrasing,recalling,for ins¬
tance,'It's static' as 'It doesn't move *(Game 32),or 'She's not a
politician...'* as 'Perhaps vaguely connected with politics'(Game
3),or 'It's not something we use in the house' as 'Not used in the
house'(Game 36).But these can be explained in other ways than by re¬
sorting to primitive representations:in the first example the pro¬
perty concerned might well have been stored(in component (c) of the
model) in the form of phonemic tokens of the lexical items 'not raove*-
i.e. the replacement of the more technical term by its more colloquial
(and in search and match processes more readily manipulable?)para-
phrase might have taken place at the time of memorization.Similarly,
in the second example,where the hesitation accompanying the elicit-
ation of the proposition would have necessitated some modification
of the latter before it was stored anyway.Such purely syntactic
variation as exhibited in the third example are compatible with the
model already,since it is assumed that only the 'key' words are
stored in (c),and that the lexical case frames for the predicates
involved allow for a number of such (transformationally)related
syntactic constructions.lbe cognitive activity involved in matching
new information to properties already stored for the game object
and in deriving implications and hypotheses from them could doubt¬
less cause various modifications to that information before it is
actually stored.Finally.mistakes in or difficulty of recall will
inevitably cause the recapper from time? to time to reconstruct
propositions somewhat at variance with(or even the opposite of)what
was actually stored.
At this point we must distinguish between two different aspects
of the 'primitive' question.On the one hand there is the question of
lexical decomposition being or not being involved in the processes
we are modelling;on the other hand there is the possibility of 'pri¬
mitive' or 'general' predicates underlying a variety of language-
specific surface predicates expressing the same basic idea(with
*From the sequence'Is she a politician?'-=^'No... I'd say not.*
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various additional nuances of meaning).This second aspect can be ex¬
amined by comparing different ways of expressing the same underlying
'primitive* or 'general' concept in the English games(not enough data
being at hand for the other languages).Take for example the following
questions found in the corpus:
G.4:Does it have any functional value?Can you use it?
G.40:Is it decorative?Is it functional?
G.27:Is it something which is useful to...humans...?
G.32:Does one vse it?Is it an object which is used?
G.28:Is it useful?
G.35:Do human beings do anything with it - do they use it for
anything?
G.18 and G.36:1s it (something) decorative?
G.36:Is it functional in any way?
G.12:(Is it) of use or decoration?
Clearly all these questions are concerned with whether the object
serves some kind of utilitarian function - the contrast being either
with 'useless' or 'decorative'(it is not clear whether these represent
non-gradable opposites of 'useful' - cf..Lyons,1977 - or indeed whether
the latter two terms even form a binary dichotomy;but at least in the
present context they are certainly treated as 'first approximation*
binary complementaries).Whichever contrast is involved(and especially
when a 'no' answer to questions as to whether the object is decorat¬
ive is received) the information gained by such questions is decide¬
dly vague unless helpful hedges are supplied by the answerer.In the
game of *IWenty Questions' one can see time and again the natural
propensity of the human mind to deal in binary contrasts(a .propens¬
ity related to the 'top-down' strategy described in Chapter 7) even
when a little reflection would show that no such clear dichotomy ex¬
ists.Some of the questions listed above are merely stylistic variants,
and at least one (Game 12)is not a legitimate game question(though
it is aimed at gaining the same information as the others),but the
examples involving rephrases of the question(as in G.4 and G.32) seem
particularly strongly to suggest that there is some underlying con¬
ceptual property being asked about which can be lexicalized in a
number of different ways.Presumably the first variant in such cases
is judged in retrospect to be too vague - or misleading - or not sat-
isfactory stylistically.One could then propose an underlying general
concept 'USE'(pronounced as the English noun),which 'points towards'
a number of different lexical items,principally the adjectives'use¬
ful ','functional','useless* and 'decorative*(the latter two as -in
some sense- antonyms of the first two).Moreover,USE would have to be
related to the English nouns/noun phrases 'use','functional value'
and 'decoration',the verb 'use* and various syntagms such as 'do some¬
thing with','have a functional value*,etc.Variants of these could be
related to syntactic options on the 'case frames' of the predicates
involved,for instance the following related to the verb 'use':'Does
one use it?','Do they use it for anything?*,'Can you use it?' and
'Is it an object which can be used?*.If on the other hand one analy¬
ses the 'deep structure' of each of these sentences in terms of
(English) word-sense-specific predicates - thus,for example,'XI.PI(=
functional)' for G.40,'X2(=one).P2(=use)(XI)' for G.32(version one)
and 'XI .^(XaCrrobject)^^ p.,)' for G.32(second version) -it is going
to be difficult to account for such semantic similarity as does exist
between successive lexicalizations here.An underlying 'XI.USE' embo¬
dying the conceptual 'primitive* hypothesized might thus be justifi d.
The problem arises,however,of specifying the exact semantic nature of
this underlying element:is it really a predicate?If so,is it a prope¬
rty, an action or a relation?i)oes it constitute a second or third order
entity?Surely all human symbols must have some specific relationship
to such major ontological categories.And the transformations(in the
widest sense of this word) necessary to get from an ontologically
neutral concept embracing all the former to specific English words
would be exceedingly complex,especially since it is a question of
generating whole syntagms,not just individual nouns,verbs or adject¬
ives.
The most satisfactory - and simplest - solution would seem to be
one that combines the two approaches discussed above:let us accept
that there is a general concept 'USE' related to a number of English
1
lexemes .Let us assume that it has ontologically 'neutral' denotation
:(functioning as a symbol.however,it could presumably act as either a
predicate/relator or a higher order entity as the case may be)and that
*And perhaps also involved in marking the 'function' of concrete
entity types(i.e. 'what a thing is for')
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it is incorporated in the non-language-specific question-formulating
routine for D2(page 166) by virtue of indicating one sort of'useful
question-type' according to strategy (iii) in Chapter 7.The activa¬
tion by the routine of the corresponding question-type (ASKIF 1X1 .USE")
will result,according to this theory,in the generation of one or
another of the questions listed above - if at that point in the game
in progress it is not yet known whether the game object(an animal,
mineral or vegetable product)serves any utilitarian function at all.
Once that is. known,the same question-type involving 'USE' can be
activated to generate questions about more specific kinds of function.
The point here is that this general concept USE is not directly lin¬
ked to an array of English predicates and nominals,but is a conceptual
variable that can be utilized in 'Twenty Questions' as a 'tree' for
relating specific functions/uses hierarchically below itCe.g.'is fo.
drinking from','is used as furniture' - or indeed 'is for decoration'
discussed above*).How the variable is bound in order to generate a
question will depend in part on the course of the game up to that
2
point.It is the stage after this in the generation of a question
to which the diagrams of the model correspond.
The particular lexical predicate plus case frame activated in this
way(say that for the English verb 'use' )will itself contain various
alternative syntactic patterns(common syntagms),one of which will be
selected,presumably,according to stylistic/thematic factors and to
the other elements(arguments and modifiers)requiring expression.Such
factors would influence the clioice of,say,an active over a passive
form of the verb.Un this view the general concept USE does not bear
its own 'case(or predicate) frame' - these having the purely lingui¬
stic function of correlating semantic arguments with surface syntactic
slots, Ihe exact type of processing whereby activation of the former
concept in the early stages of the generation of a question in turn
activates a particular English lexeme(say the adjective 'functional*
or the verb 'use')is no doubt a complex matter,but there is no reason
to suppose that the selective activation of one such predicate and its
1
Hie top-most node of the 'tree' may there have been skipped(the ob¬
ject being presumed generally useful)and a binary contrast sought.
2
inhere the question-formulating routine has already activated a
specific English lexeme corresponding to a particular binding of
the 'primitive' variable
-199-
frame(or suppression of all other potential candidates) will depend
partly on the 'set' of the speaker (whether d'-termined by ideolectic/
stylistic habits of expression or by the form of closely preceding
utterances)to formulate,say,a question beginning 'Is it(+adjective)'
or 'Does it(+ intransitive verb)' or 'Does/can one (+transitive
verb)',some lexical items being compatible with such 'sets',others
not.Some degree of random variation of near synonomous constructions
can be expected to enter here too - as can the involvement of whole
stereotyped questions.Though simulation of such processing is theore¬
tically possible,it is well beyond the capacity of any speech-gener¬
ation program to date(including that accompanying the present model).
Other sets of related questions drawn from the data can be com¬
pared in order to extract other 'general concepts' corresponding to
•useful question-types'.Thus,for example,for an underlying concept
we can call'PROCESSED'(as opposed to 'NATURAL',which it includes in
the same sense as 'USE' includes its 'opposite' 'USELESS'):
G.36:Is it a product?
G.36:Does it need to be processed before we have it?
G.41:IIas (the mineral) been through any sort of process?
G.13 and G.14:Is it in its natural state?
1
G. 19:Is it a product for consumption?
G.23:Is it a man-made object?
G.23:Is it a manufactured object?
Or for an underlying 'PROFESSION'(all well-known people are,note,pre¬
sumed to have a profession,so only specific ones are asked about):
G.3: Is it someone connected with academic circles/the acting
profession/politics?
G.37:Is she a celebrity of showbusiness?
G.37:Is she involved in politics?
G.42:Is she a political figure?
G.42:Is this person's occupation in the field of entertainment?
G.42:Is it a sports personality?
G.28:Is this person involved in politics/entertainment?
G.28:So it's (a woman) who's involved in sport?
1
A more specific binding of the same 'general concept'
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Or for (typical) •LOCATION1;
G.4:Could I see it in this country?
G.45:Is it something to be found in Scotland?
G.23:Vifould one find it normally inside a house?
G.35:Do you find it in the country?
G.36:Oo we see it (every day) around in the streets?
G.23:Would you normally expect to find it in ■_ street?
Or for 'KNOWN'(to speakei"):
G.31:Is it somebody kno^n to me by name?
G.31:Would I know this person by virtue of their office?*
G.37:Do you or I know her personally?
G.ll:Do we know it?Are we acquainted with it( I mean) ?
Or for 'STATIC*:
G.41:Does it stay in the same place?
G.27:1s it movable?
G.40:Does it move about?
Or for 'CONSUMABLE':
G.36:Is it something we eat?
G.19:Is it a product for consumption/for eating?
G.19:Is it for drinking/smoking?
G.7:Could you normally eat it?
G.27:Is it edible?
G.5:Can you eat it?
G.5:Is it something you drink?A kind of drink?*
Many more such 'general concepts' relating to 'useful question-
types' can be found in the data,some of which can both be regarded
as indepehdant 'trees' or as lower levels of other more general ones -
thus'CONSUMABLE' in relation to 'USE*.This is not an embarassment to
the model,however,as these 'trees' are not taken to be permanent,fin-
ite structures,but are to be seen as constructs produced by applying
the question-formulating routine to the long term memory conceptual
system as the game proceeds,utilizing natural associations from 'gen¬
eral concepts' represented there to move to more specific (relevant)
concepts that could be asked about as properties of the game object.
1
A more specific binding of the variable concept
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Thus at a certain stage of a game application of the'useful question-
type' concerned with USE to the LTM structure corresponding to the
current search set might lead to the concept 'CONSUMABLE•(itself
another 'useful question-type').which in turn will be treated by the
question-formulating routine as a 'tree*.
To return to the original question regarding 'primitives' as opp¬
osed to 'word-senses'.Although semantic'primitives'in the sense of
•general concepts' may well be involved in the early stages of game
question generation,as discussed.it has been found preferable to base
the model on word-sense-based propositions(as in the diagrams of
Chapter 6).A number of reasons can now be brought forward to justify
this.Firstly.it would seem likely that there are different ways in
which a given proposition can be generated by the question-formulating
routine,given the intermeshing of strategies embodied in it.Thus a pro¬
position resulting in the English utterance 'Is it decorative?' might
derive,as described,from a 'useful question-type' involving the 'gen¬
eral concept' USE;or it might be already stored there as a fully-fled¬
ged 'useful question'(along with information as to suitable contexts
of application);or it might be 'read off' a particular candidate
concept(type or token entity) hypothesized as likely to be the game
1
object jor it might be 'read off' some higher-order concept address
corresponding to the current search set(say 'manufactured object')by
virtue of its dividing that search set roughly by two.All we can be
fairly confident of is that at some stage in the generation of that
utterance(whether as a 'deep structure' or as a description of a
sequence of production processes) a proposition corresponding to a
bundle of English word-senses(including that of 'decorative') must
be involved.
Secondly,even if primitives in the sense of 'general concepts*
are involved in the generation of game questions,they are not necess¬
arily involved in the corresponding afferent processing(for comprehe-
2
nsion)by the hearer".Word-senses represent fully the propositional
information being conveyed(asked about) in the game context,and any
afferent processing that attempts to reconstruct the derivation
*
The predicate 'decorative' being activated without the intermediary
of the concept USE
2
And there is no evidence that analytic breakdown into 5 primitives
in the sense of'universal semantic features1is involved in such
processing in 'Twenty Questions'.
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of the proposition from a more 'primitive* stage is redundant,not
2
increasing the useful information content extracted.
And finally,there are more or less subtle differences of meaning
(and hence of the implications of a subsequent 'yes' or 'no' reply)
between related but differently formulated questions,differences that
go beyond mere stylistic variation.Thus,for example,in Game 23 between
•Is it a man-made object?' and 'Is it a manufactured object?',the
proof that ttey are felt as differing in semantic scope being that
they are both asked by the same player in the same game as separate
game questions.Similarly for the two questions of USE in Game 35,of
PROCESSED in Game 3d,and of KNOWN in Game 11.Even when near-synonomy
is involved,the fact that different lexemes tend to enter into spe¬
cific syntagmatic combinations(requiring 'selection restrictions' on
objects,for example) can have an important bearing on the game - thus
a 'no* answer to 'Am I acquainted with her' (cf.Game 11) would tend to
rule out fewer candidates than a similar answer to 'Do I know her?',
since the former is usually limited in use(in the sense of knowing a
person) to people known personally as opposed to by hearsay,fame,etc.
Such useful information would not be capturable if word-senses were
somehow bypassed.The same arguments can be made - with even greater
force - for games played in different languages,where the introduct¬
ion of the same 'general concepts'(USE,PROFESSION,LOCATION,etc. )appea¬
rs to be justified and yet for which word-sense-based propositional
modelling is just as adequate for our purposes as it is in English/
In sum,'primitives' - at least in the sense of 'universal semantic
features' - would seem to me to be no different in fact from word-
senses of more 'basic* lexemes(active,no doubt in the acquisition of
new vocabulary,for instance) to which more complex word-senses may
be related by 'definitional' propositions stored at their 'addresses'.
That this kind of information connecting lexemes amongst themselves
must be stored - or recreatable - somewhere in the system is not
deniedjits involvement in particular types of cognitive processing '»<
1
And it is at this level of word-senses that a weak form of the
Whorfian hypothesis of the influence of language on thought seems
appropriate.
2
And an efficiency argument could also be adduced,since words -phon¬
emic forms addressing word-sense concepts - are presumably the most
concise means the mind has of memorizing property lists,etc.
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however,open to question.
One last matter which must be touched upon in this section on
'universal' propositional constituents concerns their representation -
and particularly that of the 'logical relators/operators * included
among them.These latter are,essentially, for negation, • = ' for
identity,and *£.' for class membership( 'Loc' being simply shorthand
for a special group of predicates such as 'in' and *011* in UnglishJ;
all three are found necessary for modelling games in all the languages
used.Unlike the various 'P's and 'X's and 'j's,these constituents are,
it would seem,entirely universal and language indepe&dant,though they
correspond to various surface markers whose word-senses they can be
said to represent1, ilieir developmental evolution from pre-verbal ope¬
rations can be traced(cf. Inholder and Piaget,1958,and Vygotsky,1962)
and their independent psychological reality need not be doubted.The
only question here is as to the nature of their representation in
stored propositions(or verbal 'deep struetures').Presumably this
could be a matter of either language-specific word-tokens(e.g. 'not'
or 'no',etc.,for negation in English)or of more abstract 'pointers'
towards specific operations to be applied to the propositions to
which they are attached(e.g. antonym or implication generation) -
involve,that is,real 'operators' as opposed to static symbols.The
solution embodied in the present model is probably the most neutral
as to such interpretational possibilities - certainly the use of
the three universal logical symbols simplifies the representation of
standard propositional patterns encountered in all four 1anguages.But,
as mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 6.all the propositional
symbols on the model are regarded as metalanguage labels for either
tokens(in any sensory modality/coding)of entity/action/property types,
etc.,or of phonemic word forms symbolizing the latter,the implica¬
tion being that this is the form in which propositions are stored in
component (c) on the model.The whole question of the encoding of
propositional 'deep structures' in memory(in as far as this has any
meaning at all) is of course a highly controversial one.In general,
however,it can be stated that the nature of stored representations
of meaning and the processes whereby such meaning is extracted and
1In Russian,however,both 'f' and '=* commonly correspond to & in
the surface utterance.
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acted upon are two different issues.Logical operators may belong to
the realm of the second issue,either not being represented in stored
structures at all(when the relations 'fi' or '=',for example.between
terms in a propositional bundle can readily be inferred on semantic
grounds),or being represented - e.g. in the case of V,' - by phonemic
word or morpheme tokens,as for all other propositional terms.A similar
argument can be made for such 'modifiers1 as those for number,tense
and mood:they can be regarded as logical operators symbolized in sto¬
red forms by phonemic elements(when not deducible as needed from con-
This point of view is clearly different from that expressed by
Fodor in his influential book Hie Language of ThoughtC1.whereby
propositions.whatever their source,are converted into neutral 'Ment-
alese' representations for storage.A critique of this view,arguing
for a clear distinction between experientially meaningful 'brain codes'
and human language based on arbitrary symbols - as opposed to exper¬
ientially remote 'language'(or,rather,hypostatized metalanguage) of
mental concepts in which all 'meaning' is encoded - is presented in
a forthcoming article by the present writer4
Their semantic scope is.moreover,to some extent language-specific;
and cf. the various types of conditional relationship in different
languages corresponding to the symbol 'cond'in our metalanguage.
^Tortescue.M.D. (to appear).'iVhy the'Language of Thought* Is Not a Language'.
University of Edinburgh Linguistics Department:Work in Progress
text)*.
commonly means 'X and other such things'-
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Chapter Nine
It is notoriously difficult to justify cognitive models purporting
to account for anything approaching the complexity of natural speech
behaviour through standard paradigms of quantitive experimental design.
The attitude taken by the majority of Artificial Intelligence theorists
implementing such models is that for the present at least it is better
to ignore the question of •internal1 psychological reality and concen¬
trate on producing models that actually do simulate the external beha¬
viour under study.General criteria for model-building - maximal simp¬
licity and explanatory power - are all that need be considered.rhe
position of the linguist is analogous,though he is generally more
concerned with basing his models on maximally general rules derived
(when not from his own intuitions) from a corpus of data.The psychol¬
ogist of language,on the other hand,is concerned that predictions de¬
riving from his models should be testable experimentally.These three
approaches to cognitive modelling are ly no means incompatible in
theory,as some would claim(cf.Winograd,1977),and there is every rea¬
son to believe that a common methodological paradign for such research
is in the process of coming together.My own contribution towards this
end,as embodied in this thesis,is an attempt to show the feasibility
of applying such a methodology to a clearly defined area of speech
behaviour to produce a model that can at least go part way towards
countering criticisms leveled at cognitive modelling as mere 'ad hoc
speculation*.
One central criterion in this methodology is simplicity,but it is
essential to avoid a certain type of spurious simplification gained
by incorporating maximal generalizations into one's model deriving
from one sub-component area in isolation(i.e. some abstract analysis
1
of that area within a particular discipline) .It is often the case in
modelling complex behaviour that requires the interaction of a number
of distinct components that greater simplicity in one sub-component
leads to greater complexity in others or in interfaces between compo¬
nents. What is essential is overall simplicity.A case in point may be
transformational relationships between sentence typescwhilst making
maximal generalizations in the area of abstract sentence grammar
*This is different from the spurious simplicity caused by basing a
language model on a handful of(artificially thought up)sentences.
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their integration into a full-scale discourse generation model
would appear to complicate utterance-production considerably.The
interfacing between demons(and discourse-level rules)and the speech
generator on the present model,for instance,already determines the
ordering of syntactic constituents to be generated in a maximally
simple way.
The model has been built up in Part One on linguistic grounds
(distributional,formal and functional) from a large corpus of re¬
corded material,and its further elaboration in Part Two has been
guided by criteria of overall simplicity and psychological plausib¬
ility; it can at least be said that it does not run blatantly counter
to recent quantitive psycholinguistic evidence for the nature of the
various processes involved,as presented in such works as Fodor.Bever
and Garret(1975) and Clark and Clark(1977).What remains to be done
is to show that,on the one hand,the rules derived fsom the data in
Part One can be used to predict(qualitively rather than quantitively)
further data elicited from a new group of subjects,and,on the other
hand,that a simplified version of the core of the model is amenable
1
to simulation on the computer .
The first part of this two-pronged attack aimed at(partially)just¬
ifying the model was designed to show that two typical realization
rules derived in Part One could also account for new forms elicited
for the discourse acts concerned(and also to show incidentally that
my own intuitions as to 'what is going on* behind such sequences is
much the same as other people's);it was undertaken in the following
manner.Twenty subjects(who knew the game but had not participated in
the original recordings) were given truncated transcripts of seven of
the original games and asked to supply in written form what they tho¬
ught the next utterance might have been at the point the text cut
off in each case.Half of the subjects were told that the next utte¬
rance would constitute some kind of objection or request for a re-
2
phrase ;the other half were not restricted in their choice of sub¬
sequent utterance type,so long as what they wrote was stylistically
1
it is reasonable to suppose that further aspects of the model will
be testable in a auantitive sense as suitable experimental paradigms
develop;specific implications of the model are certainly falsifiable.
2
Which it always was in the original games.A range of contexts was
selected to elicit a variety of realization types for the acts.
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suitable and read as a natural continuation of the spoken dialogue.
The prediction was,of course,that the new data would match well with
the rules derived from the original game corpus for Ob.iect and Heauest
rtephrase.
vVith both groups a certain percentage of the elicited(written)utt-
erances were not tokens of either target act,being realizations of
Answer(or blends of that act and others also listed in Part One);the
majority of these were produced by the non-restricted group.Ihey are
not included in the results tabulated below:since in all cases a
Game Question (or a recap preceding one)had just been made in the
texts,such responses can be seen to conform with the response set
rules of Part One.It can be assumed that in these cases the test sub¬
ject simply didn't recognize that activating conditions for one of
the two target acts had in fact been met - such oversights also occur
frequently in the original game corpus.Utterances by subjects from
the non-restricted group are underlined below; a ""indicates an utt¬
erance that is clearly a blend of the two acts involved,analogous to
the cases found in Part One,where the activating conditions for both
acts are recognized as simultaneously pertaining - i.e. that a game
rule or conversational principle has been infringed and,on the other
hand,that the situation can be remedied by a reformulation of the
utterance concerned.The last utterance of the text given the subjects
(in brackets) plus the actual following utterance in the original
transcript are stated at the top for each text:
G.13
(Is it so small that,given the fact that it could be eaten,you could
eat it in one mouthful?)
You've already asked that,didn't you?Didn't you say that?
Object:
Look,we've had that one before.
I've already said you could.
But haven't you asked that one already?
You've already asked me that.
I think I've answered that question before,haven't I?Ask me an¬
other.
Yes,but I've already answered that question.
You've already asked that and I said yes.
You've already asked that.
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I've already answered that one.
You already asked me that.
Request Rephrase:
Kr,well,I think I said you could eat it in one mouthful,what do
you mean by * smal1'?
G. 49
(Is the mineral - ?)
I didn't say mineral.Animal and vegetable.
Ob.iect:
It's not mineral.
"It's not mineral.Would you like to rephrase your question?
No,there's no mineral involved.It's animal and vegetable.
When did I say anything about mineral?
There's no mineral - it's animal and vegetable.
Remember,I said it was animal and vegetable.
I've already told you it's not mineral.
It's animal and vegetable.
It's not mineral.it's animal and vegetable. (X2)
Not mineral,animal and vegetable.(X2)
It's not mineral.
Is it mineral at all?
It's animal,not mineral.




Could you repeat that?
G, 32
(It's static.It's not something like an electricity pylon?)
What do you mean 'like an electricity pylon'?
Request Rephrase:
Like an electricity pylon in what way?Size?Colour?Shape?
How do you mean 'like an electricity pylon'?
Is that a question or a statement?
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Are you asking if it jls an electricity pylon?
Do you mean '.is it tin electricity pylon'?(X2)
What do you mean by 'something like an electricity pylon'?
What do you mean bv 'something like'?
G.l
(Is it part or whole of a human animal?)
We have to rephrase the question according to the game.
Request Rephrase:
Would you like to choose first?
Mm.What do you mean by 'a_ human animal'?Is that a generic or a
specific?
Which one do you mean?
Which are you asking me?
Which are you asking me?I'm only allowed to answer yes or no.
Which question are you asking me?
Which part of that question do you want me to answer?
Ob.iect:
•You can't ask either/or questions.which do you want me to answer?
•That doesn't let me give a yes/no answer.Could you ask that ques¬
tion again so that 1 can give a yes/no answer.
G.4
(And you said it has no specific function or purpose,therefore some¬
thing decorative -)
Yes I did.I said that it had a function,very much so.
Ob.iect:
I said it has a specific function.
No,it isn't.
I said it did have a functional value.
No,no.I didn't say that.I said it was used for some function.
I didn't say that.
Did I say it had no specific function?
I didn't saji it had no specific function.
No,I didn't say that.I said it does have a function.
I didn't say it doesn't have a specific function.
-210-
I didn't say that.I said it's a specific object,and it has a
functional value.
No.it has a function.
No,it does have a specific function,but it's also decorative in
a sense.
That's not what I said.
I didn't say that it has no function,although it could also be
regarded as decorative in a way.
1 never said that.
1 don't think I said it doesn't have a specific function.
Um.I don't think I said it had no specific purpose.
Request Kephrase;
Are you asking whether it's decorative?
G. 27
(Is its specific nature related to a human or to a place?)
Can you rephrase that question?
Request Rephra se:
I'm not sure what you mean by related to...
You'll have to rephrase that a bit.
What do you mean?
Which are you asking me?
You'll have to ask that again so that I can answer yes or no.
Object:
"You can't ask that,you have to ask one or the other.
I can't answer that,can I?
"That's two questions in one,isn't it?How about rephrasing it?
"I don't follow.
I can't answer that.
G. 34
(Is it made of some sort of - transformed animal product?...Or is it
some direct animal product like a skin or a horn or something of that
sort?)
Which question are you asking me?
Request Rephrase:
Er,well,that cfepends what yCu mean by 'product*.Could you be mo,e
precise?
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What are you asking me?
•Well.you'll have to make that question a bit more straight-for¬
ward, because 1 can only answer yes or no and that's an
either/or question.
•Look,just ask me one question at a time and I'll answer 'yes'
or 'no' - remember the rules of the gameJ
Which question do you want me to answer?
Which question do you want to ask?
I'm only supposed to answer yes or no - which question do you
want to ask?
Which question do you want me to answer?
1 think you'd do better to avoid concepts such as 'transformed'.
Object:
•How can I sort all that out?
These can be reduced to the following formulae comparable with
those in Chapter 5(pages 87 - 92)*.A number of the elicited utterances
can be regarded as stylistic/ideolectal variants upon realization
formulae already stated in that chapter;thus 'How do you mean-' corr¬
esponds to 'What do you mean - ',and 'In what way -' to 'What way-'.
These need not concern us further - nor need such optional elements
as 'Look' introducing an objection or blends of known formulae with
content representing an Answer.
Object formulae:
('No*+)('Look'+) STATE pCgrounds for objection) (-t-Heq.Conf. XrJustify
Self)
Heq♦ Confirm♦ p(X state prior proposition contradicting present one)
ASKWh 'when'-)- 'I'+VP(say,etc.,expression objected to)
ASKIF p(proposition of X's objected to)
Comment (jocular -on X's previous utterance)
Express Difficulty
Hequest Hephrase formulae:
ASKWh 'what'+'you mean',etc. (+'by'+ NP)(-tJustify Self)
ASKIF 'you' + 'mean/ask*,etc. p(hypothetical rephrase of X's utter.)
ASKIF 'you'+ 'could/would',etc.+VP(rephrase,be more precise,etc.)
(Echo +) ASKWh 'In what way'(+ ASKEI/OH)
*
They include the more indirect forms to be discussed below.
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ASKEI/OR p^/p;) (force behind X's utterance)
STATE 'you'+'have to*,etc.-/-VP (rephrase.etc.)(+Give lieason)
ASKWh 'how about'+NP(rephrasing,etc. )
STATE 'that'+'depend on' p(meaning of X's utterance)
IMP p^(obey rules,etc.)+ STATE p0(answerer respond to X's question,
etc.)(+Kemind(of rule))
Propose Action (resulting in rephrase)
.there was no particularly significant difference between the re¬
alizations produced by the two groups(apart from the greater percen¬
tage of Hequest Hephrase and Object - as opposed to Answer - tokens
elicited from the restricted response group),although it can be seen
that the texts for which the non-restricted group produced the most
Ob.iect tokens were the ones in which a clear contradiction had just
been made. Ihe similarity of response realizations between the two
groups for these cases(Game 4 and Game 49) appears greater than for
texts where the objectionable nature of the preceding utterance is
less obvious.
We must now examine those indirect realizations with no exact
analogue in the original data and show,as in Part One,how a system
implementing the model could compute the force behind them from
local context and general conversational principles.It will be seen
that a function common to most of these instances is that of re¬
minding the questioner of something constituting grounds for an
objection by causing him to search in memory for a proposition corr¬
esponding to those grounds.We start with the indirect tokens of Ob.-
ject:
G.49 o, :When did I say anything about mineral?
This utterance can be taken - according to its form and content-
to be a token of Hequest Information until/unless an ulterior func¬
tion can be found to match it.In responding to it as such,the hypoth¬
etical hearer(«* )would search in memory for the answer and there
find the absence(and contradiction)of a proposition corresponding to
the presupposition of his own last utterance.At the same time(as in
the 'What's it made of?' example in Chapter 5)he would presumably be
attempting to ascertain the ulterior intended force of the utterance,
since he would have been normally expecting a token of Answer to
follow next(or,more immediately,zero,as he hadn't finished his own
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utterance yet),which this,by form and content,could not be.Nor could
it be a direct Request Information.since it is highly unlikely in the
game context that 6 should want to elicit such information for his
own ends.discovering his own presupposition failure,py would recognize
that the activation conditions for Object - one of the acts potentially
expected by the Meta-frame - had been met and that therefore fb 's
utterance was a plausible indirect realization of that act:it could
be recognized as a possible way of causing to see his own mistake
and correct it.lhere may be a case for regarding this formula with its
typical intonation contour as a conventional realization of Object.
but having encountered no other token of it 1 have not done so here.
G.49 it mineral at all?
This case is almost exactly parallel to the preceding,being a
Request Information by form.ihe *at all'(which would be introduced
by a discourse-level rule) indicates a certain kind of (presuppositi-
onal) contrast,and ha3 much the same force as contrastive stress on
the 'is' would give.
G.4 p :l>id I say it had no specific function?
This case too is similar to the first,but here the utterance foll¬
ows (interrupts) a Recap rather than a Game Question:as before it cannot
- by form or content -constitute ^'s expected next game move(i.e.
an Answer followingC^'s still unasked Game Question).It is conceivable
that the utterance might have been intended as a direct Request Inform¬
ation in this case however(for example if £ suspected that he might
have given cX false information earlier).But since the Meta-frame 'ex¬
pects' objections in contexts such as this,<* would check whether the
utterance matched the output of that act - which it does -before fall¬
ing back on the interpretation of it as a neutral Request Information.
Intonation,and the fact that an interruption of the game exchange has
been committed,would doubtless facilitate the computation of the
utterance's force here.
G.34 :How can I sort all that out?
This probably constitutes a realization of Express Difficulty,which
is already marked on the rule in Chapter 5 as a conventional(if indi-
rect)realization of Object.It represents,however,a rather indirect
token of the former act in turn.Moreover,it cam also be regarded as
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a (blend with) Request Renhrase.since in all likelihood would have
intended eliciting a rephrase in uttering it(if he had been in a real
game situation).Whichever way it is treated,it is evident that(as
for indirect realizations of this sort in general)the utterance does'nt
match the most expected act at that print-namely an Answer -,and at
the same time is unlikeiy(by content)to constitute a direct Request
Information on 's part J p. presumes that^is obeying the conversati¬
onal principle of being relevant.The utterance,once recognizedCby
intonation and content - it refers to the action Ci is having difficu¬
lty performing)as an Express Difficulty.can be related according to
their realization rules to one or both of the two •expected* Meta-
frarae acts we are concerned with.Performing his game move Answer con¬
stitutes o{ *s overriding motivation in the game context,and the most
likely thing to have prevented him from being able to do so is that
^ has broken some conversational principle(not being clear) and/or
a game rule(asking a non-yes/no game question).
Turning now to the tokens of Request Rephrase we find the follow¬
ing anamolous utterances:
G.32 : Is that a question or a statement?
By form this is a Request Information,and while searching for
£>'s ulterior intention in uttering it(it being unlikely that ^ should
merely wish to ascertain the answer to it),will search for the answer
in responding to that act.In doing so he will find that his previous
utterance(to which 's is a response)is indeed -as implied by the
question - ambiguous in form between a question and a (tentative)
statement - it is of declarative form,but in the game context it is
a well-formed Game Question.Since ^ can only supply an Answer(his ex¬
pected game move) to a question(as opposed to a statement) and <x's
ambiguous utterance might conceivably have been an extended recap in
the form of an inference ,<x can deduce that £ has grounds for find¬
ing it difficult to respond to his (^'s) utterance.He can then match
the utterance to the Request Rephrase demon,since the response expe¬
cted by the Meta-frame in the event of such difficulty is a request for
a rephrase ,and answering P *s question will indeed have the effect
of rephrasing the game question so that its force is unambiguous and
p, can reply appropriately.
G.34 Gt:Look,just ask me one question at a time and I'll answer
'yes' or 'no' - remember the rules of the game!
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This rather complicated response blends at least three acts -
Request Hephrase,Object and Remind -of which the first is,given the
motivations of the players in the game,the principle one.By form(IM& p)
the first part of the utterance is a command of some sort,but in com¬
bination with the subsequent future declarative clause it forms an
attitudinally marked conditional statement of intent.Ihe second part
of the utterance clearly indicates a direct realization of Remind.Now,
since the propositional content of the State Intent refers to the
response ^'s preceding Game Question was intended to elicit,it can
be deduced by $ that the action referred to in the conditional part
of el 's utterance is what at. wants him to do in order for himCoO to
be able to produce the desired response.Performing that action(ask-
ing one yes/no question at a time)is tantamount in the context to
performing a Rephrase.Ihe whole sequence can also be seen to constit¬
ute an Object: oi is reminding of the rules;presuming that c*. is
being relevant, & will be able to deduce that he must have broken
the rule quoted(the force of the Remind is to make him aware of just
that).ihis of course constitutes grounds for the activation of the
Object demon - in the spoken medium the intonation would no doubt
also suggest that act.'Ihis is not to say that the hearer(^) must
compute the double primary force of the utterance in this manner:
either way(leading to Object or to Request Rephrase) would be suff¬
icient for him to respond appropriately with a rephrase that meets
e* 's objection.This is due to the partial overlap in input and out¬
put conditions for these acts in Ihe game context,as has been noted
previously.
G.34 d :I think you would do better to avoid concepts such as
'transformed1.
This STATE p form(where 'p* includes 'you' and 'do better to* +
VP) is probably a direct realization of Propose Action.the 'I think'
being introduced by a tentative/polite discourse-level rule.Recogni¬
zing it as such,|i ,who is expecting an Answer response at that point
(according to the Game Frame)but presumes that is being relevant
and -more specifically to the game - generally helpful,would look
for the most likely act in the Meta-frame to which the utterance
might correspond.He would there find that it fits Give Help,on whose
output it is either maxked indirectly or whose function it can be
seen to subserve,given the propositional content of the Propose
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Action.Because of that content(i.e. a proposed action relating to
the phrasing of *s previous Game Question)the effect of follow¬
ing the advice profferred here by d would be a rephrasal of the
utterance concerned. «d's utterance above is thus a blend of Give
Help and .ieques t Bephrase.
To summarize the results of the elicitation tests:if we allow
for stylistic variations,the optional insertion of discourse-determi¬
ned elements and the combination of elements of more than one reali¬
zation in a single utterance,there is a good match between the newly
elicited tokens of Bequest Hephrase and Ob.iect and those found in
1
the original data and formalized as realization rules .As in the case
of the original data a few indirect realizations were found whose
force has to be computable from local context,general conversational
principles and Meta-frame expectations.Those that were not directly
analogous to the cases examined in Chapter 5 were analysed in the
same pre-theoretical manner as in that chapter to indicate the pro¬
cedures the model would ultimately have to incorporate if it were
to simulate these cases.One other point that arises from the new
data is that lexical fillers in our realization niles may have to
be stated in a rather more abstract manner in some instances,in order
to cover a range of related variants.For example,the VP in the first
realization formula for Bequest Bephrase(page 92) can be filled by
such explicit lexical items as 'rephrase that','be more precise','like
to choose*(i.e. one of two questions) ,o<" 'repeat that',etc.This could
be done either by stating the essential semantic features of the
verbal expression filling that slot(e.g. 'action resulting in the
rephrasing of the previous utterance?) or by listing the most common
expressions actually encountered in the data,with the understanding
that these can be replaced by closely synonomous expressions.Probably
the former solution would be the more desirable over a wide range of
data,though it might cause considerable complexity in terms of
computational implementation of the interface between demon outputs
and the speech generator.
But,of course,not all forms of these acts met in Chapter 5 occur
here.
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The second approach towards justifying the model - that of simul¬
ating a simplified version of it on the computer - was undertaken in
two stages,in collaboration with two students of Artificial Intellig¬
ence who devised a compound program(based on the model) for generating
well-formed games of IVenty Questions in interaction between the com¬
puter as guesser and the human operator as answerer*.The first stage
of OG(for 'Object Guesser') was implemented by C.deierle and is in
LISP(a programming language particularly suited to the parsing and
generating of natural language,;it generates plausible sequences of
game questions that permit the system to guess the object thought of
by the human answerer(chosen from those it 'knows' about) within a
maximum of twenty game exchanges. Ihe propositions in LISP correspond
fairly directly to the propositional input to the speech generator
envisaged on the model.The data base on which the program operates
consists of property lists on LISP addresses corresponding to the
entities the system knows about - some twenty human beings(of various
nationality,profession,era,etc.),about half a dozen body parts,and a
similar number of items of apparel.The object chosen by the answerer
can be any of the first category or any combination of one of the
latter two categories with one of the first(e.g. Mao's nose,Elizabeth
Taylor's handbag,etc.);he may answer 'yes','no* or 'can't say*.
The body of the program,which chooses the successive game questions,
is based on the flow diagram on page 166 representing the strategies
employed by human players,but is of course implemented in a manner
constrained by existing computational techniques.Of the three human
strategy types discussed in Chapter 7,OG can be said to incorporate
types (i)(top down) and (iii)(useful question-types),but not (ii)
(plausible leaps).The program works,essentially,by choosing a 'tree'
corresponding to a 'useful question-type'relevant at that point of
the game and formulating a question about the highest level node
on that tree not yet filled(with a negative or positive binder for
the property labelling that node).ftiere is not just one classific¬
ations! tree(blnary discrimination net)dividing up the system's
universe down which it moves algorithmically - as in early 'IVenty
Questions'-like simulation programs based on EPAM(Feigenbaum,1963)t
1
.The two halves of the program will be stored in the archives of
the Artificial Intelligence department at Edinburgh for a year,
thereafter the programmers can be contacted through the department.
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There are several multi-branching trees,such as those for profession
and nationality,and others which have simple binary branchings such
as 'male/female' and 'alive/dead*.The decision as to which tree to
move to next in formulating the subsequent question at any point in
the game is made by keeping track of possible 'successor tree-shifts',
according to the tree presently cm.Some degree of randomness is allo¬
wed into these 'suggestions' to ensure that no two games are likely
to be played with quite the same order of question-types - i.e. the
suggested tree-shifts are only partially ordered,enough to avoid
illogical shifts to trees no longer* relevant or completely filled*.
At the node reached on the chosen tree,the program tests to see how
many entities still on the search set remain down the two branches
below that nodeCthe numbers are updated each move) and only asks a
corresponding question if a critical percentage of candidates remains
down one branch rather than the other{otherwise it moves to the next
tree suggested as a suitable successor.When the system receives as
input from the human answerer confirmation or denial of the propos¬
ition it has just asked about,it integrates this information by up¬
dating the number of candidates marked as remaining on the unfilled
branches of all the trees.This ammounts to scrutinizing the remain¬
ing members of the search set to see if there is some property marked
on at least one of them(and also found on some but not all of the
others) about which a question has not yet been asked;the sura of all bi
ndings on the trees represents the property list for the unknown ob¬
ject. The trees are of course clearedCof truth value binders) at the
outset of each new game.The program also includes various'implication'
rules whereby x*edundant questions are avoided and a reduced number
of properties can be entered on entity addresses in the data base -
for example tlie system knows that the property 'English' implies
•British',which in turn implies 'European'.
Comparing the first stage of OG with the model based on human
performance.it is apparent that there is a major difference(apart
from the relative simplicity) between the two types of game produced:
the artificial games are played with a 'closed set' of candidate
objects,whereas the human games are all 'open set' in as far as the
game object could be practically any entity both players have know-
1
And only a certain number of successive moves down the same tree
is allowed.
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ledge of.Thus,in the case of the simulation program,the system keepf
track of exactly which of a manageable number of entities remain on
the search set at any time.This may also be the case for human 'open
set* games towards the end.Some initial testing was carried out con¬
straining human players to the closed set condition to see if there
was any observable difference in strategy promoted by that condition.
Subjects in the closed set condition were given a list of objects,to
which they could continually refer and one of which was selected by
the experimenter as the game object;a control group in the open set
condition was not shown the list,All subjects then read(or in another
version actually played)the initial few exchanges of a game for that
object.At the point of truncation they were given a series of single-
word probes in a tachistoscope and asked to respond yes or no as to
whether the object named on the probe(either a member of the total
search set on the list or not) could or could not be the game object.
Latencies were recorded for the responses.Although there was some
indication of an interaction between the open/closed condition and,
on the one hand,whether the probe referred to a member of the search
set or not,and,on the other.positive/negative answers,the results
were not statistically convincing and hence are not presented here
in detail.This was doubtless due to the large number of variables
(and particularly that of 'typicality* of match*between a probe and
the relevant conjunction of properties known for the game object)
inevitably attendant upon tests of this nature applied to behaviour
as complex as that displayed in 'I\venty Questions'. What did emerge
clearly wa3 - not surprisingly - that the closed condition made the
game easier to play.Hie subjects in this condition typically made
subjective assessments,when so urged,to the effect that they found
themselves mentally 'ticking off* successively disqualified candid¬
ates from the shrinking search set - which is analogous to what OG
does.
fhe second stage of OG was implemented by D.Allan.It converts
the LISP output from the first stage into suitable surface forms in
English.For practical reasons this half of the program was written
in IMP,though it is readily translatable into LISP and the two
halves could run as one in theory in order to play games directly in
English(rather than in LISP 'pidgin' which must be passed on to the
*Cf.Hips.Shoben and Smith(1973)
-220-
second stage).It takes as input sequences of game question propositi¬
ons from the first stage(rewritten in IMP format) and applies to them
syntactic and discourse-level rules corresponding to those on the
model in order to produce - in conjunction with a suitable lexicon-
a series of well-formed English sentences(one proposition can produce
more than one variant of a corresponding English sentence).Generation
is by syntactic rule(as in the speech generator of the model) rather
than by preformed sentence-length 'chunks' with variable slot fillers;
the latter would have been an easier but less interesting solution
(similar to that used by Winograd,1972,and by the majority of Artif¬
icial Intelligence modellers,who tend to be more interested in deta'i-
led parsing than production ).The purpose of this second stage was
to show on the one hand the feasibility of implementing linguistic
rules of the type the model stipulates,and on the other hand to show
how a variety of different surface forms could be generated in English
without the intervention of order-changing transformations once the
intial syntactic template is set up(always an ASKIF in this context).
Discourse-level rules(those for anaphora and deletion)apply after
the clause—level syntactic rules,as on the model.Included in the
lexicon was information as to particular collocations into which
certain of the lexemes - corresponding to terms of the propositional
input - enter when they are treated as predicates.For example,'above'
is realized as the predicative expression 'be worn above 'if the
grammatical subject is an item of apparel,and 'leather' is realized
as 'made of leather' when used as a predicated.e. in the production
of an English utterance from the input proposition 'LEAIHER ?').This
•key-word' approach(implied by the model) would seem to have some
degree of psychological plausibility(see Chapter 8,also Vygotsky,1962,
on 'inner speech').
Sample output of both halves of the program is provided in the
Appendix.besides generating well-formed English games as required,the
program serves to pinpoint some of the difficulties that would have
to be met if the simulation were to be extended so as to generate
output closer to the natural dialogues of our data,displaying a wide
range of discourse act3.As it stands,OG cannot handle any deviation
from the regular alternation of game questions and answersIapart
13ut cf. Simmons, 1969 ,and Goldman,1974
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from pre-forraed tokens of Kxpress Pleasure and Propose Action). Wha t
is needed is an implementation of our Meta-frame with its 'expected*
demons as presented in Part One of the thesis.*Although this is not
an insurmountable task,the size and complexity of the program would
escalate rapidly .requiring a wider and wider data base of general
and particular knowledge for each new discourse act introduced.Presu¬
mably as more sophisticated computational methods for handling dis-
course(and in particular- indirect discourse acts) evolve,the practi¬
cal feasibility of the project will grow accordingly(cf.Lehnert,1977,
for what is probably the most direct approach to this area - one baaed
on 'conceptual dependancy' - from within Artificial Intelligence to
date).What the present pre-programnatiei model has attempted to do
is at least to have indicated all the essential factors that have to
be taken into account in modelling one particular- area of verbal be¬
haviour,and to have suggested the simplest linguistically justified
path towards more ambitious simulation projects for analogous areas
of behaviour.
Even then,of course,the computational means of determining the
force behind indirect tokens of an act by the examination of local
context and motives(and general conversational principles) would
still have to be added to generate and comprehend utterances anal¬
ogous to all those in our data.
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Appendix; The Corpus of Games
G. 1 English Questioner's nose
G.2*- " Chinese statuette
G. 3 " Princess Anne
G.ij. " Forth Rail Bridge
G. 5"::" " House on Danube Street
G.6-"- " Co at-hanger
G. 7 " Packet of cigarettes
G.8*- " Beer byphon
G.9 Eskimo Questioner's nose
G.10 " Queen Margrethe
G.ll English Questioner's nose
G.12 " Packet of cigarettes
G.13 " Questioner's nose
G. ILj. " Packet of cigarettes
G.15 " "
G.16 " Questioner's nose
G. I7-* " Suspender belt
G.l8 " Forth Rail Bridge
G. 19 " Packet of cigarettes
G. 20 " Questioner's nose
G.21 " " "
G.22 " Packet of cigarettes
G.23 " Questioner's nose
G.21^:- " Scott monument
G.25 Japanese Packet of cigarettes
G.26 " Questioner's nose
G.27 English Forth Rail Bridge
G.28 " Princess Anne
G.29 Japanese Questioner's nose
G. 30* English Margaret Thatcher
G. 31 11 Princess Anne
G. 32 n Forth Rail Bridge
G. 33 !t Packet of cigarettes
G.3i^ II Questioner's nose
G. 35 II I! 11
G. 36 ft Packet of cigarettes
G. 37
I! Princess Anne
G. 36 11 Forth Rail Bridge
G. 39
I? Princess Anne
G.I4.0 II Forth Rail Bridge
G.lp- n n a 11
G.l+2 if Princess Anne
G.J+3 Ru s sian tt a
G.44 If Packet of cigarettes
G.1+5 II Forth Rail Bridge
G. I4.6 If Questioner's nose
G.V7 Eskimo Queen Margrethe
G. I4.8 English Forth Rail Bridge
G.49* II Cake
G. 50* fl Greyfriars' Bobby
Games marked * were played by a post-graduate couple in an
informal setting.The other games(except for the Eskimo ones
recorded 'in situ') were played by post-graduate students
or staff in studio conditions(usually two games per couple).
Conventions in the transcripts:a square vertical brace links
two overlapping utterances;a wavy arrow represents hesitant
intonation;'sot to voce' delivery(to self) indicated by lack
of initial capital and three dots(before and after) - which
also mark pauses of significant length.
The printed instructions given to the players before their
initial trial game(s)were as below:
1)The questioner (Q) must try and guess the object the answ¬
erer (A) has in mind;he or she has twenty yes/no questions
to do so.
2)The object will be given to A on a slip of paper and will
be a specific material thing or person(or part of one) not
necessarily in the room at the time,i.e. a name or 'the X'
where X may be a noun(singular or plural) or a descriptive
phrase.
3)To start the game,A will state whether the object is animal,
mineral or vegetable,or a combination of these.Note that ani¬
mal products(like fur) are animal,that paper,etc.,is vegetable,
and that plastic,paint,etc.,are mineral.
lj.)A should feel free to elaborate an answer somewhere between
a categorical 'yes' or 'no' if necessary,and can request Q
to be more specific.
5)Recapping by Q, ('thinking out loud' about the information
he or she has already been given)is permitted,as is asking
what number question he/she has reached.
6) Around question fifteen, A may give Q, a hint if he/she seems
to be stuck.
7)After the twentieth question(which must be a guess at the
object if it is still not known)feel free to make comments
on the course of the game.
The original recordings have been deposited in the Tape
Library of the Department of Linguistics at Edinburgh
University.
Game 1
ot :It 1 s animal,
p :Is this a human animal?
o^sYes. . . (laughs)
^:Is it part or whole of a human animal?
<A:We have to rephrase the question according to the game.
Xfi:O.K.Is this part of a human animal?
A :Yes.
|*>:...but it's a specific one...Is this part of a human
animal above or below the waist? - Is it above the waist?
c<:Yes.
£>:Is it above the neck?
o^lYes.
:Is it the whole head?
(A: No.
£ :1s there one or more than one?- is there one?
:Yes.
|^:There's one...Is it a nose?
(A :Yes.
:But somebody - does this count as a question? - somebody's
nose?It's some specific person's nose?
ai :We11,that's given in the thing that we're talking about
a specific object.
:Right.So I've got to guess who it is...Is it a TV person¬
ality's nose?
d :No.
:1s it someone at the university's nose?
ok :Yes.
(J, : Somebody in the Applied Linguistics department's nose?
^ :Yes.
|> :Is it male or female? - is it male?
ok :Yes.
$ :Does the person to whom this nose belongs also have a
beard?
ol :N°-




Right...Is it X^s*- nose?
d:No.
p:Is it a member of the MsG course?
o(:No...Do you want a hint at this stage or not?
p :Er.. .Yeah.
^:Um..Relatively difficult to see it.
p:Hold on,can I recap it?It's the nose of a male person in
the Applied Linguistics(department)who is not staff and not
on the MsG course...but is male -
: - and beardless.
p:And beardless.. .1 think it's Y's*- nose.
o( :No.
^:But it's difficult to see...
^:Relatively difficult to see.
p>:So...hang on - I've had seventeen...relatively difficult
to see...Think I'd better ask why...Is it relatively diff¬
icult to see because it's covered?
-"-Members of the department
The speaker((*>)
:No...(pause)Er,hang on,I think I've made a rather bad mis¬
take. . .However, let ' s finish it,'cos it doesn't matter since
the result doesn't matter.
P :...why is it difficult to see?...You mean it's difficult
to see at all times?
o( :The thing is - I think you got the answer but I said 'no'.
Because of the way you phrased it.
:In that case,was the answer corefferential with 'm£ nose'?
o(:Yes - because you said it in passing and I thought - you
know -I wasn't listening too carefully,and I thought 'Y'
was somebody in the room or you could see through the win¬
dow. Sorry.
^ :Oh,_I'm Y.
4. :I know,I know,but I wasn't watching you and you just sort
of said it in passingjyou said two other people's noses
and I thought ahiyou must be referring to somebody without
thinking...
Game 2*-







^ :Well,is it some sort of stone?
c* :Yes.
^ :1s it precious stone?
oC : Semi.
:Is it likely to be found in a piece of jewelry?
o( :No...Well,the material-
£> :-I mean could it be mounted?
^ fif which it is made could - might conceivably be found
in jewelry,but the particular thing I'm thinking of is not
jewelry.
:Ah.So you're thinking of a specific piece of rock or what¬
ever. .. ?
d :Yeah.
jb :1s it something like a statue?
^:Yes.
:1s it the Confucian statue?-«-
dk :Ye s.
(-»A jadite statuette owned by the players)
Game 3
ok The object is animal.
£ Is it native to Britain?
o( Yes.
(i Does it have long fur?
oC. No.
Does it have two legs?
ok Yes.
P It's a man.
o/ No.
£ Is it a female?
C* Ye s.
^ Is it a particular person you have in mind?
Yes.
^ Is it somebody connected with the cinema?
o< No.
j& Or the acting profession in general?
01 No.
Is it somebody connected with academic circles?
0< No.
jb Is this person living now?
<* Yes.
Were they born after the war?
ot I think so - yes.
Is it a famous person?
Yes,you could say that - well-known,famous.
g> Connected with the artistic world in any way at all? By
that t include music and art in general.
No,no.That's eleven questions.
(> Is it a politician?Is she a politician?
c*. No, 11 d say not. ..
£> Ah...
oC That answer has certain reservations.Very slight ones.
£> May 1 just recap - she's British; she was born after the war;
and she's perhaps vaguely connected with politics...
oi. Yesjwhat she is makes her a political entity in a sense...
That's a clue.
Does she have a well-known husband?
oi, Yes .. .
jh Does he work in the same line as she does or...?
o< I find that hard to answer, really I
p Well you must answer it I
d. The problem is the word 'work'.
p Ah.'Is it the Queen?
OC No!
P Is it somebody connected with the Queen?
o( Yes.
jb Closely connected or - is she closely connected?
(X Yes,you'd say that.
P Is it Princess Anne,then?
Yes it is - and that's eighteen questions.
Game [|_
P :It 1s mineral,
of, :An instrument?
ft : No.
& :Simply an object?
:Yes.
:Does it have any functional value what soever?-can you
use it for something?
I*) :Yes, it does.
oOWould the funtion be related to what happens in this bui¬
lding?
P :No.
sla it something very common?
:Common?No,it isn't.
:An unusual object?
p :Yes.That particular one.
o( :Are you referring to something specific?
P :Yes.
OS, :Is there more than one?
P :Um...That1s difficult to answer.'No,there isn't more
than one of these,no.
:There is only one of them on this planet...
^ :Yes,in a certain sense,yes.
Of : That's not very helpful...Size - is it a large object?
Is it larger than me,for example?
P :0h yes,much larger.
c>^ :Do people enter it? '
p :Not exactly,no.
:They partially enter it...?
jb :No,novthey don'17.
:And you said it has no specific function or purpose,there¬
fore something decorative -
P :Yes I did,I said that it had a function,very much so.
OC :That's right,you told me...That's to say somebody -or
people - use it,right?
:Uhuh.
c<:It's used by peoplejand there's only one.Does that mean
only one person is able to use it?
P :0h no,no.
:And if there's only one in existence,does it exist in a
very general sense or a very limited sense?- in the sens©
that I'd say the telephone is one thing but it's used
widely?
^>:Yes,in that sense.
O^sWe're referring to a system?
p:No,we're not.Not directly.
^:Is it a device powered by something?
fo:No,it isn ' t.
£<,:Does it supply power? ~i
:0h well - wait a minute] - device powered by something...
Not if you think of it in its broadest sense,no.
:1s it required to supply something? - in terms of energy,
power,light or anything?
£ :Uh,no...




oS:Gould I see it in this country?
:0h yes.
<XtSo it's one specific object -I'm recapping now -jmineral,
in this country,which neither supplies nor requires energy--
|b :I didn't say it didn't require energy...
c^tThat's true,you didn't...Is its existence important to
anyone besides the person using it?
p :Yes,yes it is - oh,to anyone else besides the person us¬
ing it?No,probably not.
cx, tDoes it have any symbolic nature or function?
p:No,I wouldn't say so.You've only got two questions left,
tit's not a mace or a sceptre or anything of that sort?
:No.
c\ tDoes it a\,rouse._people ' s likes and dislikes?
tUm,possibly not now...because it has something more rec¬
ent that you can compare it with.If you'd like to think
along the lines of communication...
writ's a form of mass media or something...?
^ :No,no..,
o< tit's not an atomic bomb?
^ tNo,no.Think of something in this area,
o< tin Edinburgh?I'm not a Scotsman.
tYou don't have to be a Scotsman to know it.
c^tYou can tell me now,since we've gone well past the twenty.
(£> tIt's the Forth Rail Bridge.
ol tOhi
p. :I was late with my help perhaps...
:Even so...
:I was short of ideas for it - I began thinking of ideas
for it earlier on...
^ :I should really have - well,when I was inquiring about
the size of it -
:But it was difficult - the one about energy - because you
need energy to send the trains along the rails,but the ac¬
tual bridge itself doesn't require energy,and yet it req¬
uires energy to perform its function.
:Well,power,yes.What probably put me off more than anyth¬
ing ,what led me astray was - and it means I led myself
astray,I'm not accusing you of anything -„was the fact
that there was one specific object which I related to one
specific person using it.That was probably my own -
£:Yes,but you asked me if there was only one person used
it and I said 'no'.
o(:That is what I didn't fully take in.If I'd gone on fur¬
ther along that line - who uses it and how is it used -
then I'd have got there.
Game 5>'::"
^:This one is principally mineral - but little bits of
everything else.
^rWhat do you mean 'little bits of everything else'?
:Oh,just mineral.
^:Just think of mineral?
:Just think of mineral.
^ :1s it stone?
^ :Yes.Principally.
o( :1s it precious stone?
:No.




^:Do I ever go there?
(p :(laughs)I hope not!
ei. : Danube Street?
:Yesi (laughter) So what on Danube street?
oc' :Well,you know - Madame what' s-her-name on Danube Street,
the brothel.
:What about the brothel?It's not 'the brothel'.
(A:It's not the brothel?You said it was a building,
jjj :Mm...
o(.:I mean there's just the street and houses - what do you
want?







^ :Is it attached to the building in any way?
:Yes.
0( :The plaque outside?
:What plaque?No.
o^iThe foundation?
: No.Re cap - try and think of what I told you.
c(:You said it was a building so it can't be part of it...
jp :Right.
o^tWell,! mean the brothel's a building -
^:Right.
o(:Is it the whole of Danube Street?
fp :No.




O^ilt is a building - let me recap - it is a building on
Danube Street...
^:Uhuh.
:But it's not the brothel..?
£ :No.
dl :No?
:No.It's not the brothel.
& :The house next door to the brothel?
^Yes.It's the neighbours' house.
Game 6*-
s* :Oh,I have to give you the definition first,don't I.
:Er,yes.
o^:I think that's how they do it - they always say 'It's - ',
you know...
$> :Right.
o<:It's mineral and vegetable.
£>:Um,is the vegetable wood?
:Yes.
fb:Is the mineral metal?
gk:Yes.
f :Has it got electrical parts inside it?
oi :Nof..
:1s it a piece of furniture?
oi. :No.
^ :Is there one in this room?
JL :Yes.
p:It * s not a piece of furniture;it's made of metal and wood.
Is it bigger than that chair?
^ :No.
(i :1s it bigger than that shoe?
<^:Um,which way?Length-ways or width-ways?
^ :In volume is what I was thinking.
c?t:In volume,no.
:You're counting the questions,yeah?
c:Uhuh.
^ :That wasn't a question. (laughs)O.K. ?That was a comment...
Did we buy it?
c\ :...Would you like to rephrase that?
£ :(laughs) I don't want to rephrase it .'Did one of us, in
other words -?
:Yes.
^ :Did I_ buy it?
* :No.
p, :Gosh,that narrows it down a bit J...Urn,right.Is it someth¬
ing I enjoy using?
: (1 aughs) No.
P :Is it something which you enjoy using?
cAiNot particularly.
p :1s it something you use every day?
oL: Yes.
£?:Is it something you use over twenty times a day?
c/k :No.
p :How many's that?
^:Thirteen.
^>:Is it in your handbag?
oi :No«
pils it on the table?
o< :No.
p:Is it within (laughs) one foot of you?
:Noi(1 aughs) ,
(JotIs it above us?
^ :No.
:Let me recap.It's not bigger than your shoe in volume,
right?
ck : No.
p :And,um,it's metal and wood...and you use it every day and
enjoy - no,you don't really enjoy -
d :No...J You use it too - or one of them.
£ :Hmm...And it's in this room?
:There is one of them in this room - but we have more....
Oh,that was a question - eighteen!
:OhJ(clicks tonguejpause)...It's a coat-hanger!
* Gosh, that was brilliant J (laughs)
^>:That's deduction,my dear Wat son, that' s deduction!
Game 7
<5>( :The object is vegetable.
:1s the vegetable living?
oi :No.
jb:Can it be termed a vegetable product?
aL :Yes.Two.
^ :Would this product come from a higher plant - such as trees
and flowers,rather than lower ones?
d :You must be more specific.
^:Does it come from trees?
c^:I don't think so,no.
:No...O.K.Is it a fabric of some kind?
d :Not if you mean by fabric clothes,no.
jb :It's not,no...Hm.Is - ....doesn't come from trees and...
not a fabric...
<p(:No,it.'s not a tree,no.
|!> :Right.Would this - could you normally eat it?
ol.iNojyou can't eat it.Five.
j!> :0.K. . .. so it's not that,not that, and not that...kinds of
vegetable products...Would it normally be used in someone's
job or anything?
Ok :Uh...not as part of the job,no.Sixn
^ : No, just part of the... -*
d:You were on the right track when you asked about tree...
^ :0h - would it be, er,well,would it be, say,paper?
ok : Correct.
£> : Correct.O.K. .. .Would it be a book of some kind?
ok:No,it's not a book...Nine.
^ :Oh,would the paper be printed on in any manner?
^:Uh...in examples I know it is printed on.There may be ex-
amples where it isn1t.Ten...That's not very relevant.
£) :It's not very relevant.
Well, it might help, it might help, but...
:Yeah.. .Now.. .would the rest of the paper be wood or -?
d :Not wood,no.
:0r metal?
:Not metal...The object is vegetable throughout.
^ :Throughout,0.K....let1s see...
o^:Yes,you want to pin down what the rest of it is.You've got
the paper bit...
£>:Yeah,I got the paper bit...Would the rest of it be plastic?
c*:No,no,the rest of it is all vegetable - what you're trying
to get hold of is still vegetable.
:Would the rest of it be cloth,by any chance?
jPardon me?
^:Cloth.
o<:No,you've already established that fact.I won't count that
as a question either.
^:Right,so it's not fabric and anything mineral at all,it's
vegetable.
«^:No,it's purely vegetable and you've got paper involved in
it.But the rest is not paper,
jb :And it's not living.
:So we're still on - still coming up to question thirteen,.
:0.K.Would it be - the rest of it be firm, say, as opposed to
soft?
:The rest of it would be fairly soft.Soft rathep than firm,
though.
:I don't know whether that's a yes or no answer.'
Oltlt could be made firm,but normally it would be soft to the
touch.
^ : Yeah. ..I could think of a real 'off the wall' one right
now - except that it would contradict one of my questions
I asked before...
cn:Don't forget you're looking for a specific object.So it's
not going to be a vague thing like paper - paper and some¬
thing - it's not going to be - it's going to be an actual
object.
^:An actual object.I'll try another tack.
oL:Well,think what paper is used for apart from books,which
you've already mentioned.
p:Books and newspapers and all that.. .Um,would the paper .be
on the outside?
c<:Yes,the paper would definitely be on the outside.And what
you still have to get is on the inside...Fourteen.
^>:The - would the inside be a box?
<^:No,no - not the inside,no.Fifteen.
:No ,0 ,K. . .. kind of a... and you said earlier it wouldn't be
normally...Well,let me change one of my earlier questions
around:would the inside normally be eaten?
cAiNo,no part of this is normally eaten.I won't count that
as a question.
j^:...'cos I was thinking of a packet of food or something...
grit's not a packet of food,no.
j5 : Count that if you want.
o^:No,I won't count that one...(you've) already established
it wasn't eaten,so - that doesn't count.
p :0.K.
c^:But you're on the right track - a few of - most of the
words you've mentioned are definitely on the right track.
rj :...Would the paper form some sort of coating over this?
<X:Coating or covering,yes.Some sort of - yes.Sixteen.
£> : Ye s.That' s good.. .Would,urn, well,here ' s an 'off the wall'
one: would the - what's inside - be smoked?
o( :Yes,Now you're definitely - you're almost there now.Seven¬
teen.
|!) :O.K.Is it a packet of cigarettes?
G* :It is a packet of cigarettes.That's eighteen.And you've
only got to specify which packet of cigarettes,
jb :The one lying there.
:Yes,well done - nineteen.
Game 8
^ :It 1 s mineral.
o( :1s there one in this room?
^ :No.




^:Would we be upset if we lost it?
:Not really - well,yes,just a tiny bit...No,you couldn't
really care less,I should think...I mean,well,yes(laughs),
you wouldn't want to loose it...
:1s it something we've bought within the last six months?
^ :No.
^:Does it in fact belong to us?
^ :Yes.How many's that?Gosh.About four?
at :Five,I think.
^:Five.
ei jIs it smaller than my hand?
f) sNo.
o( :Ia it something used in the kitchen?
jb :Yes.
:1s it metal?
^ :No.Told you that.
:Oh.But it's mineral...
:I'll take that back 'cos I did tell you.
oi :Oh,is it plastic?
f :Yes.
oC :Ahai..Can it be used for containing liquid?
: Yes, it canV^ . I mean that's not its purpose though.
e»( :Have you just washed it up?
£ :No.
<4 :Sorry,can I recap.It's ours.It doesn't belong to the flat.
And we haven't bought it within the last six months.OhJ Is
it one of the plastic bags?
p :No.Brilliant idea,though.No.That's eleven.
:One of those plastic containers for keeping bread or bisc¬
uits. . 1
:No.
£ : Can't think of anything else that is_ plastic - and not meant
for containing water...and in the kitchen...
A :I didn't say it was in the kitchen,I said it was used in the
kitchen.
^ :Oh...Well,when I said 'for containing water' I was thinking
of your beer equipment.And you said it wasn't meant for con¬
taining waterjwell,beer i_s water...
:Uhuh.I answered with all that in mind.
iSo it's not any of that... it's used in the kitchen, it's not
in the kitchen...Do we sometimes use it somewhere else?
^ :No.
<7i:It's plastic? i It ' s not in the kitchen,but we use it in the
kitchen...
:Uhuh;.I use it in the kitchen... at least-
<*, :You use it in the kitchen.And it's not any of your beer
stuff and it doesn't contain any liquid and it's not in-
rThat's not altogether true - but it's not altogether what
I told you.
ci. :Is it meant to contain something?
(J> :No.
citAhils it the tube - or syphon?
^ :Yes.Fifteen.I gave you a few hints...
Game 9(Eskimo)
ji tUumasuuvoq. (It's animal.)
o(:Inuk? (A human being?)
^ :Inummiippoq. (It is in/on a human being,)
^:Uumasup iluani? (Inside the animal?)
|J, :Naamik.Silataani. (No.On its outsida)
^sNiuuva? (Is it a leg?)
p :Naamik. (No. )
o^:Niaqoq? (A head?)
p :Naamik.Niaqumiippoq. (No.It's on a head.)
c* : Qingaq? (A nose?)
jb:Aap.Kija qingaa? lYes.Whose nose?)
& tUvanga qingara? (My nose?)
p:Aap. (Yes.)
Game 10 (Eskimo)
Uumasunut ilaavoq. (It is animal)
Uumasoq taanna nunami uumasuuva? (Does this animal live on land?)
Aap.Nunami uumasuuvoq. (Yes.It does. )
Nunami uumasuuguni sutortarpa? (If it lives on land what does it eat?)
Neqit,aalisakkat,naaaullu . (Meat,fish and plants)
Uumasoq taanna nassoqarpa? (Does this animal have horns?)
Naamik. (No.)
Uumasoq taanna meqqoqarpa? (Does this animal have fur/hair?)
Timimi ilaatigut meqqoqarpoq. (It has hair on parts of its body.)
Uumasocj taanna sumi inuuva? (Where does this animal live?)
Nunami I (On land! )
Nunami sorlermi? (But in what country?)
Qallunaat nunaanni. (In Denmark.)
Immaqa eqqar-saatigaat qitsuk?' (Perhaps you are thinking of a: cat?)
:Nagga.Uumasunut ilaavoq^kisianni nersutaatinut. Haanhgilaq.
(No.It is animal,but it's not a domestic animal.)
P :Eqqarsaatigaat immaqa inuk? (Perhaps you are thinking of a human
being?)
cx iAap.Inuuvoq.Inullu taanna kinaava?Pingaartumik atorfeqarpoq...
(Yes.It's a human being.And who is this human being?He/she has an
important .job.. .)
p :Inuk taanna arnaava? (Is this human being a woman?)
ot :Aap,arnaavoq. (Yes,it's a woman.)
jj :Immaqa qullersaat ilaat? (Perhaps someone high up?)
:Aap, qullersaavoq. (Yes, she's high up.)
p :Taamfc^Kwni Dronning Margrethaassaaq? (So would it he Queen Margrethe?)


















£ : Ye sV*
«^:Is it living?
^:Yes...
^:Is it in Britain?
p : Ye s.
o( sis it in Edinburgh?
:Yes.
^:Do we know it? - are we acquainted with it,I mean?
-\j(
^ :We certainly are acquainted with it,though you might find
that rather a peculiar turn of phrase if you knew what it
was...
d.: Oh. . . it 1 s human, it's living, it1 s .in Edinburgh, we ' re acquai¬
nted with it,but not in the normal sense...Do we have any
personal sort of relationship with it?
^ :Very much so,yes.
oLils it in the department of Linguistics?
:At the moment,yes.
^:How many questions is that?
^jThat's about seven.
<3^: Is it in the department of Linguistics in the flesh?
:. . .Tim,yes. . .yes,it is.
^:...and it's here at the moment...Is it an individual?
:Not completely,no. . .
dl :Help.'. . .Is it a class?
^ :What do you mean by 'a class1?
it a class made up of a number of individuals?
:No.
qL :That's about ten,isn't it?
^>:TJm, that's ten...It's human and animate,but it's not an
individual,neither is it a class...
^:Does it have a defined status?
:That's rather difficult to answer..,no,you have to be
more specific.
<^:Does it have a defined position?In the sense of -
^in relation to what?
<^:-in some sort of organization.
:Yes.. .yes, taking organization in a specific sense.
^:What do you mean by 'a specific sense'?Sorry,I don't know
this.
(J? r (It ' s) part of a system,you see - then what do you mean by
'a system'? - not an administrative one,certainly.
d*:I think I'm on the wrong track anyway.How many have I got
left?
j!> : I think nine.
^:...it's neither an individual nor a class;it has a sort of
position - define 'position' - but not clearly defined...
:It has a very xzlearly defined position in relation to -you
know...
ol :No!
|> :You're making an assumption as to its sort of - as to its
being an entity,an individual entity.
o( :Which is -
p :-unjustified.
^: - not unjustified?J
is unjustified.
oC : And yet it's not a class, itr's not a group...
(J :And it's not freestanding, as it were...It's human, 0. K. ?,
it's living and it's here in the department...
oi. :.. . it' s here in the department, it' s not an individual, and
it's not a group made up of individuals...
p :So although it's living it's not living on its own.That's
the point,I mean.
<^:By that do you mean it's in some way parasitic?(laughter)
Great hilarity there J
^>:Yes,it's part of a - yes...not in any negative sense.It's
parasitic in as much as it's part of an organism.
o(:Is it - no.Is it part of a particular person?
:Yes.
pt^Is it part of a member of staff?
:No.




o( :Which leaves the field wide open...It's not a member of staff
and it's someone in the department - at the moment...Is it
male?
p :No.
o( :Is it Mrs.X ?
:No,it isn't.(laughs)That was a shot in the dark,wasn't it?
0('.That's about twenty, isn't it?
p :No,you've got three more.It's female and it's in the depart¬
ment - it's part of a female in the department at the moment...
0^:1've got to get the somebody female first,haven't I?...I'm
not going to get it...It could be any part of the body,hell...
not a member of staff...Is it a student?
J5; :Yes.
o(:Part of a particular girl student - how exciting.'WowJMust
be somebody generally known...







:One particular vegetable or several?
:Several.
(J) :Several.. .Of use or decoration?
^ :Neither.
^ :Why did someone make it if not to be useful or decorative?
That's rather difficult - I would have thought it must be
useful or decorative else nobody would have Made it in the
first place.
d\ 'Well,there is another purpose to its existence...
:1s there?...Is it a - so, it's not a tool of any sort - is
it found in houses?
o( : Yes.
b :Pound in houses...
:How many ' s that - four, is it?
:Yeah...found in houses and - is it a piece of furniture?
at, :No.
:Not a piece of furniture,but it's in a house...And is it,
er,is it something you would carry - or could carry?
oi, :Yes.
^ :You could...Is it largely made out of wood?
o<:No.
:Is it largely made out of - er,does it contain paper?
cX :Yes.
:...it contains paperjyou find it in houses;you can carry
it;and it's not useful or decorative...
: And it's made of more than one -
j^:-more than one thing. . .Ye s, I see...Does it - well,does it
contain metal?
^ :No.
:No metal.No wood and no metal,but it has paper and someth¬
ing else which is vegetable - what else is vegetable?...01-
oth?I suppose - hang on,I'm not asking that one...You could
carry it - would you normally think of carrying it?Would
it be specific to any particular room in the house?
:No.
J)j :No...Do you - hmm,it''s not furniture either,is it?That's
funny...Am I not really getting anywhere asking about hou¬
ses the whole time?Is this a red herring?
gilt's more or less a red herring,yes.
p :More or less a red herring...thought so.Is it a specific
item?
o( :Yes.
^ :0ne specific item.Have I seen it?
d, :Yes.
(p :1s it in the department?
cf\ • Ye s •
|b Jit's in the department.. .mostly made out of paper.I can't
think of anything that's mostly made out of paper in the -
:Not mostly,you see...
j5 : Ah, contains paper, sorry,but other things as well.But not
wood or metal - which doesn't make life very easy.
c* :It's more - as a rule it's more specific to a particular -
to a person.
p> : . . . it' s in the department, and I've seen it...
ot :Not necessarily a particular person...
jb:But it's not something somebody would use, though. . .neither
would they find it decorative.
:Wait a second - you said it's not useful - (that) doesn't
necessarily mean that one won't use it...





(AiYes.It's actually the packet of cigarettes - it comes to
the same thing,yes.I hesitated a little bit over the useful
or decorative:it's not useful,it's more enjoyable;it's not
useful,it 1s not decorative,but —
:Yes.I suppose that's fair enough,in fact.I thought that
divided up the whole world,but it doesn't really,I suppose.
:There is another purpose to existence,yeah,but..packet
of cigarettes on the table...You're much better at that th¬
an I am...
Game 13
c>( : It 1 s animal.
p :1s it soft?




:1s it in any way edible - without gumming up your system?
tfstl sufepose you could eat it,yeah...
: Gould you eat it in one mouthful?
:I suppose so, if you tried.'..
:Is it a primary colour?
:A primary colour?You mean like - one of these - just regular
colours like blue and red and green,sort of?...
^ :Primary is red,green or yellow.
:No,it' s not.
:Are we supposed to keep count?
^ :That's five.
:1s it in this room?
dL -Yes*
^ :1s it so small that,given the fact that it could be eaten,
you could eat it in one mouthful?
:You've already asked tbat,d±Ln't you?Didn't you say that?
^ :Not quite.
o^:Not quite,well...I don't know,I said if you ate it - you could
probably eat it in one mouthful...Is that seven questions?
p :It's animal,softish,small enough to be eaten in one mouthful -
if you can eat it...Is it in its pure natural animal state
apart from being dead?In the sense that it's a pure material,
or is it a synthesized material?
oi :Yeah.It's in its pure state,in its natural state,yes.
|ij :God,I'm stuck...It's not a watch-strap?
cx No...How can I give you a clue?...I don't think you'd think
of eating it.
P> Well,I know that.'It's not the ink in the ink-bottle?
No.It's animal,though.
Is it something leather?
oC No.It's alive.It's in this room.
$ It's you or me.'
oi We 11,how do you phrase that?
Is it - It's you or me,you can say yes or no to that-,
ci Oh yes.
P How many questions are left now?
Was that ten,ten questions?
I think that was too much of a hint.All right,it's me.
oC Yes..(That) is not the answer.
Is it part of me?
Yes.
f> A big part or a little part?
oi A little part.
@ One of my fingers?
°< No.
£> One of my eyes?
csC No.Fourteen.











oi Vegetable.Is it in this room?
It is.Yes.
ol Is it big or small?Is it big?
$ No.
oC Is it a colour other than white -I mean a colour?Is it some¬
thing other than white?
£ It has something other than white.Yes.
o£ Is it in its natural state - as a vegetable, sort of?
£ No.
cA Does it come in a container?
P No.
o< Let me see.Is it a paper product?
f3 Yes.
o< What's that, seven or so?
JJ Six.
oC Is it part of a book?
P No.
Oi Are there more than one of them?
P Not for the question,no.
Does it have writing on it?
f Yes.
®< And you said part of it was other than white.,?
£ Yes.
...that has writing on it...and it's not big...writing...Is
it a piece of paper?
No.. .Well, they could be...
oC Let me see,is it - Did you say it was -?I can't remember if
it's - Is it a box of some sort?
^ Yes.
c* A box...Is it a tape-container,a tape-box?No it's not,it can't
be:there's more than one of them...
£ No...
c< Or a cigarette package or -
p> Yes - which?
o*. I mean,is it a cigarette package?
It is.
<< I mean,is it that cigarette package?
It is.
o( Oh]
But you said'the cigarette package(sic),so I quietly removed
mine
*-Also on the table during the game
Game 15
:The object is vegetable.
:O.K.Is it wood?
|!> :No,it isn't.
^.vegetable...Is it something you'd use over and over again,
or is it something you'd use once?I mean,is it something youJld
use over and over again?
:No, it isn ' t,
o( :1s it something you use for some specific purpose?
£:I've a good mind to go all Oxford on you and say define
'specific' and define 'purpose'...Urn,no.
c*:Oh...Is it something you'd find in an urban environment?
£:Yes,but not exclusively.
:Not exclusively,hm( laughs) .. .bad question.
^ :Actually I think you ought to remember that this is one
specific object that he's asked us to get,not a general one...
G^:Right.I have a hard time with vegetable things and - if it
isn't me... vegetable. . .Is it a vegetable product, then?
:Yes.
at :O.K.Is it a product of manufacturing?
:Part of it is ,yes. . .No, in fact just yes.But I'll give you
that there are two parts and both of them are in fact...
ot tO.K.Is it something that we could find around here - at
Buccleuch Place?
(|> :Yes.
gi,:Is it -...gee,it's vegetable...it's not used for any speci¬
fic purpose... it's a product of manufacturing...
^:We11,when you say 'used for a purpose' it's na.But I think
that might mislead you - very strictly speaking,no.
Js :No.Is it an object of adornment - not in the sense of per¬
sonal adornment,but in the sense of - is it for architectural
purposes?
{> :No.
«^:It's not for architectural purposes.In other words it serves
a function - that's what I mean by 'specific purpose'.
^:Yes,it serves a function in a way,but if by function you
expect something to have come of it - let's say function but
not useful function...
Ah.'Function but not useful function. . .Is it a complex vege¬
table matter?That is,is it made up of different sorts of
vegetable matter?
:Yes.
oj :Is it big?
£> : No . (1 aughs)
o£:Is it very small?
: Smallish.
...smallish - that would have been not big... it's something
around Buccleuch and it's not big and it's complex vegetable
matter and - goodness sakes...What question are we on?
tEleven.. .You 're on question twelve.
ol:Is it something found outside or inside?
^:Both.
^:Both?
|}:I mean by 'it' you're going for the whole range now - there's
just one specific object in mind.So I'll answer yes,it is in¬
side at the moment.
frit's inside at the moment...AhiIs it cloth?
^ :No.
<x:Does it belong to a male?
(£> :Probably.
ol :In other words there's no sex-difference - I mean there's
no particular attachment to one sex over the other.
J :No,but you're still thinking of the whole range - this one
belongs to someone but I don't know who.But in general the
whole class of them doesn't belong to one sex or the other.
: (looking round; laughs) It ' s not in here.product of manu¬
facturing; isn't cloth and isn't wood...and it's vegetable..
and it's manufactured...Does it have permanancy?
(p :No.And that will help you if you think about it.
oi :Was it my lunch?
|>:No,it wasn't your lunch.
cI :How many questions do we have?
: Sixteen. And I'd stay where you are, on the permanancy. It' s
a big help...What else disappears besides food?
of:That's what I was thinking...O.K.Is it a wood product?
:Part of it is.
oL:Part of it is. .. specif ic function...
| :Well,as you're on eighteen I'll be generous.The outer part
of it is the wood function - it's the inner part that would
help you more.It's the inner part that isn't permanent... that
it is usually identified by in fact - the inner part,
oi :0h gosh. ..Has it anything to do with,um, literacy?
illiteracy?.'Ho.
<^:So it has nothing to do with reading or writing.
^ :No,absolutely nothing...Well,if you stay on this business
of inner part and outer part,the outer part is the thing
that is derived from wood.And there's one very common thing
that's derived from wood that's often on the outside of thi¬
ngs if you think of shops and supermarkets...
C>t,:Geez,I feel like a real cluck.'The outer part's of wood and
associated with shops and things,it's round here at Buccleuch
but has nothing to do with literacy...(looks around;laughs)
I keep looking in here...part - outer part something to do
with wood...
p :Yes,derived from wood.
^:Yeah} it would be like cardboard and paper,pulp and wood-
and ply-wood,and cellulose...
|b :Right,we 11 it's in that lot...l
oi : Cellulose... what about plastic?...
:Stop-it was in that list.
oi..It's got to be on that listiCellulose,and it covers things,..
It's a package of something.
^:Right.
C<:O.K.What is it?
^>:You've got one more question.
ot,:No.That was the twentieth.
^>:Oh,I see - 'is it a package?'.Yes,it is.Twenty first:it's
the packet of cigarettes on the -
^: Cigarettes .'Oh.
^:You got close to it with your lunch,really.
ok!We11,I don't think of that as vegetable - I think of it as
mineral.
^:Well,cigarettes are vegetable,
ck : Oh, I know...
Game 16
^ tit's animal.
^ :Is it anywhere in Buccleuch Place?
:Yes.
jb :1s it in this room?
cK 5Yes.
^ :Yes.Good.There aren't too many animals in this room.Is the
animal animate?
cK tWell, the animal's animate,but it's not obviously,I mean-
jb : I s - no, it's not an animal... Is the animal human?
o(_ : Well, it's in this room and it's got to be animal - and yes,
the animal's human.
:Well,that means it's either you or me,is it not?Well,let's
start with you.Is it you?
:No.
jb : Is it me?




^:That's five questions now.
£ sO.K.
o^:I mean there's more to it.
|j :0h,I see - I thought the whole thing was me.It's a part
of me.
0^ :Yes.
^:0h Christ 1 ... Above the waist?
iX :Yes.
:0h,so it's all the sort of clean bits...Mm.Is it my beard?
oC :No.
:Is it above the neck?
o( :Yes.









: It' s mineral.
(£) :1s it a manufactured object?
:Yes.
£) :Do we own one - at least one?
o( :Yes.




^ :1a there one in this room?
<={ :Yes.
p :Do we use it every day?
o( :You keep using 'we',which is difficult.
0 :I mean one of usT
q( :I do,yes.
p :Would it be strange if I used it?
J,:Yesi
p :1s there just one in this room - or more?
01 :More.
p :But you're thinking of a specific one,right?That1 s not
question -'cos you have to think of a specific object.,
you use it in the evening?
cx:As opposed to any other time?No,I use it all the time,
p :1s it something consumable - I mean do you consume it?
/ :Noi
p :Is it a utensil?
o( :No.. .That' s eleven.
pj rO.K.Let me recap.It's plastic;there are several in thi
room but you're thinking of one of them;it's not consumable;
you use it all the time,I don't...Is it within five feet of
me now?
o(. :Yes.
fb :Are you wearing it?
:Yes.
jt, :1s it something in the cosmetic line?
oi :No*
^ :Is it decoration or jewelry,something in that line?
^: No .Fifteen.
6:Do you wear it below the waist?
Yes...(laughter; interference)That' s not fairi
p :Well there's not too much plastic down there.Is it someth¬
ing to do with your stockings?
oC :Yes.
:The belt - the studs on the belt - the suspender belt?
d.:Well,what do you call it?Suspender - yes,I'll give you it.






:Is it a precious metal?
p7:No.
o(:Is it at all decorative?
|b :It may be,but that's not its purpose...
<^:So it's essentially a functional object -made of metal...
^ :Right.That's three.
^:Are there lots of these things around?
: No.
ci :Are you thinking of one specific object?
jj :Yes.That's not a question,'cos I have to...
of :Is there one in this flat?;
jb :NoJ
o( :Is it of more than two by three by three cubic feet?
:YesI
o( :1s it something like a dustbin?
ft:Nothing whatsoever like a dustbin.
:Would you be very surprised if I went out and bought one?
j5 :YesJVery surprised,yes J
^ :1s it as big as a car?
P> :Yes.
\
o(:Oh.And it's just metal?
|7 :Uhuh.
ok sis it some kind of large container?
:No.
o^:Does it have wheels?
p:No.Ten.
^:Is it something flat or does it have depth?
£:Well,which of those do you want to ask?
p(:Well,I'm thinking in terms of something like a gate.That
wouldn't have depth,that's sort of flat.
^sO.K.So is it f1at?Answer:no.
oi:Oh.Are there any of these things in Edinburgh?
f^:Yes - well...The particular one I'm thinking of is not
exactly in Edinburgh,but - and there's only one of these
things in and around Edinburgh,but there are things like
it in Edinburgh...I mean the same general class of objects*
but...
<X :0h, is it something like a bridge?
jj :Yes.








You're not sure about that,are you?(laughs)
Is it alive?
f> No.
Is it made up from different vegetable origins?
Yes.Well,there's parts of it - the whole entire thing is veg¬
etable,but there are different vegetables involved.
o( Is it a product for.consumption - for eating?
p Not for eating,but for consumption in a general sense...
In other words it gets used up.l
C< But it's not eaten.
^ Uhuh.But it's not eaten...That's three,right?
<?C 0 .K..It gets used up but it's not for eating...Is it - can
it be used as furniture?
?> No.
No kind of furniture -soft furniture or any kind?
No.
oC Is there a lot of it around?
Oh yes.
C* c an you see some just now?
^ Yes I can.
Is it far - no,it's not.Not for drinking...Is it ink?
No...
cL. Is it used for writing?
f No.
Is it used for smoking?
jb Yes.
Cigarettes?
B Yes.It's the packet of cigarettes over there.
Game 20
$:Animal.
o(:Is it a member of the class 'human'?
ji :Yes...Not necessarily...
ol :My goodness.Yes,but not necessarily?...
£>:Yes,it's a member of the class 'human',but it need not
be restricted to the class 'human'.
o(:(laughs)I'm stuck completelyI ... Can it be only male?
q(. :It can be male or female.. .This is ridiculous.'.. .Is it
alive - or,is it a live or dead human?
jh :Um. . . alive.
o<:It's alive?So it's not a corpse or anything like that...
p :No.In fact,oh no ;• i.e.'i.e. means 'that is' -so it
is definitely human.I'm sorry.It's definitely human.I'm
sorry.It's definitely human and it's alive.
:And it's not - is it imaginary?
£ :No.
d :So it's-not fictitious,
jb :No.
:It actually lived and breathed - or lives and breathes.
^ :Uhuh.You're very close.(chuckles)
o(:I'm very close...Is it in this room?
p :Yes.





(-^-Looking at printed rules)
£> :Sort of,yes.
c=01t1 s sort of me?
f»:Yes. (laughs)
o( :1s it your idea of me?
^ :No.
:How can it be sort of me and still not maybe be human?
^ :Ah,but I retracted that.I said it was definitely human
because it was an 'i.e. ' in brackets.
o^jBut - so it1 s me 'sort of'?
^ :Uhuh.
c^:Is it me in a certain role?In other words as the quest
ner?
£ :No.
cj( :But it's not simply me...
f> :No,




^:Cheat I...I don't see how it can be me and not me.I don
see how it could only be me 'sort of'.Can I give up?
£ :No.
0^:1 can't give up.
^ :It's not entirely you.It's not you as a whole.That's a
big clue.
ck tit's only part of me?
jj, :Yesi
o( :Is it part of my anatomy?
f :Yes.
o(,:Is it part of my anatomy above ray waist?
^ :Yes.
c£:Is it my head?
^jYes.Part of it,yes.
ck:Is it my eyes?
:No.





jb :Now you had a big clue a while back.
o^rWhat was it?
j!) :I said it was a clue.
ot^ :0h, crumbs.
:I said you were close.
Could you take it out of me and put it somewhere else?
jj : (laughs)Well,I suppose you might,but it would look most
peculiar.I'11 say 'no' to that,
ot. :No...
:You wouldn't function properly without it where it is.
Now you have to have a guess now.
cC :I have to have a guess.
|3 :I'll give you a big big clue,0 .K. ?, so' s you get it right.
Well,it's prominant.
cL :1s it my nose?
^ :Right.
^5Ah deari(laughter)Oh no,that's awful - what does it say?
A: Questioner's nose.
:Oh, for gosh sake]
^ :Yes,I was just thinking of a nose at first.You see that's
why I said animal - or human.
0* :0h dear.
^ :I apologize for misleading you for the first two or three
questions.
o4.:That's all right.I'm glad I guessed it even thpugh I gu¬
essed it the last thing.It's a shame you didn't give me
a clue about Gogol or something like that.'
Game 21
at : It 1 s animal.
^ :Is it alive?
ok :Um.. .yeah.
:1s it a land animal?
at :Um, yeah.Mostly.
:Is it a mammal?
ck :Yes.
j!> :1s it found in Britain?
ck :Yes.
|b -Is it a domestic animal?
0( i(Pause as she writes notes)You asked for land mammal,right?
:I asked for land -
ok : You said land,you said mammal,you said found in Britain...
Is that three?Four?
:Three,.I think.No.I asked if it was alive also - so that
was the fourth -
ck :That was the first one - so we have had four,
j!): We've had four...The fifth one then would be:is it a dom¬
estic animal?-domesticated animal?
ok :Yes.
^ :Is it found in suburban homes?
(1aughs)Occasionally.
p,:Occasionally - that sounds interesting...Is it found on
farms?
Ck: Gould be. . .
:Is it non-human?
ok : No.




|>:Is it - is he a Britain-wide - er,does he have a Britain-
wide reputation?
c^:I don't think so.'No.
^:Does he live in Edinburgh?
d, J Yes.
:1s he associated with the linguistics department?
oi, :Yes.
^:Is he a member of staff?
d:Yes.
£>:Is he a high-ranking member of staff?
d:No.Would you like a hint?
|> :Urn,no... thankyou.Is it me?
d,:Sort of...
P :Sort of me?Is it a part of me?
oC :Yes...You now have three more questions.
:Is it part of my head?
o( :Yes.
Ijj :Part of my head..?Very difficult to narrow it down from
there...
ok :I know - you only have two questions.
^:I know.What shall I say?Is it identifiable as an organ?
oC :11 all depends what you mean by 'organ'..,
:hh yes - can I have that question back? I laughs)
dtThere are certainly some senses in which you would ident¬
ify it as an organ - but there are certainly other senses
in which you might not.
IJd :A sensory organ?
:Yes.
^ :Is it my nose?
ol:Yes it isJThe twentieth question - congratulations J
^5 : (laughs)Ridiculousi
^:You're pretty goodi
(J3 :I was so stupid though - not to think of human beings be¬
fore, because the word 'animal' put me off,made me think of
animals,and I think it was question eight or nine whether
or not it was a human being.That was kind of dumb.
o(, :I was going to say to you at fifteen that it was a part
rather than a whole,if you wanted a hint.
:Yes,I see.
really loved your progression from a low-ranking member
of department to youi
Game 22
£j:It is vegetable and mineral,
c^sls it edible? - by people,I mean.
£>:In the very widest sense of the word,yes...That's not a
very helpful answer.
qH :...and it's vegetable - and probably not really edible...
Is it an implement?
:No.
^jNot an implement...Is it a manufactured - that is, is it
made by people?
£> :Yes.
<^ :. . . it is made by people...not an implement.. .Is it larger
than this room?
^ :No.
o^rls it in this room?
:Yes.
C<:Is it electronic in any way?
f :No.
:Did I ask you if it was an item of apparel?
:No,you didn't ask me.
<JL :May I ask you that? (1 aughs)I mean don't count that as a
questionlMay I ask you,she says,staying( within...) - Is
it an item of apparel?
^:It is not.
oC sit is not...Is it a structural part of this room?
p :No.
c< :1s it a piece of furniture?
f :No.
: Is it - is it a long, thin object?
£>:No...I wouldnH^aay so, You've had ten.
o^rYeSjI've had ten...a vegetable and mineral object which
is neither structural,wearable,electrical,nor an implement-
lb :Correct.
-which is in this room and is not long and thin...and is
edible in a very wide sense of edible...
|b:In a very wide sense. (1 aughs)
o[ :Does it have writing on it?
^:Yes.
<A :Is it a set of directions - instructions?
^ :...No.
I'd love to ask you why it took you so long to answer that
que stion!(1aughs)
^:I was thinking about why -I'm not sure!
^:Anyway,never mind - you're not supposed to answer that
question.
^ :At tribute my hesitation to stupidity.




:(laughs)You could do a brute force search in how many qu¬
estions? .'
^:Thirteen so far.
oL :Is it on the table?
£ :Yes.
oi :0h shit...Is it the last item to be guessed?- in other wo¬
rds was it the answer - the sheet with the answer on it for
last time?
:I don't understand your question, sorry.
qi iThat
(-"-pointing at slip with previous game object written on it)
^ ;No,it's not that.Now you've had fifteen nowjwould you li¬
ke a hint?
:Yes,please give me a hint.
:The object in question is imported,
c^rlt's this cigarette box.
p, :Yes.
o( : All right.
p, :Was that a very broad hint?
g(:Yes...I'd been staring at the thing - shall I ask that ne¬
xt or shall I do things like -am I touching it,you know?1'
(bell rings as she touches it by mistake;laughter) - and
then work from there since there's quite a lot of gundge
on the table...
Game 23
o< : It' s animal.
{>, :1s it in this room?
oI :Yes.
:1s it sitting down?
P^:Yes...Not it itself.
p:Is it on 'X'*-?
o( :No.
|) :Is it on me?
o( sYes.
^ :1s it above my waist?
:Yea»
jl :1s it below my neck?
:Yes.




(tf-Person present in room, seated)
Game 21m;-
^ :It 1s mineral.




cxils it bigger than my shoe?
(/ :Yes.
c<:Is it bigger than this room?
p :Yes.
J. :1s it in or very near Edinburgh?
P:Yes.




Gould I stand on top of it?
p :You could...
o^:But I wouldn't want to...?(laughs)Right.Is it a landmark?
I mean would you use it as a landmark to guide someone
somewhere?
p :Yes.
cj^:Is it stone or rock of some sort?
P? :Yes.
^tls it a building?
jb :No?..
^ :I mean in the widest sense of the word 'a buildingright?
p :No.( inaudible)
:A construction]on which human people -human beings move
around,or can move around...You're not answering?
^>:I said no,it's not a building.
o(:Gould you see it from Princes Street,anywhere along Pri¬
nces Street?
$:Yes.
ol, :Is it a historical monument?
^ :Yes.
J;:Let me recap a bit...It's made of stone,it's a historical
monument visible from Princes Street.I could in theory
I
stand on top of it...Is it the Scott monument?
:Yes.That's fourteen.
Game 25(Japanese)
: Shokubut su desu ka? (Is it vegetable?)
p:Hai,so desu. (Yes,it is.)
o(:Hana ga sakimasu ka? (Does it grow flowers?)
j*,:Sakanai to omoimasu. (I don't think so.)
<*:Okii desu ka? "(Is it big?)
:Okii desu. (It's big.)
o( :Eto...kudamono ga arimasu ka? (Let's see...does it have
fruit?)
:Arimasen. (No.)
ai :Aki ni naru to ha ga ochimasu ka? (In Autumn do its
leaves fall off?)
jb :Iie. (No. )
ol :Ja...jorokuju desu ne? (So...it's an evergreen?)
j>7 :To mo iemasen. (You wouldn't say it was that either.)
o^tOnshitsu no naka de sodachimasu ka? (Is it grown in a green¬
house? )
P :Iie. (No.)
o(:Scotland ni mo - de mo miemasu ka? (Even in Scotland can
you see it?)
r :(shrugs) Ammari kankei arimasen. (That's not really rele¬
vantJ
^:Nihon ni arimasu ka? (Is it found in Japan?)
^:Arimasu. (Yes,it is.)
C^ilkutsu ni narimashita ka?...Ju-gurai....hana ga sakanakute...
shokubutsu de,happa ga ochinakute...koko de wa nakute,Nihon
ni wa aru'n desho... (How many's that?...About ten...doesn't
have flowers... vegetable,doesn't shed its leaves...not found
here,but found in Japan,I guess...)
:Un. (Mm. )
£)k:...a,ko iu no baai wa ne. . .Nichi jo" ni tsukaemasu ka? (...ah,
in that case...Is it used everyday?)
:Tsukau - iie,tsukau mono de wa arimasen. (It is - no,
it's not something which is used.)
:Miru mono desu ka? (Is it something for looking at?)
(Jj :Miru mono to mo arimasen. (It's not for looking at either.)
o(:Taberu mono desu ka? (Is it something for eating?)
^j:Ni chikai mono desu...(It's something close to that...)
o(:Takai desu ka?- kau to takai desu ka? (Is it dear?- when
you buy it is it dear?)
: lie, t akaku arimasen. (No,it's not dear.)
^:...okikute...Ju-gurai natta?...(...big...Is that about ten?..)
^ :Juyon. (Fourteen.)
^:Mo hitotsu ne?...miru mono de mo nai desho?...zenzen wakannai
...Hinto - jugo-gurai nattara - (One more,right?...not for
looking at?...don't get it at all...A hint - when it gets
to around the fifteenth question - )
^ :Taberu mono ni chikai'tte... (I said it was close to some¬
thing for eating...)
c/. :. ..ml ga naranai desh'o.. .Tokai de mo miraremasu ka? (...no
fruit...Can it be seen in the city?)
p:Tokai-jiT to mita koto ga arimasu. (It has been seen in the
middle of cities.)
<j(:Koko de kau koto ga dekimasu ka? (Can you buy it here?)
p tDekimasu. (You can.)
^:Ie no naka ni arimasu ka? (Can you find it in houses?)
^ :Yoku arimasu. (Often.)
oi, :Kyu ni fuyasu koto ga dekimasu ka? (Can it propagate rap¬
idly?)
Jb :Dekimasu. (It cam.)
o( :Ueru koto ga dekimasu ka? (Can you plant it?)
JbiUwaserete imasen. (It's not planted.)
^rNijH ja nai? (Twenty, isn ' t it?)
p>:Mo hitotsu. (One more.)
...Kono hen ni arimasu. (...It's in this vicinity.)
:Tsukue desu ka? (Is it the desk?)
^ :Chigaimasu. (No.)
^:Kami desu ka? (Is it paper?)
: lie.. .Kami mo bubunteki ni shosarete iru... (No...It's partly-
made of paper though.)
<A:Hon ka?shimbun ka nanka?...(A book?or newspaper or something?.
^ :Nai.Miete imasu. (No.It's visible.)
^:...nanka na... (...what could it be...)
^:Taberu koto ni chikai... (It's close to something edible.)
<^:Tabako? (Tobaco/cigarettes? )
| :Un.Tabako de keredomo - hyogen chotto kaete kudasai. (Mm.It's
tobaco,but please change the way you phrased it.)
^:Cigarette? (Cigarette?)
:Un.. . iie, chigau. (Mm...no.)
o(:...Hamaki to paipu to ka shurui? (Cigars or pipes or some¬
thing of that sort?)
^:lie,shurui de wa nai...Doko ni arimasu ka? (No,it's not a
'sort'of thing....Where is it?)
*^:Tsukue no ue desho?... (On the desk?...)
j?) :Tsukue no ue ni - (The what on the desk?)
oC : Wakannai. * . (I don't get it...)
j>j iTsukue no ue ni aru - (The - which is on the table.)
i^lTabako?... (Tobaco?...)
jb : - no - ((The what) of (tobaco)?)
^:Tqbako no - nani ka na?... (The - of toba4co - what coulds
it be?..
p:Miete imasu ne... (You can see it,can't you...)
<a£:Ippon no tabako? (One cigarette?)
:Ja nai.Kazu wa kankei nai'n.Miete iru .jotai ieba iijmiete
iru'n sono mono wo ieba yoroshii... (No.It's nothing to
do with numbers;Just say what situation you see it in;the
thing itself you can see...)
Oi:Pilta no tsuite iru tabako to iu koto?...(Do you mean a filter
cigarette
^:Sore wa kankei nai...Are wa nan desu ka?Asoko ni aru tobako
no - ? (That's irrelevant...What's that over there?The cig¬
arette - ?)
dk: Suisashi? (Butt?)
: lie. (No .)
<*Mqbako no hako? (The cigarette packet?)
j!> :Hako. (The packet.)
<^:Tabako no hako?...De mo,tqbako no hako to iu no wa - (The cig¬
arette packet?..But the cigarette packet is - )
^ :Matte - tQbako mo haitte iru keredomo...Kara no baai mo attya
nai?...Chotto aimai da kedo.Hitohako no tcxbako... (Wait - there
are cigarettes inside it but.../ It could also be empty,
couldn't it?..It's a little vague.One packet of cigarettes...)
:De mo,ne,hako 1 tte iu to katai mono... (But still a 'packet
of cigarettes' is when it's packed full...)
: - iu keredomo, are mo hako ni naru wake - Nihongo de wa.Nai
kara,fukoro to iwanai desho...Pukoro 'tte ienai. (-but that's
what it's called - that too is a 'packet of cigarettes' - in
Japanese.You'd hardly call it a 'fukoro .It ' s not a Tuk-
oro'.)
oi. :Watashi wa tabeko no tsutsumi 'tte iu. (I_ would call it a
cigarette 'tsutsumi'-"-.)
^:Iie - iwanai.Tabako no hako 'tte iimasu yo. (No - you don't
say that.You say 'tabako no hako'.)
-"-Respectively 'bag/container' and 'packet/wrapping'
Game 26(Japanese)
o( :Bohutsu desu. (It's animal.)
(jj) rKakohin desu ka? (Is it a manufactured object?)
oi :lie. (No. )
:Dobutsu sono mono desu ka? (Is it an animal itself?)
o( : So desu. (Yes.)
£ :Sore wa kono hen ni orimasu ka? (Is it in this vicinity?)
^ : Imasu. (It is.)
:Honyurui desu ka? (Is it a mammal?)
« :Hai. (Yes.)
|> :Chiisa na dobutsu desu ka? (Is it a small animal?)
o( :Dotchitomo iemasuiokii no mo chiisai no mo arimasu. (You
could say either way:there are big ones and little ones.)
:Katei ni kawarete imasu ka? (Is it kept in the house?)
d. :Katei ni imasu. (It is found in the house.)
:Inu'desu ka? (Is it a dog?)
o( :Chigaimasu. (No.)
:Ningen desu ka? (Is it human ?)
: So desu. (Yes . )
:Sei ni kankei arimasu ka? (Has it got something to do with
sex?)
d :Arimasen...Ano - ningen no karada no ichibubun desu. (No...
Well,it's part of a human being.)
P :Sore wa miemasu ka? (Is it visible?)
oi :Jibun de miru - ? (To oneself -?)
ft : - koto wa dekimasen? ( - it isn't visible?)
cH :Miemasu. (It is visible.)
^ :Sore wa kagami wo tsukaeba to iu imi desu ka? (You mean
if one used a mirror?)
csi. :Hai. (Yes. )
<?> :Senaka desu ka? (Is it the back?)
jChigaimasu. (No.)
sKuchi desu ka? (Is it the mouth?)
c4 :Ghikai desu. (Close.)
|J, :Aa.Shita desu ne? (Ah.It's the tongue,isn't it?)
oL : Chigaimasu. (No.)
^ :Han a J (NoseI)
a :So...Sore de,dare no hana desu ka? (Yes...But whose nose?)
$ :Jibun no hana? (My own nose?)
ol sSo" desu. (Yes.)
Game 27
& :The object is predominantly mineral.
:Well you'll have to tell me what the other -the non-
predominant part - is:mineral and - ?
& :Mineral and vegetable.
:1s it moveable?
c\:It could be moveable.
lis there one of these objects in this building?
ck :No.
^3 :Do human beings need it in this country?
:Yes.
P>;Is it larger than my briefease?
CK :Yes.
:Would one find it normally inside a house?
<k :No.
:1s its specific nature related to a human or to a place?
o^:Can you rephrase that question?
|b:Well,what I mean is,presumably you have a member of a
class of objectsjnow the identification of this particular
member,does it depend on its relationship with a person
or does it depend on its relationship with a place?
ot :With a place.
:So let me think...
c<:But the questions have to be phrased in such a way that
I answer'yes ' or'no '.
£ :Well,wasn't it in the first place?
Oi :Perhaps,yes... i
^:0h sorry,right .J So it's larger than my briefaase,potent¬
ially movable but not normally;it's needed by humans in
this country,its specific nature is related to a place,and
it's largely mineral with some vegetable...Is there more
than one of these objects in Edinburgh?
u :No.
:Implication is there's only one of them in Edinburgh.Let1 s
think...It's not Waverly Station by any chance?
oCsIt's not.I think you're assuming about something I haven't
actually said.
£ :Oh,is there one in Edinburgh at all?
O^sNot 'in' Edinburgh...
^ :Aha.Is it something which is useful to -or necessary to,
rather - to humans as a group?
jUrn,yes...
:...specific to a place...and there isn't one in Edinburgh
...Can I recap?There's not one in Edinburgh?
d :Depends how you define 'Edinburgh'.1'd say there is not
one in Edinburgh.Not in Edinburgh.
^ :It's not the Forth Bridge,is it?
oC :Uhuh.Which bridge,though?That is the point.'The Forth
Bridge' is not the exact answer.
|3 :0h well,heads or tails - the Forth Road Bridge?
J. :No.
:The Forth Railway Bridge?
o( :Yes.
Game 28
:The object is animal.
oC :1s this object in this building?
:No.
c< :Is it in Edinburgh?
:Not as far as I know. '
^ :1s it in Britain?
:Yes,as far as I know.
d :1s it a specific object?
jbiYes.
d :Is it larger than your briefcase?
:Yes.
oUIs it larger than a house?
:No.
ok:Is it useful?
£>:(laughs)I can't answer that questionlDo I have to answer
that question?
qC:So the question doesn't count...
ft :No.
ok :Is it useless?
j5 :I can't answer that question either!
o<:...it's between the size of a brie^a^e and a house...in
Britain;specific...
:And it's animal.
P^rAnd it's animal.Is it a living animal?
:Yes.
^:Is it a person?
p :Yes.
O^tHow many questions have I had?
^ :Eight.
o(.:Is this person involved in politics?
p:I have to give an expanded answer.This person shouldn' t
be involved in politics.




c<, :.. .female... shouldn't be involved in politics - that
wasn't really very fair,was it?...Does this person live
in London?
:I don't know.
^:So that doesn't count.I think - I'm recapping - you did
say that this person was not in Edinburgh but was in
Great Britain...
P :As far as I know,yes.
:1s it a person involved in entertainment?
^ :No...No.
cL :1s it Princess Margaret?
$ :No.
oi 'Is it a person in the academic world?
:No.
^ :Is it a specific person?I mean,have I got to get a name?
:Yes.That's not counted as a question ' co.s-
^:Not counted.But it might be a mother or -
p :No,no,no.I mean it's not one of a class of objects.
c{ :...not politics,not entertainment,not the academic world
...a woman...not entertainment means not sport,very like¬
ly. ..
^ :I'd be giving you a clue next question - can I give it
to you now?
d :Yes.
:Because of something you've just said.I hadn't thought
of sport as being entertainment...
ci :No.I was just thinking of possible fields for well-known
women.
^ :So when I said 'not entertainment' I was not excluding
sport.
C£ :That's my clue...So it's a woman who's involved in sport.
'Is it Princess Anne?
:Yes.When you started asking 'Is she - is it_ useful or is
it useless'-
oi :(laughs)YesJUseless,I think!j
j? :0r entertainment -
d :Actually the answer to this is very very difficult beca¬
use you gave it away when you said she shouldn't be inv¬
olved in politics,which put me right on the royal family
in a sense...But I mean,what can you say?
£ :Yes,but you see how can I answer your question 'is this
person involved in politics?'?Well, in one sense no, in that
she can't vote and is not a member of a political party
and so on.In another sense very definitely involved in




^ :Dobutsu desu ka... (Animal,is it...)
:Ikimono desu. (It's a living thing.)
^ :Ikimono,ikimono desu ne...Dobutsuen ni imasu ka? (Living
thing,living thing,right...Does it live in a zoo?)
g*£ : Imasen. (No.)
:Dobutsuen ni wa inai...So suru to,kachiku desu ka?(It does-
'nt live in a zoo...In that case,is it a domestic animal?)
<£ : Chigaimasu. (No.)
P :Kachiku de mo nai...sunde iru tokoro wa...Tobemasu ka? (It's
not a domestic animal...lives in...Can it fly?)
:Tobenai desho ne. (I guess it can't.)
^>:Sore ja.. . oyogemasu ka? (Well... can it swim?)
:Kanari oyogemasu... (To some degree...)
^ :Kaaari oyogemasu ne...Sore de...oyogeru...Umi ni imasu ka?
Soretomo kawa ni imasu ka? (To some degree...Then...it can
swim...Does it live in the sea?Or in a river?)
d :Riku desho ne.Pudan wa ne. (On land.Normally,that is.)
£ :Pudan wa riku de...So suru to,ryoseirui desu ka? (Normally
on land...Would it be amphibious then?)
c< : Ghigaimasu. (No.)
^ :...oyogeru keredomo...umi ni mo inai,kawa ni mo inai...fu-
dan wa riku de kurashite wake desu ne... ryc?s eirui de mo nai
...hachurui de mo nai - (...it can swim but...it lives nei¬
ther in the sea or in a river...because it normally lives
on land...it's not amphibious...nor is it a reptile -)
:Nai desu ne. (No,it's not.)
^ :Sore de,honyurui? (A mammal then?)
^:Honyurui desu - honyurui ni zokusuru desho...seikaku ni iu
naraba zokushimasu ne... (It's a mammal - it probably
belongs to the mammals... strictly speaking it belongs to
them...)
:Honyuruizoku to iu koto wa tsumari akachan wo umu koto de-
su ne?Tamago wa nakute...(A mammal gives birth to babies,
doesn't it?Without an egg...)
ot»:Ma. ..Sono dobutsu wa akachan mo umu desho,ne...Nan to iu
ne?...Kanari gutai-teki desu kara ne... (Well...I suppose
this animal also has babies...What can I say?...It's some¬
thing pretty corirete,you see...)
:Sono dobutsu wa ikimono de - (This animal is a.living cre-
ature-r J
o< :Ma,kobutsu ja nai,kedo... (Well,it's not mineral,but...)
£,:Soshite ikite iru nai'n mono desu ka?Kakohin desu ka?(Then
it isn't living?Is it a manufactured object?)
oC. : Ikite iru mono desu ne. (It' s a living creature.)
ji:Ikite iru mono desu ka,ne...De,kodomo mo - (It's a living
creature,right...And (it can have) a child - )
o< :Kodomo wa nai,kedo ma...( It's not a child,but,well...)
p:De,hachurui de wa nai,honyurui de aru to...kachiku de mo
nai...(And it's not a reptile if it's a mammal...nor is it
a domestic animal...)
^ :Ima juichimon-gurai desu. (That's about eleven questions.)
^..mizu no naka ni iru...tokidoki wa...(...found in the
water...occasionally...)
ol :Amari okiku kangae ga hogai desu.Kanari gutai-teki da kara...
Nan to ka,nan to ka?... (Your ideas are too high-flown.It's
something pretty corirete,you see..What can I say,what can I
K
say?...)
y :Akachan desu - kodomo-mitai na mono desu ka? (Is it a baby -
something like a child?)
^:So ja nai desu ne. (No,it's not.)
^ : JTS, seichSshita otona no ikimono desu ka? (Well,is it a
fully grown creature?)
^ :Nan to iu ka nai (What can I say.')
oUBetsuni kodomo to kankei nai 'n de mo...sugoku ' specify L
sareru to - dare no,doko no nan to ka kanji de ne...Bakuzen
to ieba - tatoeba,ne:empitsu de,empitsu j.& nakute, dare-dare-
san no empitsu da - so iu kanji da...kanari 'specify1-sareta
... (It doesn't have any particular connection with chi¬
ldren...if you were to be much more specific - asking sort
of whose it is,where it is,etc...Roughly speaking - for ex-
amplerif it were a pencil,it wouldn't just be a pencil,it
would be Mr. so-and-so's pencil... something pretty specific.
^:...honyurui de...de wa,ningen...kachiku de mo nai..."Petto"
de wa nai desu ne. (...mammal...human being...not a domest¬
ic animal...So it wouldn't be a pet...)
cA:Petto ja nai desho ne. (It wouldn't be a pet.)
p:Ningen no seikatsu to kankei arimasu ka?(Does it have any
connection with human life?)
oi, : Arimasu ne.HijtJ ni arimasu ne... (Yes, it does. Very much so.
-p :...mizu ni yoku ite...ningen ni kankei ga aru... (...often
found in water...to do with human beings...)
o( :Gutai-teki na no - kikan da kara...Ningen to iu ka no nakute
ne,tatoeba - ningen no te to ka:sore btq motto gutai-teki ni -
tatoeba ningen no dare-dare-san no nan to ka...Sugoku gutai-
teki sarete iru kara.Sono 'point' de kiite kudasai. (It's
something concrete - it's an organ...It's not a human being
or anything like that - for example,something like a human
being's hand,but more concrete - for example,a Mr. so-amd-
so's something.lt1s very concrete.Ask along these lines.)
:...dobutsu...mizu ni kankei...Mizukaki to ka ja nai ka? (...
animal,..connected with water,,.Would it be webbed feet?)
<* :MaI..Kikan da kara,.. (Goodnessi.,.Look,it's an organ,.,)
:Ningen? (Human?)
ot :Ningen desu. (Human.)
j3:Ningen no kikan...Teashi? (A human organ...A limb?)
^ :Chigaimasu ne. (No.)
p:Ja...mizu ni kankei... (Hm...connected with water...)
tOyogenai'n - ningen da kara oyogeru kedo,kono baai wa kan¬
kei zenzen nai. (It can't swim - that is,since it's human
(you can say)it can swim,but that circumstance has nothing
whatsoever to do with it.)
£ tNingen no kekkan? (A human being's veins?)
: Ghigaimasu.Ningen. ja nakute ne,waiashi no doko ka,anata no
doko ka - kikan desu ne - ware-ware ni tsuite imasu. (No.
It's not a human being,it's somewhere on one of us - it's








4, :Yes...Well,I take it that's what you meant by the first
question.So I won't count that. ~
:No, ' cos it could be part of a person^
4,:0h,all right,if you insist.
^ :Right, that' s two questions...Female?
QK :Yes.
^ :Does she live in Edinburgh?
4 :No.
^ :Have I ever met her?
4 :No»
Y :Do you know this person?
4 :No.
Jb:Is it somebody famous?
<j\ :Yes.
jb: Somebody famous, female,who lives in Edinburgh -
4:1 said didn't live in Edinburgh.That's eight.
p :1s she English?
4:Yes.
£>:Can I recap?It ' s somebody famous, doesn't live in Edin¬
burgh.Did I ask if you knew this person personally?
4:Yes,you did.
^ :And what did you say?(laughs)
ol : I said no.
p :So is it somebody like a member of the royal family?
4 :What do you mean 'like' a member of the royal family?














o( A particular person in the department?
♦
f> No.












What else is there in the world besides politicians,writers
and entertainers?...A public figure,neither a writer,politi¬
cian or...Would I know this person by virtue of their - what
do I mean? - primarily their:office?
P In a sense...Certainly by virtue of what this person is...
do Male or female?
P Female.
It can only be the Q,ueen, then?
P No.
What somebody is, who's female.. .Oh, is it a public figure?Yes,
you said that.
P You're not too far off,actually...And it may or may not be
helpful to say she might also for part of the time be con¬
sidered an entertainer,but that's secondary...
A member of the royal family?
£) A member of the royal family.
oi Oh,is there any useful subdivision I can make or do I just
have to ask names?..I can't really think of one.
You've got several questions loft, so you might as well.
O.K..I was trying to think of the most economical way of rou¬





oliFor the most part.
|?) :Do you use it?
otsls that an impersonal 'you'?
:Does one use it - is it an object which is used?
oC :Yes.
^:Does one use it indoors?
o*« :No.
{5 :In the street, as opposed to the countryside? In the street?
c^, • No...
:Not in the street.In the garden?
o^:No.
tin the countryside?
<X:It is in the countryside.
|^:It's in the countryside.Is it static?
^:Yes.
j>7 tit's static.It's not something like an electricity pylon?
oLtWhat do you mean 'like an electricity pylon'?
P :Is it an electricity pylon?
c<:It isn't,no.
^:...it doesn't move...Is it-some form of shelter?or buil¬
ding?
o<, :A building,certainly - in the sense of a structure.
fb ?Yes,that's what I was trying to get at with the electric¬
ity pylon.It's a structure but doesn't" give any shelter.
<x :Yes.
^ :The Forth Bridge?
:Which one?
fb:Oh well,when I was a schoolboy - the one you paint ince¬
ssantly. ..I suppose it's the new one.
d*:No,it's the other one.
:It's the old one,is it?
Game 33
:The first object is vegetable.Almost entirely I would
say,though there may be little mineral bits -
:Sh.'Is it made of wood?
:Indirectly,parts of it.
: Is it made of paper?
:0f a sort.
& j...I'm absolutely blank.'..Is it made of cardboard paper?
^:Yes,I should say so.Principally.
:1s it a box?
j>> :Yes.
^ :Is it a box for - which contains food?
j?> :Er,no.
q( :1s it a box which is a container?
^:Yes.It's a box which contains certain objects.
^:Ah,that's a different question.Is it a container?Such as
the producer of a product would put -
P :Quite,yes,it is.
,3^:...it's a box which is a container...
:And made of cardboard...
: -made of cardboard:a cardboard box.Is it?A large box,is
it more than three feet cube - I mean,side by side by side,
three feet in each dimension?
p:No,it's smaller than that.
o(:Is it more than two by two inches?
^:Probably - no,well,it's round about that,
obit's a small cardboard box which is a container...Does
it contain anything that's used in this department?
:Not by the department as a department.
^:It contains things that might belong to individuals?
(£> :Yes.
: Am I better off looking for the things that belong to the
individuals?
jt> :You're well off enough,I should say J .. .That1 s ten quest¬
ions so far.
^ :More or less.
^:I'm sorry,what was the last question?
^:The last question is:am I - would you kindly advise me
with a yes/no answer - the form of the question is:am I
better off pursuing the contents or the box?No,no -
would I be better off pursuing the contents?
^:I should say so,yes - in the sense that you'd be more
likely to arrive at the kind of box if you pursue the
contents...1'm afraid I'm giving you more information than
the rules of the game permit!
^ :You did say metal,didn't you,might be rattling .about in
it,so it's clearly not something like a matchbox...
:I said mineral,yes.but I may be wrong on that because I
may simply be ignorant.
0^ :It ' s not a matchbox?
ft :3orry?It's not a matchbox,no.No,what I said,I'd better
clarify that point,is that part of the object may be - may
have mineral -
- associations?
j5:-components or associations or -
^:Yould that be to do with things like metal clips on its
edges?
f) : Well, it's that kind of thing, but it's not that in fact.
^lAre the metal -
: I think I must be leading you up the wrong -
:-garden path!
^ the wrong garden path,yes JI wouldn't want you to pursue
the notion of metal too much,0.K.,what I said actually
was mineral.But I may even be wrong about that.I'm quite
ignoranfc about what the source of this particular substa¬
nce is.
:Do you have plastic in mind?
|b sNo.
o( ils it a box such as I would have in my house?
^ :I've no doubt there _is such a box in your house.
cK' Would it contain sane thing which I own?
jjsl'll give you a clue at this point,which Im allowed to
do because it's your fifteenth question.The clue is that
if you think in terms of a particular kind of box for which
we have a separate lexical item in the English language
then this would be exceedingly helpful to you - you might
get it in one.
ok:You mean something like a musical box?-
p : - 'cos there's a speparate lexical item for this - we
have a hyponomous relationship -
(X.:Oh God I
p:and what you are seeking is the subordinate item - I
should say,though it nouM be arguable...Let me recap:
it's a box which is a container which a manufacturer puts
things in and if you think of boxes which manufacturers
put things in then characteristically we don't call them
•boxes',we call them something else,and -
:Oh God.'
jjt :And I think if you could somehow dig out this pseudo-hy-
ponomous expression,vim. * .It1 s a matter of collocation.
c*:Yes,well,I'm clearly walking up so many wrong paths;I do
think this is nicer when you have a team!...A less than
two inches square container made of cardboard,which is not
called a box...
^>:And which has specific things inside it.
^rAnd which has specific things inside it.And clearly it
doesn't contain food of any sort.
^:It doesn't contain food.
c^:So it's not a 'Smarties' packet - that isn't a question.
^>:I take that as a question.
oL :It isn't a questionlYou said it didn't have anything to
do with food so I know it's not a 'Smarties" packet.
:O.K.But if the question is 'is it a packet rather than
a box?'the answer to that question is 'yes' - and I'm
putting it down for another question.
cAsYes,can it be a cigarette packet?A packet of cigarettes?
p :Which particular packet of cigarettes?
^:0h...Which particular packet of cigarettes?I bet people
who smoke do it fourteen times as rapidly as people who
don'tl...A'Benson and Hedges' packet of cigarettes?
P?:I don't think it's a generic particular,but which part¬
icular particular?
^:Whose packet of cigarettes?
a : Well,your last question - you're on yuur last question:
this is question twenty.You actually have to guess now
the particular packet_of cigarettes.
<p<:The packet of cigarettes which is over there, (points)
Game 3U-
& :Well,I believe it has to be animal.
^ :Ah,I've got to ask you questions.
:The roles are reversed.
:1s what it is made of a significant fact in determining
what this object is?
:What an impossible question.'Well,yes. I suppose the answer
is 'yes'.
^ :1s it made of some sort of - transformed animal product?
Like ,for instance,butter is a transformed animal product.
Or is it some direct animal product like a skin or a horn
or something of that sort?
& :Which question are you asking?
:Well,it's a yes/no question,I mean,so -(laughs)Is it a
transformed animal product like butter?
c< :No,it's not transformed like butter.
; Is it therefore something made from some surface part of
sn animal?
:I suppose the answer is 'yes'.But it might be a mislead¬
ing answer.
^ :Would you like to develop that?
0^ :Not at all.'(laughs)
p :...some surface part of an animal...Is it something people
consume?
^ : No,people don't consume it.
p :1s it something people use as an implement?
q^iNo,people do not typically use it as an implement.
$:Is it something people use out of necessity or in order
to make their lives more comfortable?
o<;Out of necessity,
p :Is it to do with clothing?
<^:No,it's not to do with clothing.
p;:Is it to do with transport?
of :It's not to do with transport.What an excellent question-
asker you are.How quickly they flow.
^ :...Well,I'm stumped.(laughter)
:That's eight.
|3 :That's eight;how alarming.I must recap a bit.It's animal;
it's in direct link with the animal,it's not some totally
transformed product.lt's not to do with transport and it's
not to do with food and not to do with clothing - you did
say it's not to do with clothing,didn't you?
:I don't know I (laughs)
pslt's obviously not -...and it's a matter of necessity,not
of luxury.And it's to do with the surface of the - it comes
from the surface of the animal, rather than its innards -
though you hedged a bit on that one,Perhaps we're in the
are*of fat,blubber,sub-cutaneous matter of some sort - are
we?Are we super- or sub-cutaneous?Are we sub-cutaneous?
oC :Yes...Well,it's not possible to answer that question wik
thout being misleading.Yes or no.I shan't count it.(laugh-
ter]feoth' is the answer.So I shall jolly well have that -
and I'm not sure I shan't have it twice,answering 'yes'
to both parts.' '• "
^ :Is it to do with hair?
o(:No,it's not to do with hair.
p:Or anything like hair?- and that's the same question,
gilt's not at all the same questioniWhat is 'like hair'?
^ :I was thinking of fur.
^:It•s not fur.
p :Pilum generally?(laughter)
o< :No,it's not that either.
-p ;That was purely anaphoric,it had no substanceJYou can
cross that out.
c£:O.K.I'll take that away.You've now had eleven.
(etc.'fThe object was the questioner's noseyriot guessed.)
Game 35
c*. Animal.




p Do you find it in this country?
ck Yes.
^ Is it domestic?
oC No....
£ Well,domestic in the broadest sense - domestic in the sense
of not necessarily you keep (it) in your home,but not wild.
o<. Er,I think I'll say no,otherwise I'll put you off the track
unfairly.




(i Does it have a tail?
0( No.
And it doesn't have two legs...Does it have four legs?
CK No.
Does it come into the insect category?
ot No.
ft Hasn't it any legs at all?
cA, Correct - it has no legs.
p, Ah - it has no legs...and a particular kind of terrain...
Something like an earthworm?
cK. No.
p Does it come out of its habitat in certain conditions?
No.I think I'll warn you even at this stage that you're
not getting onto the right track,
f So it's something that comes from an animal,not an animal
itself?
It's not an animal itself.
P No.It's a product of animal...
No,it's not a product of an animal...
It's not animal itself and it's not a product of an animal...
^ It's not an animal itself.
£ Not an animal itself but it is animal...Do human beings do
anything with it - do they use it for anything?
^ I must answer yes there,they do.
j} Reluctantly.
o» I'll give you a clue...I want to give you a clue without
being too obvious...Humans do something with it...What can
I give you as a clue?...Perhaps this might make it easy,but
I think I'll give it to you.Don't think of a whole item.
£ Oh...And it's not the product of an animal. . .either that ±.he
animal produces it - or that man extracts it from the animal...
No.
Glory bei And it's part of something...Anything connected with
clothing?
ci No...But in a sense you're getting warm.
Ah.Not clothing....To do with furniture?
o( No,,.
Have you got one?
0( Yes I have.
jj Do you think I've got one?
You certainly have.That's nineteen so you've got to guess
now.I"'ll give you one very generous clue,O.K.?Every person
in the world has one.
p Good griefI...This is only part of it...
o< Well,what it is is identifiable,but it belongs to a whole. •
p Is it one's hair for example?
oi No,but you've got very near.It's your nose.
Game 36
(j?> :It's vegetable.I beg your pardon - it's a mixture of
vegetable and mineral.
dsiA mixture of vegetable and mineral.Is it then a product?
(p :Yes it is.
0^ :Is it something we eat?
§ :No.
^{Is it something we wear?
:No,it isn't.
:ls it something that we use in the house?-in the widest
sense?
:No.
:...not something we eat,not something we wear,not used in
the house...Does it have any industrial or commercial use?
p, :Use,no.
c^zSo if it has no actual use - is it something purely dec¬
orative?
^ :No,it isn't.
^:Is it functional in any way?
^sYes.Well,you could say it was function al,yes - perhaps not
in the strictest sense,but in tie broadest sense,yes...But
I might be misleading you saying that...
:You said it was both - or a mixture of - vegetable and
mineral -
:Yes,but concentrate on the vegetable.
C>(. : Ah, quite - I needn't ask that question now.'Does it stem
largely from some thing grown?
: Yes, it does.
^:Does it need to be processed before we have it?
p:Yes,it does.
<^:Is it found in every country?
j2j :Yes, it is*
c^:Do we see it every day around in the streets?
j]?:0h yes - well,this particular object,no.The object in
general,yesjthe specific object on the paper,no...1've
given you quite a clue there.
0( :You have,have you?Thank youJI must try and interpret that J
^ :A specific one of a kind.Try and sort of localise your
questions...
c/ :Do we see this - inside buildings?
:Mm...
C^:Is it a necessary part?
^ :No.
p{:...inside and it's not decorative and not basically fun¬
ctional. ..
p:No...
0^:Do people have it?
:0oh...Do people have it?
^tLet's ask a different questionrdo people have it unintent¬
ionally?
:No.
oC:Is it something we buy?
tjb'- Yes.
^Is it something we use to make another product?
ft :N°.
^:How many questions is that?
|5:That's fourteen.Try and localise your questions geogra¬
phically.
:Right.Is this limited to certain climates?
£ :0h no.When I say 'geographically' I don't mean in the
world sense.
#:A much more local sense...in a building...Is it found
only in one part?
£,:Well,this particular one is only in one part,yes.
_^:Is it something we use at all in building?In actually
constructing?
|^:No?no.. .That' s seventeen.Oh dear,what can I - apart from
telling you to sort of -
c^: - tell me""Ywhat it is -
:-bring your] --urn.. .What else can I say?I think you'd need
to look about you...
tX:Is it in terms of history a fairly recent product?
:No.
:No?
^:'In terms of history' depends on how far back you take
history.
^:Twenty,fourty years,something like that.
£>:0h no...Eighteen....1'11 tell you:it's in this room.
o(:It's in this room?
:You've got two to go.
^:Two more.
frit's vegetable and it's processed - and it's got a little
mineral in it.
0^:Most things seem to me to have a very clear function...
God...I'm really stuck...Do we use it for writing in any
way?
£) :No. • .You've got one question:You're at nineteen.
o<:I've done nineteen - or eighteen?
P:Done nineteen,yes.One to go.
okil'm supposed to guess, aren't I, in fact, in that case?
:Yeah.. .It' s not British.
o< :I suppose there's that -(taps something;laughs)Certainly
not vegetable though...Oh God,I don't know - rubber?
|t:No.It's the packet of cigarettes on the tableJThere was
I moving my bag and the batteries so that it wouldn't -
the line of vision wouldn't be obstructediWere my answersi
misleading?
d :No,no,I don't think so,um...
pi'Cos I wouldn't -.It is functional in a certain sense,but
not in the normal sense of the word 'functional'.
£K:No,I think that's perfectly reasonable.I should have got
from,urn...I suppose what put me off was 'decorative'.1 mean,
what put me off in a sense when I asked the question was,
I mean,I ruled out,I tended to rule out anything we do that
is not functional,you see.
^ :Ah - sort of considering -
diClothes and luxury things like that.No,I think the ques¬
tion was a fair- .I've done this game quite a lot,but only
with people.I should have got that.
:Do you think I should have given you more help?
c*:No,I mean what could you say?'People put them in their
mouth' would be a fairly obvious clue.
:When I said that it was in this room I thought that surely
must lead you on - mind you it's fairly squashed - and it1s
only got one cigarette in iti
Game 37
: Animal.
|^:Is the animal human?
:Yes.
^:Is the animal - is the human male?
^:No.




pftDo you or I know her personally?
:No.
fl?: Is it a well-known person?
c(:Yes.
ft :1s it Margaret Thatcher?
o( iNo.
j^:Is she British?
• Ye s •
j^:Is she a celebrity of what one might call show busine
as say films,theatre and so on?
<?(:No.
(j^:Is she involved in any way in politics, even remotely?
o{ :No-
^:Is it the Queen?
cK :No»
: Is it Princess Margaret ?
A :No.
jly : Is it Princess Anne?
 
Game 38
|^;The object is mineral.
o^:Is it made from a raw mineral product - in other words,is
the finished article made of something different from the
raw mineral?
{i; Can't understand the question -not precise enough,
c*! Well,say plastic,for instance,is not what I would call a
raw mineral.The answer would then have been 'no' if it was
a plastic pen or something like that.
Yes,I see...I'm not quite sure if I still see.I've still not
pinned down-
Just forget it and we'll -
Just forget the quest ion,right.. .1 'm not quite sure what you
mean by 'made from'...
otIs it an instrument of some kind?
No.
oCJls it something found in every country in the world virtually?
This is a specific object,remember - (I) won't count that
one as a question.You'd forgotten the rules,
at.*,Is the specific object to be found in Scotland?
£>;Yes.
cOls it specific by dint of belonging to a particular person?
For example - a particular Scottish M.P.'s ball-point pen?
(b'.No,no.It doesn't belong to any person or family or anything
like that.
oC%Is it a well-known landmark or symbol or sign?
Uh...I think you could say yes, it's one of those,yes.
!X',Is it large?
jt'. Very.
<X'„Is it either in Edinburgh or within a fifteen mile radius of
Edinburgh?
It is.
ctfls it a bridge?
Ye s.
dtfls it one of the two Forth bridges?
f>' Yes.
<*',Is it the rail bridge?
fc;It is.We11 done,that's very quick - in fact you crossed
oCit before you got there.That's nine.
Game 39
jx, :Animal.
oC : Human animal?
py.Yes.
o(.5Part or whole of a human animal?
Whole.
«^:Male or female?Sorry,this has got to be yes/no.Male?
^ sNo.
c( s...specific person...A member of the department?
£ sNo.
ol :By 'member of (the) department I meant either as a lecturer
or as a student.
^ :No.Question number six.
:1s this a celebrity?
:From television?Nope...Probably has been on television
though.
<31, :But is not a -
:No.
:By that you mean does not appear regularly on television?
£ :Yes.
:Sportsperson?
P :No...You've had eight questions.
:1s it a person of similar standing to a member of the
royal family?
pi • Ye s...
^:Is it the Queen?
£:No.
j, : Oh, shit...
:The previous question is a bit difficult to answer in
fact.
ot :OhJ
^ :Perhaps you could rephrase it -not 'is it the Queen1,
the one before that.
st:Well,is it a member of the royal family?
:Yes.
d:But it's not the Queen...and it's female...
^ :Come on,this is limited.'
si :1s it Princess Anne?
^lYesJEleven questions that was.
Game lj-0
(X Mineral.
Q Is it made of metal?
c* Yes.
Is it in this room?
No.
(?> Is it a specific named object ? -with a name, as opposed to
a thing like a tape-recorder...
o<. Do you mean - ?
Like 'David's hat',right?
C/i It is one specific one,yes.
Q Which is recognizable from the name?
o( Yes.
Is it a piece of machinery?
oC No,you wouldn't really call it that.
£> Is it in the department?
c< No.
Ah...Completely Made of metal?
o< I don't know for certain,but you can take it as 'yes',
t Is it small enough to carry?




Can you live in it?
oC No.
pj Is it a means of transport?
<4 No.
And it's not machinery?
It's not machinery.
^> Is it pretty?
oi You mean do I think it' s pretty?




^ Is this in Edinburgh?
^ Strictly,no...
£ Does it move about?
No.
£> Is it outside Edinburgh?In sort of - around Edinburgh
somewhere?
C* Yes.
£ Is it bigger than a house?
Ck Yes.
0 (I) probably don't know what it is -if it's anything...
o( No,I'm sure you know it.
(5 And it' s not a building?
o( No.
£> Yes,you said that before.So it's made of metal,it's not a
building...Did you say it was functional or pretty?
Functional.
It's not a vehicle,not a piece of machinery,it's completely
made of metal,it doesn't move about,and it's near Edinburgh...
d Yes.
Sure it doesn't move about?
ci Yes.Positive.
(I) give up, can't think what it is I...You can't get inside
it?...Is it for getting inside?
o* No.
£ Is it solid?
cs( If you define solid a bit more-
|2> I mean,is it a solid lump of metal - like a house?
o( Er,yes,er...
Is it tall and thin?
o( It "a tal1 • #«thin...
^ Have I seen it ?
Yeah,I'm sure you must have.
P> Is it some kind of radio pylon or something like that?A
television thing?
o( It's not a radio pylon,no.
I mean,is it some kind of transmitting thing or - or a super-
structure made of bits of metal?
o( It's a kind of construction like a - yes.
Like a pylon?
o( Yes?..
Is it north or south of Edinburgh?
North...
^ The bridge!
oi. It is a bridge,yes.. .
|£ Well,what's it called?The bridge like this (gesture)?0r that
one(gesture)?
Yeah!
$ The suspension bridge?
ot No.
j>> The other one - the railway bridge?
C<, O.K. .The Forth rail bridge.
Game lj.1
ai :It1 s mineral.
£>:Is it pure mineral?
c<:I should think - yes.
p> :Has the mineral been through any sort of process?
; Ye s.




* Very solid?Gome on... So it isnjt porcus or something?
^ sNo.
:That wasn't a question.
oi:0.K.S6 that's four.
|3:O.K....so it's solid and it's mineral.Is it coal?
ert :1s it coal?No.
:Is it some kind of metal?
J. : Ye s.
^ :1s it used in this room?
oi :No.
|j :1s it used for construction?
J :The object already exists for a certain purpose...
^ :Ah...
o(:Clue:in other words the object made of mineral substance
exists for a certain purpose somewhere in the world.
(£> :I see,right.Is it a machine?
sA :No.
:...and it \ s mineral and it's very solid...Heavens.
^:There's only one.
:Only one in the world.
o< : Yes, there' s only one in the world.
£j:There's only one in the world??My goodness.
:Yes,there1s only one.This particular object is one thing.
£?:Oh,I see...Have you seen it?
:Yes.
^ :Do you see it often?
cK : Ye ah... What do you mean by 'often'?
:Do you see it every day?
oi :No.
^ :Is it a building?
^\j,
4 :No.
p :That was a qualified 'no'.'... It' s not a building,'it' s
been as a very solid object...Is it a road?
<s<:No.
p :...it's not a machine,so it can't be a car or anything...
can't be a heater or anything...not in this room,so it's
not tables and chairs...I think I'm stuck....and it's
mineral and it's been processed...
o( 5Do you want another clue?I probably see it once every few
months.
|j:Once every few months...and it's not a machine...Does it
stay in the same place?
Yes.
: (laughs) Very solid and it stays in the same placeJAnd
it's not a building?.,.What else stays in the same place?
«.:Oh,lots of things...
^.:Not many things,most things are moving.. .What about a
siulpture of some kind?
o( : No. Sculpture in the sense of art form,no.
£)jSo it's not an 'art form'.
oC 5No.
Sculpture can be in another sense,can it?
Don't take that as any kind of a hint,it'11 just mis¬
lead you.
jjjSl don't think it really matters, any kind of leading,whe¬
ther it's misleading or - (laughs)You're welcome!...Is it
a bell of some kind?
c<:No.
^:No,that would be a machine,wouldn't it,sort of...It's not
an art form,so it's a non-art form...It's not a construc-
tion - didn't you say it wasn't a construction?
c* :No,I didn't say it wasn't a construction,
p; :11 jls, a construction?
lYes,
Jit's not an art form - it could be that monstrosity at
the top of Leith Walk,which is decidedly not an art form.
: (laughs)
:But you laughed so I won't ask that question!
^(jThat's a sneaky way of getting a question answs red!
:This is too difficult for me.
o^:Do ymu want another clue?
^ :Is it a harbour or something?J
o(:Very close - you're getting there.
jLeith docks?
^jNo^.Tou pass over it.






$ :George the Fourth Bri
oONoJWhat's it made of?
p:The Forth Bridge?
c^:The Forth Rail Bridge
Game U-2.
$> It is animal,
d Is it non-human?
(£> No.
o( That means it's human...Is it a person,an individual person?
J> Yes.
oi Is it someone you and I knows - know,you and I know?(1aughs)
f Oh dear, quite; a grammatical error to go on tape I
Shows you're being natural!...Not personally.
So it's someone that we know but we've never met?
Probably.
Are you sure I've never met this person?
^ Pretty sure.
qI Is the nationality of this person Western?That is,American






d. Is this person well known to many other people?
Yes.
ok Is he a political figure?
Mmmnl.. .
cKls he or she a political figure?
No.
^ Oh - is it a man or a woman - is it a man?
^ No.
It's a woman,then.
£> Yes.You been keeping count?
ok No.
£> Call it ten,then.
ck British,known to many people...but not politics...Is this
person's occupation in the field of entertainment?
Not really...
ok But almost?...Entertainmait meaning very widely anything to
do with the media at all,as well as acting and musicianship
and stuff...
$ This person could be involved with the media...
ck Could be involved with the media...
^ Often is involved with the media,
ck Often is involved with the media.
Is this person an employee of the B.B.C.?
j2> I don't think so.'(laughs)
ck Oh dear,what does that mean?
Q No,I don't think so.
ck Is it a sports personality?
ck Is it Princess Anne?
Yes.'What a flash in the dark J
GAME 43(Russian.)
<X :Eto iz zhivotnovo mira? (Is it animal?)
f sDa. (Yes.)
oi :£to chelovek? (Is it a human being?)
p :Da. (Yes. )
:Chelovek kotory zdes v etom pomeshchenii? (A human being here in this room'
P sNet. (No.)
ot,;Chelovek kotorovo ya znayu? (A human being I know?)
J3 :Gm.. .Nemnozhko.Vozmozhno. (Hm. ..A little .Possibly. )
o<:0n v toy laboratorii? (Is he in the laboratory there?)
p :Net. (No.)
o( :Eto nash znakomy? (Is he an acquaintance of ours?)
p I Net. (No.)
:Eto znamenity chelovek"? (Is it a famous person?)
P jlzvestny. (Well-known.)
(Xilzvestny v oblasti iskustva? (Well-known in the field of art?)
P ;Net. (No.)
U. :V oblasti politiki? (In the field of politics?)
jb sNet. (No.)
qL :Tak eto prostoy chelovek? (So it's an ordinary person?)
p : - no izvestny. ( - but well-known.)
:0n russky? (Is he Russian?)
p lNet. (No.)
d ;Anglichanin? (An Englishman?)
p :Da. (Yes.)
^ :0n sovremenny? (Is he a contemporary?)
p :Da. (Yes.)
:Eto kto-nibud iz moevo nachalstva? (Is it one of my superiors?)
P :Net...Vyshe. (No...Higher.)
c< : Vyshe ... iz moevo nachalstva.. .Tak,mozhet byt,etorZ'? (Higher.. .one of nty
superiors...So,perhaps it's 'X'?)
P :Eto vashe nachalstvo - ya skazala "net'. (That's your superior - I said
•no'.)
o< sNet.Vy skazali 'vyshe'. (No.You said 'higher'.)
p :Eshcho vyshe. (Still higher.)
d JTogda eto raozhet byt v pravitelstve? (Then he could be in the government
:Ne sovsem. (Not altogether.)
0^ :Ne sovsem?Kto-zhe eto mozhet byt? (Not altogether?Who on earth could it
be? )
p> :Kto vyshe pravitelstva? (Who is higher than the government?)
erf :Vyshe pravitelstva kto mozhet byt?!Vyshe pravitelstva kazhetsa nikto ne
mozhet byt, (Who could be higher than the government?!here would seem
to be no-one higher than the government.)
p :V Anglii2 (In England?)
^:V Anglii?Vyshe pravitelstva?AlMozhet byt eto odna iz tsarstvuyushchich
osob? (In England?Higher than the government?Ah!Perhaps it's one of the
members of the ruling family?)
p:Vot imenno. (Exactly.)
di :Tak >mozhet ,eto koroleva sama? (So perhaps it's the Queen herself?)
p jNet.Radom. (No.Next to her.)
:Radom s ney - eto Prints?Edinburgsky? (Next to her - is it the Prince -
of Edinburgh?)
p rNet.Eshche radom. (No.Somebody else next to her)
ds :Mozhet eto £ama Printsessa Anna? (Perhaps it's Princess Anne herself?)
p:Printsessa Anna. (Princess Anne.)
Game ^(Russian)
rMineralnoe veshchesttoo? (Mineral?)
o( :Da kak vam skazat?Pozhaluy ne mineralnoe - rastitelnoe. (What
should I say?I soppuse it's not mineral,but vegetable.)
^:Vnutri?V dome,v pomeshchenii? (Indoors?In the home,in the
flat?)
d :Da. (Yes.)
^;V pomeshchenii...Dver? (Indoors...A door?)
<^,:Net. (No.)
:...mineralnoe - (...mineral? ,)
^:Rastitelnoe. (Vegetable.)
p:Rastitelnoe...Evo edyat ili poyut? (Vegetable...Is it eaten
or drunk?)
O^sNet. (No.)
^:Ne poyut...A - nosyat na sebe? (Not drunk...Ah - is it worn?
^:Net. (No.)
p, :Na nyem pishut? (Is it written on?)
£:Net. (No.)
;Ne edyat,ne poyut,ne pishut,ne nosyat...rastitelnoe vnutri
doma...Tsvetok v gorshke? (Not eaten,not drunk,mot written
on,not worn...vegetable,indoors...A flower in a pot?)
<A:Net. (No.)
^ :Yolka? (A Christmas tree?)
^L:Net. (No.)
^:Na nyom sidyat? (Is it for sitting on?)
o[ :Net,Na nyom ne sidyat. (No.It's not for sitting on.)
^ :Za nim sidyat?(Is it for sitting behind/at?)
cK:I za nim ne sidyat. (Nor is it for sitting behind/at.)
: Gospodi, gospodi, gospodi.. .Na stene? (Heavens, heavens above...
Is it on the wall?)
ot.:Net. (No.)
^5 :Na po lu? (On the floor?)
ot:Net. (No.)
^:Na potolke? (On the ceiling?)
^:Net. (No.)
|i>:Bolshe negde.'...na polu net.. . vnutri. . .Evo izpolzuet na - Iz
chevo on sdelan -iz dereva? (There isn't anywhere else J...
not on the floor...indoors...Do people use it for - What
is it made from - from wood?)
:Net.Ne iz dereva...A po-moemy on ne v kazhdom dome,potomu eto
tak - v obshche - (No.Not from wood...As far as 1 know it's
not found in every house,so it's - in general - )
:Ne v kazhdom dome? (Not in every house?)
^:Da.Nado byle bolee konkretirovat vashi voprosy. (Yes.You
should make your questions more specific.)
jb :A - v etoy komnate? (Ah - in this room?)
^:Konechno...potomu chto eto legche budet...(Of course...so it
should be easier (now)...)
^ :V etoy komnate rastitelnovo ochen malo.. .Ko;fe? (There's not
much vegetable in this room...The coffee?)
ck :Net. : (No. )
p,:Chto-zhe zdes eshcho rastitelnoe?...Ghernila? (what else
vegetable is there here?...The ink?)
^:Net. (No.)
jl) : Sigarety? (The cigarettes?)
0^ :Mm.Pachka sigaret,esli mozhno - ('Mm.The packet of cigarette
if you can
|i :PachkaI (The packet.')
Game L|_5(Russian)
^ :Eto chelovek? (Is it a human being?)
p :Net. (No.)
o< :Eto obyekt? (Is it an object?)
:Obyekt. (an object.)
J, : Obyekt... Skazhite - on v etoy komnate? (An ob ject. . .Tell
me - is it in this room?)
:Net. (No. )
qS:V mire? (In the world?)
j>>:V mire.Dazhe blizhe. (In the world.Even nearer.)
kakoy-to konkretnoy strane? (In some concrete country?)
p :Da. (Yes;)
^:V kakoy-to strane konkretnoy...On v Britanii? (In some con¬
crete country...Is it in Britain?)
:Da. (Yes . )
<^:V Britanii...znachit - chelovek,vy skazali - (In Britain...
that means - it's a human being,you said -)
:Net,netJ (No,no.')
<^:...obyekt v Britanii...On nachoditsa v Londone? (...an object
in Britain...Is it in London?)
£ :Net. (No.)
,^:Eto zdanie? (Is it a building?)
p:Ne sovsem.Eto postroeno,no ne zdanie. (Not quite.It's
constructed,but not a building.)
ojrEto postroeno no ne zdanie.Skazhite - eto v Shotlandii? (It's
constructed but not a building.Tell me - is it in Scotland?)
:Da. (Yes. )
i Postroeno - skazhite - eto v Edinburge? (Is it a construction,
tell me,in Edinburgh?)
p :Da. (Yes. )
o( :Eto starinnoe chto-to postroennoe? (Is it some kind of ancient
construction?)
£>:Net.Ne ochen. (No.Not very.)
^:Postroeno - skazhite nu - postroeno eto dla tsarstvuyushchey
osoby? (Was it built - tell me now - was it built for a
ruler?)
;Net. (No. )
b^:Eto muzey kakoy-nibud? (Is it some sort of museum?)
jj!> :Net .Postroeno dla vsech. (No.It was built for everyone.)
o(:Postroeno dla vsech - most? (Built for everyone - a bridge?)
:Most.Da.Kakoy most? (A bridge.Yes.Which bridge?)
d:Kakoy most?North Bridge? (Which bridge?North Bridge?)
^ :No. (No.)
^:South Bridge? (South Bridge?)
(Jj :Net (No.)
^:Znaete,ya nazvaniy vsech etich - ne znayu,no most kotory
idyot paralelno North Bridge - vot tarn gde-to po seredine
Princes Street. (You know,I don't know the names of all
those - ,but the bridge which goes parallel to North Br¬
idge - somewhere there around the middle of Princes Street.)
^ :Eto most bolshe chem North or South.On izpolzuetsa v drugich
tselach. (It's a bridge bigger than North or South Bridge.
It has a different function.)
£ :Bolshe?Most? (Bigger?A bridge?)
£:0n ne vnutri goroda... (It's not inside the city...)
^sNe vnutri goroda. .. vnutri saraov<? goroda... (Not inside the
city... inside the city itself...)
^:Ne vnutri goroda. (Not inside the city.)
d\:Da,no vidite,ya zatrudnayus potom chto ne znayu nazvaniy
etich bolshich mostov v Shotlandii,vne goroda...(Yes,but
you see,I'm having trouble because I don't know the names
of those big bridges in Scotland,out side the city...)
:Da,no dla chevo on mozhet izpolzovatsa yesli on ne dla
peshechodov? (Yes,but what could it be used for if not
for pedestrians?)
0(1 :Yesli ne dla peshechodov verno tolko dla bolshovo transport-
novo dvizhenia. (if not for pedestrians then it can only be
for heavy transport.)
|>:Da eshcho? (What else?)
:Transportnovo dvizhenia i zheleznodorozhnovo dvizhenia...
(Transport or railway...)
:Tak, tak... (Right, right...)
C*:Znachit eto bolshoy zheleznodorozhny most. (So it's a big
rail bridge?)
^:Bolshoy zheleznodorozhny most.A nakvanie yevo vy ne znaete?
(A big rail bridge.But don't you know its name?)
<^:I ya yevo tozhe ne znala.Tak-zhe. (I didn't know its name
either.Nor that.)
... I on nachoditsa Ysfje goroda,vy skazali. .. (. . and you said
it's outside the city...)
:Po-moemy,da. (In my opinion,yes. )
:Nu,vsyo ravno - budete schitat^. chto ya yevo otgadala.
(Well,all the same,you can say that I guessed it.)
:Otgadali.Eto Forth Bridge. (You guessed it.It's the Forth
Bridge.)
Game L|_6(Russian)
p :Chelovek? (A human being?)
oC:Ne sovsem. (Not exactly.)
^ :Zver? (A wild animal?)
:Nu, znaete - zachem v takuyu kraynost? (Now,look - why (go)
to such extremes?)
Zhivotnoe,zhivotnoe - no pochti chelovek. (Animal,animal -
but almost a human being.)
p :Obezyana? [aii ape?)
ot :Nu chto vy - net.Eto chast cheloveka ya by skazala... (Co¬
me off it - no.I'd say it's a part of a human being...)
P :Chast cheloveka... t.elo?Chast tela cheloveka? (Part of a
human being...the body?Part of the human body?)
Chast tela cheloveka. (Part of the human body.)
:Chast tela cheloveka...ich ne tak mnogo...dvadtsat vopro-
sov...Noga? (Part of the human body...there are not so
many of them...twenty questions...A leg?)
</s:Net. (No. )
Jj, :Ruka? (An arm?)
^. :Vy sobiraetes v obshche govorit ob etom?- kak chasti tela
v obshche? (Are you going to talk all about that? -what
parts of the body there are?)
p :(laughs) Nu ya sobirayus vge chasti tela perechislit. (Well,
I shall go through every part of the body.)
:Ne mozhet vpast v oshibkui (Impossible to go wrongi)
p :Golova? (The head?)
b( ;Net ,ne sovsem. (No.Not quite.)
^:Ne sovsem golova... (Not quite the head.)
Ci. :No ochen blizko. (But very close.)
:Mozg? (The brain?)
c^:Net. (No.)
j^sBlizko golovy byvayut ushi - ushi? (Near the head are
the ears - ears?)
<3^ :Net.Ne ushi. (No.Not the ears.)
£>:Mm...Eto telo,eto ne organ,net?Ghast tela... (Hm...it's the
_ body,not an organ,isn't it?Part of the body...)
^jEto teplo,sovsem teplo - potom sovsem zharko.. .(That ' s warm,
very warm - then really hot...)
:. .. golova... i esli eto ne ushi no na golove;byvayut eshcho
nos i rot...(...the head...and if it's not the ears, but on
head/there are still the nose and the mouth...)
o(;Vy sobirates srazu sprashivat? (Are you going to ask(it)
right away?)
P» :Nos? (The nose?)
o( :Nos,da.Teper kakoy nos,da? (The nose,yes.Now which nose,
O.K.?)
:Esli nos pravilno eto konets,ili ne konets? (If the nose
is correct it's the end,or isn't it?)
^:Eshcho nado otgadat,ochevidno,i chey nos. (You've still
got to guess whose nose,obviously.)
:Nos - yevony?*-( laughs) (That bloke's nose?)
of :Net,ne yevony. (No,not his.)
:Moy nos? (My nose?)
^:Da. (Yes.)
-"-Pointing at M.P. through studio window (the possesssive
adjective used is highly colloquial)
Game li7(Eskimo)
jUumasoq. (Animal.)
:Kalaallit nunaanni uumasuuva? (Does it live in Greenland?)
oi jNaamik. (No. )
:Qallunaat nunaanni? (In Denmark?)
<a : Aap. (Yes. )
(J) : Illumi uumasuuva? (Does it live in a house?)
(A : Illumi uumasuunngilaq. .. ((It) doesn't live in a house...)
^ :Orpippassuini uumasuuva? (Does it live in the woods?)
oC :Naamik. (No. )
:Inuk? (A human being?)
: Inuk. Aap. (A human being, yes.)
:Kalaaleq? (A Greenlander?)
iNaamik. (No.)
{> :Qallunaaq? (A Dane?)
£ :Aap. (Yes.)
£ ilmmaqa illit?* (You perhaps?)
o( :Naamik - uvanga qallunaanngilanga.' (No - I'm not a Dane))
jbiArnaava? (Is it a woman?)
<3(:Aap. (Yes.)
^ lUlluinnarni atiuva? (Is it a name (heard) everyday?)
oi, : Aap. (Yes.)
^:Inuk tusaamasaava? (A famous person?)
:Mm. (Mm. )
p :Atuartartoq? (A writer?)




jb lUveqarpa? (Does she have a husband?)
c*.: Aap. (Yes. )
(-* is half Danish)
^ :Meeraqarpa? (Does she have any children?)
d :Aap. (Yes.)
;K^benhavnimiuva? (Does she live in Copenhagen?)
U. : Aap. (Yes. )
P :Qitittoq? (A dancer?)
c( :Naamik. (No . )
:...isikkua...Pualasoq? (...her appearance...Is she fat?)
o( :Naamik. (No. ) .
p iMe era inuusussuuva? (Is her child very young?)
(J\ :Naamik. (No. )
p,:Ilinniartitsisoq? (A teacher?)
oi, :Naamik. (No. )
:. . .suna, suna?.., (...what is it,what is it?...)
cf( : Nukappiarai marluk.. . aamma pingaartut ilai... ((She has)
two boys...also important people...)
^ :AaJDronning Inge - Dronning Margrethe?(laughs) (Ah J Queen
Inge - Queen Margrethe?)
c* :Aap.' (Yesi )
Game l+S
jb :This one is mineral.
o(:Is it within this room?
^ :No.
oC :1s it something you would find anywhere?
^ sNo.
Would you normally find it on a street?.. .Would you norma¬
lly expect to find it on a street?
^ :No.




c*:But that wouldn't be the usual place you would find it?
^? « « . . Ye s.
^:Does it exist in water?
:No.
^:Is it a man-made object?
^>:Yes...It exists in the country,but the country could manage
without it, and it isn't _in water but is connected with water.
^:Would you normally expoct to find it on a farm?
p>:No.
<^:Is it connected with human-beings existing in the country¬
side?
£?:Don't get mislaid - I mean misled! - by the countryside.
o(:You're talking about the country in general rather than
the countryside...or out of town...
:(laughs)a bit difficult. ..It ' s out of Edinburgh.
cH, :Does it exist by the sea more,normally?or by fresh water?
^ :It exists by the sea.
c^:Would you expect to see it in a seaside village or town?
^:In a specific seaside village or town,yes.




:1s it a bridge?
$5 :Yes.








c<:(laughs)I've forgotten what it's called.
^ :It's not the Kincardine Bridge.
c*.:That's the one I was trying to rememberi..Is it on the
East coast?
:Yes.In your questions you've been next door to it.
:The Forth Rail Bridge?



















Sort of animal with vegetable trimmings,that sort of thing?
Animal and vegetable.
Is the vegetable wood?
No.
Right.Is it a piece of furniture?
No.
Is there one in this room? - "
No.
Do I or you own one?
No.
Is it decoration - or decorative?
No;t principally. ..
Is it bigger than the T.V.?
No.
Would you like to own one?
I wouldn't mind...
But I'd like it more...
Yes.




Is the mineral -
p :I didn't say minera^Animal and vegetable.
<X :Yeah,sorry,I meant vegetable.Is the vegetable some kind of
plant?- including does it come from a plant?
^ :Yes.
cA :And is it only that part that gets consumed?
f> :No.
A :1s it edible?
^ :Yes.
<A :Have I eaten any in the last week?
:No.
<A:Is it something I've eaten in the list year?
:Yes.
c^;is it something one would eat at a restaurant rather than
at home - I'.mean for us?
:For us in particular,I suppose so.
cA :. . .This is difficult.. .Is it a savoury dish?
:No.
ol :Is it a sweet?
^,:Yes.Two left.
^lO.K.jlet me recap and think out loud a bit.Animal and veg-
etablejthe vegetable -I mean all,of it- is consumable...1've
had some this year - but not recently,this last week...It' s
a sweet,not savoury...It's between the size of my fist and
the T.V.(laughs)If I eat it I don't suppose that helps much
actually.'...And it's something we rather tend to eat at a
restaurant than at home...A sweet,gosh,I don't eat many sw¬
eets... I mean it could either be - let me think out loud a .
bit - a pie,or an ice-cream,or fruit or - some kind of Ita¬
lian speciality - zabaglione(laughs)...Wait,that's vegetable,
the ice-cream,mineral -
: You've got two left, come on, stop thinking out loudlYou're
not going to get it.
^sil'm not going to get it?O.K.,is it something that we've had
at friends' at a dinner party and we've talked about after¬
wards or mentioned?
^:No...I was only saying you wouldn't get it because you only
had two left and you were still thinking out loud.
^ :Here's my bonus question:is it something you prefer -I mean
rather than me?
^:0.K.,here's my real final questionsis it sweets, chocolate
or something in that line?
|jb:Sort of .Right .Twenty one .Finished.Do you want to switch off
arid carry on guessing?
ck :I don't want to switch it off at all.
:A11 right.Garry on guessing,but you've had twenty one.
c^:O.K.Is it something soft like yoghurt?
: It' s hard.
frit's not hard,but it's not soft like yoghurt...Yoghurt is
almost sort of liquid.
C*. :What I mean is it's not a mousse or anything like that,wh¬
ich is sort of semi-solid.I mean it's harder than -
:It's harder than mousse.
:is it harder than ice-cream when, it's really hard?
:No - you'll kick'yourself.'
o^:...almost liquid...
f>:It's not almost liquid. You said that J
cK ;No ,you said it wasn't solid - you said yoghurt was almost
liquid and it's not a solid and it's as liquid as - -it's
more solid than that...Is it something I -Oh.'Clotted cream?
f> :No.
P :No.
No...not much mineral in that...
:Why do you keep on harping on mineral?It's animal and veg¬
etable.'
:0.K.Ice-cream is ruled out - you said before...
p sNo.
^ :O.K.It's a sweet we've had here once -or at a restaurant




^3 :No.It's a sweet.
& :I know,but I can't think of anything you bakei... sweet...1
mean is_ it sweet?I mean you said -
f, :Yesi
£,( :Yes,I knowiRight, it must be in that case... shortbread,
jb
oI:You've never baked anything else!
:I never said I_ baked it.
^ :...Baked apple?
:No.
^:Something in an Italian restaurant?
:You might have had it there - or you might have had it some¬
where else...
(A slt's not a kind of pie?
^ :No.
o( :Has it got fruit in it?
: Some kinds have but that would be misleading.




^:Damn it,what kind of sweet is this?
j5>:It's something so basic and easy you can't think of it.Do
you want to give up?Shall I give you a clue?
c* :Yes.
P? :Concentrate on the baking - what do you b.ak®.normally?




(etc.;the object - a particular cake - is not guessed)
Game 50*-
:Mineral.
gilt's mineral.Is the mineral stone?
d:Yes.
^ :Is it bigger than this building?
J,: No.
:Is it a landmark?
<A :Yes.
^:Is it in the centre of Edinburgh?
o^tYes.
|Jj : Can you see it from Princes Street?
J.: No.
£,:Can you get inside it?
:No.
:Would you consider it strange if you saw a Japanese man
photographing it?
CK 5 No.
jb :Would you consider it strange if you saw a Japanese man
sitting on top of it?
d 5Yes.
^:Is it located within a hundred yards of the Royal Mile
any point along the Royal Mile?
c^: No... but quite near.
:1s it a monument?
CK:Mm.. .yes.
:Is it older than a hundred years old?
«^:Uh...I don't think so.It may be...
(ji :1s it - has it got religious connotations?
^:Not in the sense you mean.
Would it be mentioned in a typical guide to Edinburgh?
:Yes.
:The Heart of Midlothian,
ol :No.. .What' s that anyway?
: (laughs) Oh, forget it - it's a spot on the ground near the -
Saint Giles...um,it1s made of stone,near the Royal Mile...




(jj : Fifteen, eh?... Could a Japanese man hide behind it and take
a pee and not be noticed by passers-by?
oJL:No. (laughs)
^>:Oh.Is it higher than - is it taller than the average Jap¬
anese man?
c^:In itself,no.
You've only got three left,
jjb :In itself?Wait a minute - in it self?.. .When you said it
was stone - this is recapping,sort of - you said it was stone-
it's all stone,I presume.
o(:Yeah.
:Therefore when you say 'in itself it's not taller than a
Jap ane seaman' ,um...
o(:That 's 'cos it's standing on something.
(jj : AhlThankyoul
- which is also stone,actually,but I'm just thinking of
the top bit.
|3:0h,you're thinking of the top bit.Is it something like a
spire?
iNOo
p:Is it more than twenty feet off the ground?
^jlfe.You've only got one left,






Interpretation of this output is straight-forward:the first Pa£Q
is typical output from the first stage of OG and is in LISP.The human
answerer thinks of an object following the command 'THINK OF AN OB¬
JECT' and answers either 'Y'(for 'yes') or 'N'(for 'no') - or 'CANT-
SAY' - following the prompt 'HEAD:'.The program's questions are LISP
atoms with question marks in brackets.The second page is the corr¬
esponding output of the second stage.
LISP?(NEWGAMEI

















(I GOT IT ! « ! )
L ISP:(NEWGAME)











(SHOES BELONGING WRITER ???)
READSN
(SHOES BELONGING MALE ???)
READS Y
(SHOES BELONGING EUROPEAN ???>
READS Y
(SHOES BELONGING BRITISH ???)
READ:Y
(SHOES BELONGING SCOTTISH ???)
READ:Y
(SHOES BELONGING INTHISROOM ???)
READ:Y
(SHOES BELONGING YOU ???)
READ:Y
(I GOT IT !f!)
